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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Ricardo J. Valencia 
Doctor of Philosophy 
School of Journalism and Communication 
June 2018 
Title: The Making of the White Middle-Class Radical: A Discourse Analysis of the 
Public Relations of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador between 
1980 and 1990  
This study explores the role of public relations in the formation of a collective 
identity of the activists of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador  
(CISPES) between 1980 and 1990. CISPES was a radical U.S.-based organization 
comprised of a majority of white college-educated members. CISPES had two goals: 1) 
stop the U.S. military assistance to El Salvador, and 2) support the Salvadoran 
revolutionary movements that were fighting a U.S.-backed government.  
Through interviews, discourse analysis and historical research, this work shows 
that CISPES used as currency the whiteness of its activists, in conjunction with its 
educational background, to influence public opinion and policy-making in the U.S.  The 
formation of CISPES as a white organization was partially achieved by continuous 
negotiations with Salvadoran radicals living in the U.S. Early in the 1990s, CISPES' 
collective identity as a white organization entered in crisis as internal debates on gender 
and race along with social changes in the national and international levels challenged 
dominant views and the status quo of whiteness and what this implies in political, social, 
and cultural spheres. This work proposes two models: the intersectional recruiting 
process and the ideological identity model of public relations. Both models were created 
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using dialectical methodologies that understand public relations and social movements as 
processes of permanent contradictions between social conditions and ideology/discourse 
creation. This dissertation has real applications because it reveals how activist public 
relations can help the global struggle for social justice. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
     
In February 1988, FBI Director William S. Sessions acknowledged that the 
agency carried out a “full international terrorism investigation” into the Committee in 
Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) between 1983 and 1985 (Shenon, 
1988). Sessions argued that the FBI once believed that CISPES, a U.S. activist 
organization, provided money and guns to the Salvadoran insurgency of the Farabundo 
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). The administration of President Ronald Reagan 
viewed the FMLN as a communist group backed by Washington’s principal geopolitical 
enemies: the Soviet Union and Cuba. By the end of 1985, the FBI ruled out the terrorist 
charges against CISPES and acknowledged that its activities were political and within the 
frame of the U.S. Constitution. The FBI apologized through the U.S. media; such an 
apology represented a public relations triumph for CISPES in its battle against President 
Reagan’s government and policies.  
Unlike other organizations that framed their work in the defense of human and 
religious rights in El Salvador (Smith, 2010), CISPES unapologetically sided with the 
FMLN by supporting the guerrilla-led revolutionary efforts in El Salvador. The 
organization held the U.S. government “directly responsible for unjust wars against the 
peoples of El Salvador and Central America” (CISPES, 1988, p. 1). Between 1980 and 
1990, Republican administrations and CISPES waged a public relations battle to 
influence both U.S. public opinion and the political establishment. The conflict took 
place in the halls of Capitol Hill, in the streets of America's larger cities, in the 
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newsrooms of U.S. media outlets, outside federal buildings, and on college campuses 
(Little, 1994).  
How did CISPES resist Reagan, who was one of the most popular presidents in 
the history of the U.S.? Previous research on the Central American solidarity movement 
in the U.S. (Smith, 2010) and testimonies collected for this dissertation concur that 
CISPES was, indeed, an organization primarily constituted by white college-educated 
radicals. This dissertation does not want to be tautological by repeating that white people 
use their white habitus to achieve their political goals (Bonilla-Silva et al., 2006). Rather, 
this work sheds light on the processes that led CISPES to become a white, college-
educated organization that had two types of audiences: a white political elite and a radical 
public. The making of CISPES involved a series of strategic and unconscious decisions 
made by its members through continuous negotiations with Salvadoran radicals. In this 
dissertation, I propose two models: 1) the process of intersectional recruiting and the 
ideological identity model of public relations. The first one shows how CISPES – a 
relatively homogenous organization– negotiated ideology, strategies and collective 
identities with Salvadoran refugees with ties to the insurgency of the Farabundo Martí 
National Liberation Front (FMLN). I show how the majority of CISPES’ activists 
followed a 6-stage path that explains how family themes and structural factors -such as 
level of education and race- facilitated the formation of a white organization.  The 
ideological identity model of public relations is an organization-centric archetype that 
describes the centrality of ideology and demographic makeup in the designing and 
implementations of public relations strategies. The ideological identity model of public 
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relations also shows that an organization and its collective identity are influenced by 
national and international social systems. 
No public relations studies can be found that examine the role of dominant 
identity markers (e.g., race, class, education) as resources used by activist organizations 
to influence the public sphere. A growing number of examinations in public relations 
addresses issues such as the relevance of social and symbolic capital inside corporations 
(Edwards 2009; Ihlen, 2005; Ihlen & Van Ruler, 2007; Ihlen, 2009), diversity and 
inclusion in organizations (e.g., Gallicano, 2013; Mundy, 2016), and racial identities of 
non-white audiences and public relations practitioners (Edwards, 2013; Len-Rios, 1995; 
Mundy, 2016; Murphree, 2004, Sha, 2006); however, just a handful of examinations have 
focused on the role of whiteness in the research and practice of  public relations (Logan, 
2011; Pompper, 2005; Vardeman-Winter, 2011).  
This dissertation provides a theoretical framework in which race is not only 
conceived as a dimension in the practice of public relations, but also as a force that 
modulates the assembling of organizational structures and the design of strategies, tactics, 
and discourses. In situations and places where whites are the majority, or where whites 
have access to more resources than non-white individuals, whiteness is an analytical 
category that can help the understanding of how organizations are formed. Lipsitz (2006) 
argues that “whiteness” possesses “cash values, profits made in housing, unequal 
educational opportunities available, inside networks that channel employment, 
international transfer of inherited wealth” (p. Vi). Literature on organizational 
management has proved how whiteness is an invisible, but central dynamic in 
organizational culture and power (Grimes, 2002). By including the role of ideology, class 
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and gender in the development of public relations processes, I understand whiteness in 
conjunction with other intersectional identities (e.g., Crenshaw, 1989; Varderman-Winter 
et. al, 2013). A perspective that understands social identities as the intersections of many 
other factors such as social class and gender reduces the possibility of essentializing a 
specific group of people, in this case, an organization with a majority of white activists. I 
am also aware that concepts of race are historic artifacts that change over time and are 
determined by social and contextual factors (Omi & Winant, 1994). To explain not what 
CISPES was, but how CISPES became, I looked at CISPES’ public relations material 
(e.g. internal documents, pamphlets, press releases) and interviewed 12 CISPES activists 
and allies. The combination of examining documents and interviews shows that collective 
identities, which are intersectional by nature, are negotiated in relation to political 
ideology. I show that CISPES built a unique set of discourses and crosscutting identities 
in the 1980s through the continuous negotiation of their political and strategic 
communication praxis.   
Previous research on the narrativization of Central American conflicts in the 
1980s has focused on how the U.S. media covered the issues (Bennett, 1990; Lenart & 
Targ, 1992; Smith, 2010), the relevance of counter public mobilization regarding El 
Salvador’s solidarity movement in the U.S. (Nepstad, 2001; Perla, 2010), and the 
rhetorical resources of the Reagan administration regarding Central America (Weiler & 
Pearce, 1992). However, none of these studies examine the types of discourses that 
radical organizations used in their public relations strategies to counter dominant 
narratives at this time, and little research addresses how intersectional identities shape the 
development and perception of those discourses.  
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 This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. The first one is a succinct 
historical overview of CISPES, and describes the context in which the organization was 
immersed. This historical account will help the reader understand social arenas in which 
CISPES attempted to influence Washington’s foreign policy. In chapter two, I review 
four streams of literature: 1) post-colonialism, race, diversity, and intersectional identities 
in public relations (Pompper, 2005; Mundy 2010, Varderman-Winter, Tindall & Jian, 
2013), 2) critical race theory and intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989, Frankenberg, 1993; 
Omi & Winant, 1994; Bonilla-Silva, 2006), 3) the formation of collective identities in 
activism (Bedford and Snow, 2000; D’emilio, 1983 de Volo, 2000; Nepstad, 
2001;Thompson, 1982, Viterna, 2016;), and 4) theoretical framework behind my dialectic 
methodology (Bourdieu, 1990, 1991; Foucault, 1992; Hall, 1991, 1992, 2000). This 
theoretical framework allows me to examine CISPES and the phenomenon of public 
relations activism at the organizational level- a dimension that connects individuals with 
larger forces in society, such as race, class, and gender (Viterna, 2016). 
 In chapter three, I describe the methodology of this dissertation and how I have 
operationalized the concepts and the limitations of my approach. This dissertation uses a 
mixed methods approach with strong historical perspectives. I use Hall’s (2001) 
discourse analysis to examine both the discourse formation (the creation of ideological 
messages) and the discourse practices (how those narratives were created). Bourdieu 
(1990), D’Emilio (1983) and Thompson (1988) are used to understand the dialectic 
relationships between structural factors (i.e., race and class) and language. This research 
is qualitative in nature. I got access to some of CISPES’ internal documents, which were 
the raw material for my discourse analysis. In addition, I conducted 12 in-depth 
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interviews with former CISPES staffers between September 25, 2017 and December 31, 
2017 in person or via Skype/telephone. 
 In chapter four and five, I show the results of the discourse analysis along with the 
examinations of in-depth interviews I conducted.  In chapter four, I provide an 
examination of discourses, campaigns and public relations strategies have been placed in 
chronological order to create a discursive trajectory of CISPES’s communications and 
their relation to historical events. Through the examination of interviews, I show the 
rationale CISPES activists used to select their discourses, strategic goals, and the ways in 
which they monitored the organization’s success. I also highlight several dissenting views 
that emerge in the interviews about the interpretation of history and collective actions. In 
the interviews, I ask participants about their personal history to understand the influence 
of intersectional identities such as race, class, and gender in their political mobilization 
and work in CISPES. In chapter five, I discuss the findings and propose a model of 
intersectional recruiting, as well as an ideological identity model of public relations. In 
chapter 6, I provide conclusions and discuss future avenues for research on race, public 
relations and activism. 
CISPES represents an example in history that shows a common practice in U.S. 
activism: white college-educated activists use their available resources (i.e. access to 
politicians and celebrities, knowledge of the media environment and organizing skills, the 
ability to monitor U.S. politics) to challenge the status quo and propose a radical agenda 
(Hobson, 2016; McAdam, 1986; Smith, 2010). This is also the story about how CISPES- 
as a white organization- was the product of the close relationship between Salvadoran 
immigrant-activists- many of them undocumented- and white radicals. Salvadoran 
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radicals in the U.S. were aware that the education and racial background of CISPES’ 
activists were assets that they lacked, and that they needed desperately in their struggle 
against Reagan.   
Theoretically, this dissertation contributes to the expansion of the fields of public 
relations and social movement theory through the use of critical race theory. The main 
argument of this dissertation is that public relations is one of the vehicles in which 
collective identities are activated, exchanged, negotiated and reformulated over time. 
This process of identity exchange is mediated by the ideology and demographic makeup 
of the organization, which serve as tools to reduce tensions and inspire the development 
of public relations material. To understand this, the organizational level is ideal because it 
allows us to see the relationship between national and international levels.  
In relation to the field of social movement theory, my research contributes to an 
understanding of how collective identities, especially whiteness, are historical processes 
deeply embedded in organizations. Previous examinations on social movement 
organizations have looked at the centrality of the construction of social identities and 
frames in transnational social justice (Gamson, 1991, de Volo, 2000; Melluci, 1989), but 
often overlook the organizational dynamics that facilitate the appearance of identities and 
collective messages. In this research, I examine the internal processes in which discourses 
and identities are formed within movements.  
Furthermore, this work reveals how race and class are assets for organizations that 
aspire to profoundly transform U.S. society. CISPES’s strategies may serve as an 
example for contemporary times, revealing an effective model of advocacy between 
white college-educated groups and immigrant activists. In this context, understanding 
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models of solidarity between U.S. activists and undocumented immigrants can serve to 
examine phenomena such as activism around DACA and the Dreamers movement. 
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Between 1981 and 1991, CISPES operated at the intersection of two axes: anti-
imperialist goals to stop U.S. intervention in El Salvador and the emergence of a radical 
left that challenged the New Right. CISPES’ commitment to the self-determination of the 
people of El Salvador echoes the goals of the Non-Aligned Movement (NOMA). 
Between 1950 and 1970, a group of Third World countries and national liberation 
movements built a coalition to push forward an agenda against colonialism and the 
imperialistic policies of both the United States and the Soviet Union (Prashad, 2007, 
2012). NOMA was a coalition of the “darker nations” who “longed for dignity, above all, 
but also the basic necessities of life (land, peace and freedom)” (Prashad, 2007, p. xv).  
By 1975, NOMA decreased its international influence while the Group of Seven, a bloc 
of rich countries (U.S., United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Japan and Canada) reasserted 
their collective power by pursuing an agenda aligned against NOMA (Prashad, 2013). 
NOMA’s geopolitical goals, along with the emergence of liberation movements in the 
Third World influenced the work of many social movements in the U.S. during this time. 
CISPES was one of the organizations inspired by the Third World Left in the U.S., which 
expressed their solidarity to revolutionary groups in Latin America, advocated for the end 
of U.S. hegemony in the region, and for the dismantling of race and class hierarchies 
(Pulido, 2006). This spirit was still alive when Reagan came to power with an ideology 
that unleashed neoliberal policies on the global economy (Prashad, 2007). 
In 1979, Nicaragua’s Sandinista Revolution created new political opportunities 
for national liberation movements in the Third World and for pro-Third World Left 
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organizations in the U.S. In July 1979, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) 
overthrew a 40-year ruthless dictatorship and implemented a mixed economy in which 
representative and participatory democracy operated simultaneously (Prevost & Vanden, 
1993). The success of the Sandinista revolution made Nicaragua a leader among 
progressive forces in Latin America and an active member of NOMA. In 1981, the 
Republican President Ronald Reagan was inaugurated and immediately implemented a 
hostile policy against Nicaragua and the emerging insurgency of the FMLN in El 
Salvador. In Reagan’s view (1983), both El Salvador's and Nicaragua's political situations 
originated in cold war logics of conflict: 
“The problem is that an aggressive minority has thrown in its lot with the 
Communists, looking to the Soviets and their own Cuban henchmen to help them 
pursue political change through violence. Nicaragua, right here, has become their 
base. And these extremists make no secret of their goal. They preach the doctrine 
of a ‘revolution without frontiers.’ Their first target is El Salvador.” (Reagan, 
1983) 
 
The inclusion of Central America in the ideological universe of Reagan dates 
back to July 1980, when a staff aide to the North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms 
introduced language in the Republican party platform to condemn the “Marxist takeover 
of Nicaragua and Marxist attempts to destabilize El Salvador and Guatemala” (Gutman, 
1988). The aide was John Carbaugh, who lobbied in favor for a white minority 
government in Zimbabwe in the 1960s. In July 1980, Reagan attempted to draw an 
aggressive stance toward Central America, differentiating his ideology from the “softer” 
position of democratic President Jimmy Carter. In 1981, Helms became the chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs where he advocated for a tougher 
policy toward the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.  Helms was a close ally of the 
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right-wing Salvadoran politician, Roberto D’Aubuisson and Chilean dictator, Augusto 
Pinochet- the former tied to the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in 1980 
(PNUD, 2017). In this context, groups of Latin American anti-communists, right-
wingers, neo-Fascists and neo-Nazis, along with benefactors and allies in the United 
States and Europe, formed a network dedicated to “overcoming the communist 
menace”(Anderson & Anderson, 1986). By 1980, the World Anti-Communist League 
(WACL), a collection of right-wing individuals, situated the battlefield against 
communism in Central America. Anderson and Anderson (1986) argue that anti-
communism in the 1980s was a political “chameleon able to change its colors, even its 
politics, at will” (p.263). Roger Pearson, a British-American member of the league, 
reveals racial debates that occurred inside these organizations:  
The problem was exacerbated by the South American group. They were anti-
communists but also believe the communists were Jews (…) These Latins tried to 
swing all of WACL over their side. They put some books and there was some 
truth in what they wrote-everyone knows some communists have been Jews-but 
ridiculous, really, saying all communist are Jewish (Anderson and Anderson, 
1986, p.102-103) 
 
Finally, Anderson and Anderson (1986) describe the flexible nature of the Anti-
Communist league: “When black Africans are not present, it talks about the democracy 
and bastion of freedom and prosperity for white-controlled South Africa; when black 
Africans are present, it talks about black Africa’s struggle against Soviet-Cuban 
aggressors” (p. 102).  This debate inside the far right reveals the complicated relationship 
between anti-communism and conservative discourses in the U.S. Reagan’s immigration 
amnesty of 1986 showed the disagreements between the Republican administration and 
the ideology of the far-right that pursued the end immigration flows to the U.S. (Omi & 
Winant, 1994). These three elements show the complexity of Reagan’s agenda: punitive 
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idealism, free-market absolutism and right-wing Christian mobilization (Grandin, 2006). 
Reagan’s interpretation of domestic conflicts in Central America was that the unrest 
depended on the Soviet and Cuban “adventurism” and the U.S. should act aggressively in 
order to stop any possibility of communist expansionism (Smith, 2010, p.20).  
Domestically, the ascension of Reagan represented the rise of the New Right in 
the U.S. conservative movement. This faction wanted to reduce the velocity of the civil 
rights movement that resulted in the rearticulation and relevance of a new black political 
identity (Omi and Winant, 1994). Black identities provided oppositional frameworks to 
traditional whiteness. In the 1980s, the political right reasserted a new white identity, 
after having been “rendered unstable and unclear by the minority challenge” in the 1960s 
and 1970s (Omi & Winant, 1994, p.120). The construction of a white neoconservative 
identity included the dismantling of political gains made by racial minorities, the 
reclaiming of individual interests over collective interests, and a systematic undermining 
of affirmative action initiatives in the federal government (Omi & Winant, 1994).  
At the beginning of the 1980s, whites represented the overwhelming majority of 
employees in U.S. political institutions. In 1981, only 6% of members in both chambers 
of the U.S. Congress belonged to a racial minority, despite the fact that almost 20% of the 
U.S. population was non-white (Bialik & Krogstad, 2017). In 1980, whites represented 
83 % of the 226.5 millions of U.S. citizens, while the percentage of Latinos was 6.4% 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). In 1980, 40% of the Latino population age 25 and older in 
the U.S. had an education of 9th grade or less and only 8% had a bachelor’s degree 
(Eisenach, 2016). In the same year, 17% of whites had a college degree (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 1999). In the early 1980s, only 9% of whites lived under the poverty line, while 
  
 
13 
25% of Hispanics and 33% of African Americans were poor (Plumer, 2013). The median 
household income for white families was a little under $50,000 a year, for Hispanics, 
under $40,000, and for African Americans, under $30,000 (Plumer, 2013). These data 
show the extent of racial inequality in the economic and cultural realms during the time 
CISPES was created. 
Internationally, U.S. foreign policy has regularly used cultural themes with racial 
undertones to describe foreign populations whom were subject to U.S. domination and 
hegemony. Central America and the Caribbean were especially targeted by these 
racialized discourses. Between 1885 and 1900, U.S. government officials hid any overtly 
racial discourse before the annexations of Spanish colonies in the Caribbean and Asia, 
but after Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines were finally in the hands of the U.S., 
more overt forms of racial language became commonplace (Love, 2005). In early 20th 
century, Julian Smith, a U.S. marine major, testified that “the racial psychology” of “the 
poorer classes” in Nicaragua made them “densely ignorant”, having “little interest in 
principles” (Grandin, 2006 p. 20).  In 1981, Jean Kirkpatrick (1981), who later became 
Reagan’s representative to the United Nations, locates Salvadoran political unrest in the 
culture of the Salvadoran subject, specifically; she argued that machismo is key in 
understanding “the nature of the world and the human traits necessary for survival and 
success” (p.508). She argues that there is a congruity between cultural traits and political 
patterns in El Salvador, which produces a “tendency to schism and violence within the 
political class.” Citing Hobbes, Kirkpatrick suggests -that on the verge of a clash between 
anarchy and civil war in El Salvador- the emergence of a strong leader such as the 
Christian Democrat, Napoleón Duarte, is necessary. 
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In addition to her view of the Salvadoran individual as prone to violence, she 
defends a perspective in which anti-communism is the metaframe that explains social 
unrest in Latin America. She states that: 
Ignoring the role of ideology had powerful effect in the administration’s 
perception of conflicts and on its ability to make accurate predictions. Although 
Fidel Castro has loudly and repeatedly proclaims his revolutionary mission, and 
backed his stated intention by training insurgents and providing weapons and 
advisers, Carter’s Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, William 
Bowdler, described Cuba as “an inefficient and shabby dictatorship-a description 
more appropriate to say Paraguay, than to an expansionist Soviet client state with 
troops scattered throughout the word. The refusal to take seriously, or event to 
take into account, the commitment of Fidel Castro or Nicaragua’s Sandinista 
leadership to Marxist-Leninist goals and expansionist policies made it impossible 
to distinguish them either from traditional authoritarians or from democratic 
reformers, impossible to predict their likely attitude toward the United States and 
the Soviet Union why in their view Costa Rica and Mexico as well as Guatemala 
and Honduras constituted invited target (p.510-511)  
El Salvador in the Congress 
Although the Reagan administration always viewed the FMLN and the 
Nicaraguan government as two intertwined actors (Grandin, 2006; Peace, 2012; Smith, 
2010; Walker 1987), this historical review focuses on the legislative processes in both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate between 1981 and 1991 rather than the rationale 
behind Reagan’s executive foreign policy. Literature on U.S.-Central American relations 
in the 1980s (e.g. Grandin, 2006; LeoGrande, 1998; Smith, 2010) and my examination of 
CISPES’ internal documents and the opinions of CISPES’ activist reveal that the 
organization understood the legislative branch as the arena in which they could 
effectively influence U.S. policy toward El Salvador. 
After Reagan’s presidential inauguration on January 20, 1981, the administration 
started its aggressive policy toward El Salvador and Nicaragua. Reagan tried to avoid at 
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all costs the insurgency efforts of the left-wing group, Farabundo National Liberation 
Front -a coalition created by five Marxist-Leninist organizations in October 1980. 
Simultaneously, the U.S. government continued its policy aimed at debilitating the 
Sandinista government, which possessed strong diplomatic and military ties with the 
FMLN, Cuba and the Soviet Union. On February 27, 1981, the National Security Council 
approved 25 million dollars in new military aid to El Salvador, which was more than El 
Salvador had received in aid since 1946. However, between 1981 and 1984, the 
administration had a hard time pursuing the House of Representatives with Democratic 
majority to fund its plans to escalate the confrontation with the FMLN and Nicaragua. 
The Senate had a Republican majority. 
 In the early years of the Reagan administration (1981-1984), Congress placed 
strict limits on American engagement with El Salvador in terms of personnel, (Gradin, 
2006). In December 1981, after a well-crafted strategy by democrats in both chambers, 
Reagan and Republicans were pressured to pass the International Security and 
Development Cooperation Act of 1981 that required the U.S. to certify the Salvadoran 
government in human rights as a condition to send military aid to El Salvador.  In 1981, 
U.S. aid to El Salvador totaled over forty  million dollars (GAO, 1990). However, the 
Reagan administration struggled with Congress for years to pass his requests for funding 
U.S. military presence in Central America. This was especially true in the House of 
Representatives. For example, in late 1983, both the House and the Senate voted in favor 
of banning military aid to El Salvador if the president did not certify that there were 
improvements in human rights in that country. The democratic representative, Michael 
Barnes, from Maryland, sponsored the bill in the House. In November 30, 1983, Reagan 
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vetoed the resolution. In March 1986, the House of Representatives rejected the 
president’s aid package to help the Nicaraguan insurgency, “Contras”, with 220 votes to 
210 (Smith, 2010).   
It took three years for the Reagan administration to get legislative approval of a 
military aid package to El Salvador that exceeded $200 million (GAO, 1990). In 1982, 
the National Security Council acknowledged that the administration was having “serious 
difficulties with U.S. public and congressional opinion” (Smith, 2010, p.27). The U.S. 
public was largely against any American intervention in Central America, which was in 
part, due to the trauma of the Vietnam War (Smith, 2010). To improve his chances of 
winning over Congress and U.S. public opinion, Reagan built a public relations and 
lobbying machine. 
Reagan’s PR complex 
Since the beginning of Reagan’s first term, the White House and the State 
Department used its insurmountable power to create news that strengthened its vision of 
the FMLN as an emerging communist threat.  In February 1981, the State Department 
leaked the document “Communist Interference in El Salvador” to the media, which 
supposedly confirmed that the FMLN was receiving arms from Vietnam’s communist 
government with the support of Cuba and Nicaragua (Smith, 2010).  The document 
written by the Bureau of Public Affairs of the State Department (1981) states: 
The evidence drawn from captured guerrilla documents and war material and 
corroborated by intelligence reports underscores the central role player by Cuba 
and other Communist countries beginning in 1979 in the political unifications, 
military direction and arming of insurgent forces in El Salvador” (p.1). 
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In the same document, the State Department argues that Shafik Handal, the 
general secretary of the Salvadoran Communist party –one of the five organizations of 
the FMLN- received an offer from the Vietnamese government:   
Continuing his travels between June 9 and 15, Handal visits Vietnam where he is 
received by Le Duan, Secretary General of the Vietnamese Communist Party; 
Xuan Thuy, member of the Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat; and 
Vice Minister of National Defense Tran Van Quang. 'I'he Vietnamese, as a "first 
contribution," agree to provide 60 tons of arms. Handal adds "the comrade 
requested air transport from the USSR.” 
 
Between 1981 and 1987, the White House and State Department continued to leak 
intelligence reports that tied the FMLN to Nicaragua, the Soviet Union and Cuba. In 
1982, the Reagan administration started to assemble a powerful strategic communications 
and lobbying machine aimed at winning over the legislative branch, improving the image 
of the executive branch in the U.S. public and receiving positive journalistic coverage 
(Grandin, 2006).  Public offices, think tanks and private entities participated in pushing 
the idea that the national security of the U.S. was in danger of Central American 
“communist” organizations such as the Sandinista government and the FMLN 
(Kentworthy, 1997; Smith, 2010).  
The U.S. government tied the FMLN to the Nicaraguan government in their 
public relations messaging (Smith, 2010). In 1983, Reagan signed the National Security 
Decision Directive 77 that created the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (Grading, 2006; Smith, 2010). The office was led by Cuban American 
exile Otto Reich, and it was staffed by CIA and military officials expert in psychological 
operations (Grandin, 2006). The goal of the office was to influence both domestic and 
foreign audiences. By May 1983, the White House invested over $400,000 to support the 
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work of private groups that defended Reagan’s anticommunist agenda (Smith, 2010), and 
Edelman Public Relations was hired by the National Endowment for the Preservation of 
Liberty to design a 25-page strategy to challenge democratic leadership who was critical 
of Reagan’s plans in Central America (Grandin, 2006).  
In 1984, the conservative think tank, the Heritage Foundation published a paper 
condemning the “left’s Latin American lobby” in Washington D.C. (Frawley, 1984). The 
think tank provided short descriptions of six U.S.-based organizations that attempted to 
dissuade the U.S. public and the executive branch that the “Salvadoran government 
shares power with the Marxist guerrillas operating in that country despite the fact that the 
government was chosen in free elections witnessed by hundreds of foreign observers.”  
The Heritage Foundation traced the movements against U.S. intervention in Central 
America back to “Radical Left Students for a Democratic Society”, an organization that 
built a grassroots network opposing the U.S. war in Vietnam, which promulgated leftist 
transformations in U.S. society (Gitlin, 1980). 
Regarding CISPES, the Heritage Foundation believed that leftist organizations 
followed the guidelines of Salvadoran insurgency:   
CISPES organizers in the U.S. seek to disassociate themselves from [Farid] 
Handal (an assassinated member of the Salvadoran Communist Party) and other 
foreign representatives of political or insurgent groups and instead are active in 
broad based coalitions that represent domestic groups like the National Council of 
Churches, organizations for the handicapped, Physicians for Social 
Responsibility, and the Democratic Socialists of America. CISPES, reports 
Waller, also publicly allies itself with affiliated movements like the National 
Network in Solidarity with the People of Nicaragua, Coordinadora de Solidaridad 
con el Pueblo Salvadoreño, and the Committee in Solidarity with Viet Nam, 
Kampuchea, and Laos. 
The Nicaraguan government responded to Reagan’s public relations campaign by 
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hiring a New York campaign public relations company. In February 1986, the U.S. firm 
Agenda International scheduled meeting between the Nicaraguan President, Daniel 
Ortega, and editorial boards of different newspapers (Boyd, 1986). According to media 
reports, Ortega’s government paid over $100,000 for the public relations campaign 
(Allen, 1986).  A White House spokesperson called the Sandinista effort as a “very 
sophisticated plan involving the media and also calls for a campaign of disinformation 
about the success or failure of the Contra there…It’s carefully worked out and a highly 
professional plan to influence the American people” (Allen, 1986). Since late 1970s and 
early 1980s, the Nicaraguan government and the FMLN had offered an alternative vision 
of their efforts through the creation of radical press agencies: New Nicaragua Agency 
(New Nicaragua Agency) and SALPRESS (de Mateo, 1988; Ortiz, 1990).  
The New Left 
In the 1980s, the Central American Solidarity Movement in the U.S. inherited 
many of the conditions, ideologies and tactics of the New Left. The Vietnam war 
provoked the emergence of new radical thinking and practice in the U.S., especially in 
important segments of the white, college-educated population (Gosse, 1993; Smith, 
2010). The New Left is the collection of political expressions that rejected the traditional 
interpretation of Marxism centered on class in the1960’s (Klimke, 2015). Organizations 
such as Students for a Democratic Society and the Black Panther Party channeled the 
dissatisfaction of young people toward consumer society, war, white supremacy, and 
global imperialism (Slobodian, 2015). Although the epicenter of the New Left has been 
traditionally located in the U.S. and Western Europe, Central America, especially El 
Salvador, experienced its own version of the New Left. In early 1970s, a wave of young 
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Salvadoran radicals disputed the hegemony of Salvadoran Communist Party as the only 
instrument of radical transformation and created guerrilla organizations that wanted to 
advance a socialist revolution through guerrilla warfare. Leaders of social movements, 
Catholic thinkers and communist dissidents formed the Salvadoran New Left (Chavez, 
2014). A similarity between the New Left in the U.S. and in El Salvador was that in both 
countries, radical mass mobilization did not originate in communist parties who 
traditionally embraced electoral politics. However, unlike the U.S., Catholics and 
Catholic institutions were central actors in the formation of a broad revolutionary 
ideology and praxis in El Salvador (Chavez, 2014; Nepstad, 2001). In the early 1970s, the 
Popular Liberation Front (FPL in Spanish)- one of the five organizations that later 
became known as the FMLN - acknowledged that the Salvadoran revolution had three 
sources of inspiration: Marxism, Leninism and Christianism (Alvarenga, 2016).  
In the U.S., white radicals of the New Left in 1960’s and 1970’s protested U.S. 
foreign intervention and favored radical politics in diverse ways. Some of them aligned 
their efforts with the lessons of the Black Panther Party, which called white people to 
organize other white people in order to challenge white supremacy (Hobson, 2016; 
Klimke, 2015). Some created feminist and gay collectives and others called for the 
independence of Puerto Rico (Berger, 2006). Some believed that dividing radical 
mobilization along racial lines could complicate the achievement of class-consciousness 
in the U.S. (Berger, 2006). However, many white radicals such as the clandestine 
organization, Weather Underground, emulated revolutionaries in Cuba and Vietnam 
through the implementation of violent tactics (Varon, 2004). In 1968, there were 236 acts 
of sabotage in the United States alone (Berger, 2006). The period from the late 1950s 
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until early 1970s represented the beginning of a struggle in the U.S. that would continue 
until the end 1980’s (Van Gosse, 1993). In those four decades, some U.S. radicals 
participated in solidarity movements in favor of Third World revolutions, and opposed 
what they saw as a U.S. imperialist agenda.  
CISPES came to life after an intense decade in which revolutions were seen as 
“logical” and “real” (Berger, 2006, p.8). Racial dynamics and radical politics have always 
interacted within the U.S. Left, but not always for the best. In 1930s, while the Socialist 
Party of the U.S. recruited white working class activists in the South, the communist 
party designed a strategy to enlarge their membership through the recruitment of African 
American rural workers in Alabama (Kelley, 2015). The difference of strategies between 
the two parties was based partially in the difficulty of establishing personal ties between 
white and black radicals. Some white communists were killed for helping to organize 
African Americans (Kelley, 2015).  On other occasions, black and white workers joined 
forces to challenge the status quo. During the early part of the twentieth century, the 
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) organized white and black workers in 
Philadelphia, and between 1910 and 1913, timber workers with membership divided 
between black and white defied Jim Crow laws in the Deep South (Goldfield, 1988). 
CISPES as an organization 
In words of one of its former members, CISPES “was the major expression of 
U.S. radical politics during the 80s, it was the only explicitly left current that operated all 
across the country” (Van Gosse, 1994). CISPES navigated a complex network of 
geopolitical and national events. At the geopolitical level, their ideological commitment 
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located them at the forefront of the struggle against the U.S. intervention in Latin 
America. Between 1900 and 1960, the U.S. military intervened dozens of times in Latin 
American countries, including once in Guatemala, twice in Nicaragua, six in Panama, and 
seven in Honduras (Prashad, 2007). In 1983, U.S. troops invaded Granada to overthrow a 
left-wing government, which, in Reagan’s words, was proof that the United States “was 
back and standing tall” (Lipsitz, 2006).  However, in 1979, in Nicaragua, the insurgency 
of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) overthrew the dictatorship of 
Anastasio Somoza, a member of a family clan who occupied the presidency for 40 years 
with the support of the U.S. In October 1980, five Salvadoran Marxist Leninist military 
organizations founded the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), which 
agreed on a political coalition with the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR in 
Spanish)- an organization comprised of Social Democrats and Social Christians.  
Unlike liberal organizations who advocated for reformist and domestic goals, 
CISPES had an internationalist view of the Salvadoran struggle as a conflict mainly 
provoked by the interventionist and capitalistic policy of the U.S. in Latin America and 
the Third World (Hobson, 2016). CISPES was founded in late 1980 in San Francisco, 
California (Gosse, 1987). It happened weeks before the FMLN’s first military offensive 
to San Salvador in January 10, 1981 and 10 days before Reagan’s inauguration. Van 
Gosse reveals that the antecedents of CISPES are the Bloque de Solidaridad-Farabundo 
Martí (the Solidarity Block) comprised by Salvadoran nationals and “a few key North 
Americans” who formed first the “U.S. friends of the BPR” (Popular Revolutionary 
Front, a mass organization inside the FMLN), which later created the “U.S. Friends of the 
Salvadoran Revolution” that later became San Francisco’s CISPES in the late 1980s 
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(Gosse, 1987, p.23). CISPES’ mission was to build a national movement to end U.S. 
support of the Salvadoran regime and to assist in the battle for self-determination of the 
countries of the Americas (CISPES, 2015).  CISPES belonged to a larger effort called 
Central American Peace and Solidarity (CAPSM), which was a coalition of secular and 
religious activists and civil society that attempted to frame the Salvadoran conflict as 
arising domestically in response to the brutality of Salvadoran state (Perla, 2008). Along 
with CISPES, there were other actors that operated under the umbrella of CAPSM such 
as the sanctuary movement in which religious volunteers assisted and advocate for 
undocumented Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees at risk of being detained by the U.S. 
immigration authorities (Coutin, 1993) 
With over 300 chapters and 60,000 members (Cunningham, 2005; Little, 1994), 
CISPES became one of the most relevant activist organizations against Washington’s 
foreign policy regarding Central America. In the beginning, the organization was formed 
by a coalition of organizations and grassroots movements, but by 1985, CISPES became 
a single organization with groups operating throughout the U.S. (CISPES, 20015; 
Donaghy, 1990; Van Gosse, 1987).  Through the mid 1980s, CISPES built a cohesive 
organization with a stable grassroots volunteer base and local and regional staffers with 
goal-oriented plans and campaigns (Van Goose, 1994). 
By 1987, CISPES had a national headquarters in Washington, D.C., and six 
regional offices that organized different chapters: Boston, New York, New Orleans, San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago and Boulder, Colorado (CISPES, 1988). CISPES hired 
a group of staffers who established contacts with the different regional officers and also 
designed political and communication strategies to affect policy debates concerning U.S. 
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foreign policy towards El Salvador (CISPES, 1988). Green (2014) defines the CISPES 
model in three factors: 
Three major factors contributed to the success of CISPES as a solidarity 
organization. The primary one was that CISPES based its program on the needs of 
the people of El Salvador, not on the priorities of political struggles here in the 
U.S. There was consultation with Salvadorans and direction taken from them but 
CISPES still remained an independent U.S. organization. Secondly, CISPES 
developed its programs by first making a thorough and careful analysis of the 
situation in El Salvador, Central America and the U.S., then formulating specific 
objectives and a comprehensive political strategy. The kind of program that would 
eventually be adopted flowed directly out of those objectives, strategies and 
analyses. The third factor in CISPES' success was the use of an active, systematic 
and rigorous methodology of outreach. That methodology was based on the idea 
that people do things because they are asked to do them. In practice that meant 
thousands of phone calls, and person-to-person recruiting. CISPES chapters, in 
other words, didn't just wait for people to come to them, but actively went out and 
organized people in their own communities. 
 
In the minds of CISPES’ activists, Reagan was signaling his intention to support 
the overthrow of the new Nicaraguan government and undermine the emergence of the 
FMLN, which was generally seen by U.S. activists as a grassroots expression of the 
Salvadoran people (Donaghy, 1990). Some of these U.S. activists had a history of 
involvement with the protests against the Vietnam War and believed their participation in 
protests against Reagan was a moral and religious commitment (Nepstad, 2001; Smith, 
2010). In the1980s, the anticolonial cause was also framed in racial terms, as race was a 
territorial category that signified the struggle of poor countries against a system of race 
distinction developed by European colonialism in the Third World (Omi & Winant, 
1994). 
Public relations strategies were central in CISPES. Many of the guidelines for 
messaging and media work emanated from the headquarters in Washington, D.C. 
(CISPES, 1988). These strategies were a combination of extreme and mainstream tactics 
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that included mass civil disobedience actions at U.S. governmental agencies, 
demonstrations in front of the United Nations’ headquarters in New York City, rallies 
with thousands of participants, pamphlets, meetings with local and federal legislators, 
bulletins, TV ads, media appearances in newscasts such as “ABC’s Nightline,” and 
documentaries (Little, 1994). CISPES’ information campaigns raised suspicions in the 
FBI regarding the relationship between the organization and the FMLN-an organization 
framed by president Ronald Reagan as a proxy armed movement in favor of Soviet and 
Cuban interests (U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence, 1989).  
In the 1980s, CISPES was a radical organization that inserted itself in debates 
about U.S. foreign policy (Donaghy, 1990; Little, 1994). By proposing the “end of U.S. 
intervention in El Salvador and all of Central America” through a relationship of “mutual 
independence and respect” with the Salvadoran movement (CISPES, 1988), CISPES 
went beyond the liberal call for the unrestricted respect of human rights (Smith, 2010). 
“We do not impose our own perspectives and ideologies on the Salvadoran people,” 
CISPES argued in its 1987 bylaws. In the same document, the organization made an 
official commitment to recruiting more activists of color into leadership positions. 
Although there is no available data about the demographic makeup of CISPES activists in 
the 1980s, a study on the Central America solidarity movement in the U.S. shows that 
over 90% of the activists were white, with an annual household income above the U.S. 
average, and with over 4 years of college education (Smith, 2010). CISPES is still active 
today, but this dissertation does not examine the organization after 1990. 
Through the examination of late 1970s and early 1980s, this chapter establishes 
connections between the debate around Reagan’s foreign policy and the rewiring of the 
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many views of race in the U.S. Although Reagan’s foreign affairs ideology was not white 
supremacist, it is also true that his foreign policy activated a series of racial discourses 
about Central America, which we can understand as “racial ideologies” (Haney-Lopez, 
1994; Hall, 1997; Picower, 2009) that narrate the conditions and possibilities of 
Salvadoran people (Mohanty, 1991) in relation to the communist menace. Reagan’s 
ambassador to the UN, Jean Kirkpatrick (1981) saw Salvadorans as people who could not 
rule themselves and needed iron fist governments. Thankfully for Salvadorans, she 
argues that the U.S. provided guidance and material support against the possibility of 
international communism endangering U.S. strategic interests. The same can be said 
about the case of CISPES. As an organization led and comprised of mostly white middle-
class activists, CISPES formed radical ideologies not only about race, but also about the 
nature of the Salvadoran civil war, the FMLN and U.S. foreign policy. CISPES appeared 
in a time when many discourses coexisted: the decentralization of class in the Left, the 
Third World as a center stage in the struggle against imperialism, the emergence of a new 
white conservative identity in the U.S., and the visibility of the FMLN as a grassroots 
coalition of Marxist Leninists, Christians, and Social Democrats. Through the 
examination of public relations, it is possible to understand the formation of collective 
identities in CISPES.  These identity formation processes can be understood using the 
complex lenses of critical race theory, postcolonialism and social movement theory. 
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CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Critical approaches to public relations have attempted to build their own paradigm 
for over three decades. Karlberg (1996) distinguishes mainstream public relations from 
critical public relations. In his view, instrumental research is conducted under the 
“premise that theories are instrument that function as guides to practice”, while critical 
examination is concerned with “critiquing the broader social, political and economic 
implications of public relations” (p 265). Karlberg criticizes mainstream public relations 
research for treating citizens and public interest groups as secondary actors and calls for a 
public relations research that empowers ordinary people and not only rich and influential 
organizations. Dozier and Lauzen (2000) echo some of Karlberg’s concerns. They call for 
public relations research that liberates itself from the obsessive examination of 
professional practice. Dozier and Lauzen understand public relations as an intellectual 
domain- a collection of knowledge about a phenomenon, instead of an area that serves 
corporate interests. Coombs and Holladay (2012) argue that traditional public relations 
has overlooked power, persuasion, and activism, and critical theories can help researchers 
understand these understudied dimensions.  These three examples show the emergence of 
a critical paradigm in public relations that conceptualizes the practice of public relations 
as a social and cultural phenomenon difficult to quantify (Munshi & Edwards, 2011).  
Critical approaches to public relations use an array of theories that originate in 
fields and traditions such as rhetoric, cultural studies, postcolonial studies, social 
movement theory, historical materialism and philosophy. In this literature review, I 
provide an account of different perspectives on the ties between activism, politics and 
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racial identity formation. The majority of these works come from the critical paradigm of 
public relations. Secondly, I connect those critical approaches to public relations with 
critical race theory.  In doing this, I show that scholarship of public relations needs to 
take into consideration that the creation of racial identities and racial discourse inside 
organizations reflect structural processes and inequality in society. Thirdly, I used social 
movement theory to place the debate of collective identity formation and the instruments 
of production and reproduction of identities inside activist organizations. Finally, in this 
literature review, I engage in a fruitful conversation with cultural studies in order to 
develop a sound methodology that reveals the intersection of structural demographic 
markers such as social class, race, gender and ideology-building in the praxis of public 
relations. The pillars of my methodology are Hall’s (1997) perspective on racial identities 
and discourse production, and D’Emilio (1983) and E.P. Thompson’s (1980) views of 
collective identities as an aggregation of cultural practices located in history. 
 Public relations, politics and activism 
This study is situated in the context of political public relations, which is defined 
in the following way: 
“The management process by which an organization or individual actor for 
political purposes, through purposeful communication and action, seeks to 
influence and to establish, build and maintain beneficial relationships and 
reputation with its key publics to help support its mission and achieve its goal” 
(Strömbäck & Kiousis, 2013, p. 2). 
 Political public relations focuses on political purposes, questions of the common 
good, and the relevance of volunteers and activists (e.g., Ledingham, 2001; Levenshus, 
2010). On the contrary, the focus of corporate public relations is on economic revenues, 
private actions, and the professionalization of their practitioners (Dozier & Lauzen, 2000; 
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Strömbäck & Kiousis, 2013). Political public relations embrace political action as a 
constitutive part of the field of study (e.g., Kiousis, Laskin, & Kim, 2011; Saffer, Taylor 
& Yang, 2013).  
From the political public relations perspective, CISPES may be defined as a 
radical activist organization because the group “comes together in opposition to 
something in their environment” and “they work outside of the system to express their 
objections” (Derville, 2005, p. 528). In this case, the organization wanted to change the 
foreign policy of the Reagan administration towards El Salvador. CISPES used 
informational, symbolic, organizing, litigation, and civil disobedience activities to 
influence U.S. policy toward El Salvador (Sommerfeldt, 2013). 
An important amount of research regarding activist organizations that pursue 
structural change has concentrated on communication strategies and tactics (Smith, 
2013). Activist organizations have used carnival-like demonstrations and occupations of 
buildings to influence public opinion and media coverage, (Weaver, 2010) and to bring 
attention to the negative environmental impact of corporations (Murphy & Dee, 1992). 
The use of extreme actions aimed at building identity inside the group’s constituency 
energizes the movement and stresses the idea that the system is skewed (Derville, 2005). 
Radical actions also tend to trigger the sharing of information among people who are 
informed about these types of events (Jahng, Hong & Park, 2014). However, little 
research on public relations focuses on how race, gender, and social class influence the 
narrative of organizations, and the relationship between multiple identities within 
organization and discourses they produce. 
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Racial Identities and whiteness in public relations 
There are only a few studies that examine how race and other intersectional 
identities impact the performance of public relations. A small number of publications in 
public relations journals are related to race, ethnicity and culture (Pompper, 2005). 
Pompper (2005) argues that public relations research has a position of ethnocentrism 
revolving around whiteness, not only in the selection of individuals for their studies but 
also in the theoretical frameworks behind their methodologies. Whiteness as a problem in 
the practice of public relations has been systematically understudied, even though white 
practitioners dominate the profession of public relations in the U.S. (Len-Rio, 1995; 
Logan, 2011). In public relations, intersectional identities should be understood as 
“individuals’ interdependent and simultaneous identities that affect how publics confront 
issues” (Vanderman-Winter et. al., 2013 p. 279). In public relations research, we can 
observe at least four perspectives on whiteness and intersectional identities in public 
relations: 1) the effect of whiteness and intersectional identities on public relations 
practitioners (Edwards, 2013; Len-Rios, 1995; Logan, 2011), 2) the effect of whiteness 
and intersectional identities on public relations audiences (Varderman-Winter et. al., 
2011), 3) the role of intersectional identities in conducting research (Varderman-Winter, 
2011), and 4) the role of diversity and inclusion strategies in public relations 
organizations (Mundy, 2016). 
In the first group, Logan (2011) claims that race is the most salient factor in 
choosing white managers- a situation that creates the “white leader” as a “prototypical 
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attribute of business leadership” (p. 443). In Logan’s reasoning, the archetype of the 
white public relations leader is “a historical discourse formation” in which all other 
professional roles revolve around. Her argument is built on the examination of data about 
25 leaders in the industry of public relations. She found that 18 out of 25 public relations 
leaders were white men, 7 white women, and two were people of color (one Asian and 
one Hispanic). Through the eyes of Critical Race Theory (CRT), she concludes that in a 
society that claims colorblindness, whiteness still symbolizes possession, while blackness 
symbolizes dispossession. This translated into the practice of public relations means that 
whites are not only located in the higher echelons of the industry, but they set the 
standard for the profession. 
Research demonstrates that practitioners of color have difficulty being upwardly 
mobile in corporations. Practitioners of color expressed their satisfaction in being part of 
the industry, but simultaneously acknowledge that whites are still perceived as actors 
who can reach wider audiences than practitioners of color (Edwards, 2013; Len-Rios, 
1995). Thus, whiteness has been historically constructed as a proxy for relatability to 
clients. In the mid 1990s, participants exemplify the conflation of whiteness with 
economic prestige in the practice of public relations:  
“Several years ago she (the practitioner) said had an interview with a PR firm and 
they have her the bottom line. She asked, ‘why don't I have an opportunity here?’ 
and the agency people just came back and told her “If I go down my client list and 
I send a minority over there representing a business, one example is an exclusive 
resort area, basically they don't have a lot of black visitors” (Len-Rios, 1995, p. 
544). 
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Almost twenty years later, public relations practitioners of color still feel pressure 
to manage their own ethnicity, while trying to avoid being labeled as “ethnic 
professionals” by their bosses. The industry has a tendency to hire white professionals 
who resemble the demographics of their white managers (Edwards, 2013; Logan, 2011).  
However, practitioners’ racial identity does not only influence the hiring and promotion 
processes, but also how they create cultural artifacts and engage in relationships with 
clients and media professionals (Edwards, 2013). 
The influence of identity markers in audiences has also been studied in public 
relations. Varderman-Winter, Jang and Tindall (2013) use the concept of intersectionality 
as a tool to understand the complexity of the audience in public relations campaigns. 
Intersectionality originates in black feminist theory and means that the identity of 
individuals lie at the crossroads of many identity markers such as gender, race and social 
class (Crenshaw, 1989), Varderman-Winter et al. (2013) criticize the way corporations 
segment audiences according to gender and call for a more sophisticated way of 
measuring the impact of campaigns on the receivers. Using quantitative methods and 
social identity theory, Sha (2006) shows that individuals’ racial identities have an effect 
on the way publics process public relations campaigns. In Sha’s view, publics of color, 
especially African-Americans, report more engagement on issues related to race than 
their white peers. Sha (2006) argues that recipients have two types of collective identities: 
“avowed identity” and “ascribed identity” (p. 52). Avowed identity is the identity that 
individuals choose and define for themselves, and the ascribed identity is the identity that 
society assigns to individuals. 
Whiteness as a methodological constraint has been rarely studied with the 
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exception of Varderman-Winter’s (2001) study. She shows how the race of researchers, 
especially Varderman-Winter’s background as a white woman, can influence the results 
of health campaigns. Using Frankenberg’s concept (2000) of whiteness, Varderman-
Winter finds that race matters in the way women of color create meaning in health 
campaigns, but her findings are inconclusive as to whether the effect is positive or not. 
Sha and Varderman-Winter suggest that the effect of race is often greater for audiences of 
color than white publics. As a consequence, the locus of the process of racialization in 
public relations is the individual of color who complicates the reception of the message 
and the role of the researcher. A similar assumption can be seen in diversity and inclusion 
strategies in public relations organizations. Mundy (2016) proposes a perspective that 
understands diversity as an essential requirement in organizations, and not merely as 
strategic resource for profits and public recognition. Businesses, he argues, transform 
diversity into a commodity. This transformation has not solved the difficulties in 
recruiting and retaining minorities for positions of leadership. To remedy this, Mundy 
proposes a two-pronged model: 1) structural and cultural and 2) internal and external 
dimensions. Structural dynamics are the ones “communicating the policies and programs 
that aid individuals professionally while conveying the benefits of recruiting and 
retaining diverse employees,” while cultural dynamics are the ones “exploring individual 
difference as a way to help organizations evolve while responding to external cultural 
mandates from the communities an organization serves” (p. 3). 
Mundy’s analysis shows the elusive nature of diversity and inclusion efforts in the 
corporate world. This is because public relations theory has traditionally treated the 
process of racial identity formation as a dynamic happening inside the minds and the 
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context of people of color, rather than a social construction that involves social and 
organizational dynamics. Using an alternative paradigm, Pompper (2005), Logan (2011) 
and Edwards (2013) argue that the racialization of public relations makes whiteness the 
default, or standard of public relations practice. Scholars of critical public relations are 
aware of this and propose that public relations can also be used as tools of resistance 
against structural racism, neocolonialism and neoliberalism. 
Public relations as resistance 
In public relations, postcolonial approaches highlight connections between 
neoliberal economies and colonialist and imperialistic rationales. Munshi and Kurian 
(2015) argue that public relations can help networks of activists in their struggle against 
hegemonic discourses, especially regarding climate change and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. They argue that the main goal of activist public relations is building “sustainable 
citizenship,” which revolves around the idea of “democracy that resists hegemonic 
power” and calls for a “subaltern politics to build relationships” (p. 406). Munshi and 
Kurian state that one of the goals of the public relations of resistance is crafting 
“alternative narratives that can challenge structures of power wielded by dominant 
coalitions” (p.406). Alternative discourses should challenge elite voices and align with 
vulnerable populations. Dutta (2015) claims that colonialism is “structured into new 
relationships of material flow that simultaneously reproduces the structure of U.S. 
imperialism, reconfigured under the logic of neoliberal governance.” In this sense, 
subaltern populations both in the developing world and inside developed countries, 
receive an image of reality in which neocolonial and neoliberal discourses are embedded. 
Dutta conceives postcolonialism as a framework that understands public relations as a 
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dialectic of global capital and neocolonialism, and how these two forces build a narrative 
of empowerment that works “toward serving specific neoliberal goals of privatizing 
public resources” (p. 253).  
Inspired in postcolonial theory, Curtin and Gaither (2005) understand the process 
of public relations in five moments of interaction: 1) consumption, 2) production, 3) 
identity, 4) representation and 5) regulation. This model, called the circuit of culture, was 
first developed by cultural theorists (Du Gay et. al, 2013) and later applied by Curtin and 
Gaither to public relations. The circuit of culture is an alternative framework to the 
“functional” and “linear-transmission-based” tradition led by James Grunig (i.e. Grunig 
& Hunt, 1984; Grunig & Grunig, 2008; Grunig & Huang, 2000). Hon (2015) also 
expands the view of public relations beyond the practitioner scale and device a digital 
social advocacy that understands public relations in four dimensions: antecedents, 
processes, digital media ecosystem and consequences. In antecedents, Hon includes 
structural forces such as social class, race and gender that facilitate the social 
mobilization of collective actors.  
Understanding public relations as the overlap of structural, organizational and 
personal dimensions also complicates the notion of racial identities. Race cannot be 
quantified and predict outcomes as the instrumental paradigm expects. On the contrary, a 
critical examination of race in public relations requires instruments that explain racial 
identity formation, especially whiteness, as a complex social and cultural construction 
that is historically located (Munshi & Edwards, 2011).  Critical Race Theory is one of 
those instruments because it involves understanding racial policies as both material and 
ideological.  These larger social forces do not only affect minorities, but also shape 
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radical social movement organizations that have an overwhelmingly majority of white 
members. 
Identity as a dialectic structural process 
Critical Race Theory is a set of accounts about how law and other political 
mechanisms function to establish, protect, and reproduce white racial power in the U.S. 
(Logan, 2011). Critical Race theorists argue that the construction of whiteness is the 
power-dominance benchmark and the standard in the U.S. (Pompper, 2005). Lopez 
(1997) defines race as “historically contingent social systems of meaning that attach to 
elements of morphology and ancestry” (p.10). Lopez provides more details about the 
three interrelated levels of race: physical, the social, and the material: 
First, race turns on physical features and lines of descent, not because features or 
lineage themselves are a function of racial variation, but because society has 
invested these with racial meanings. Second, because the meanings given to 
certain features and ancestries denote race, it is the social processes of ascribing 
racialized meanings to faces and forbearers that lie at the heart of racial  
fabrication. Third, these meaning-systems, while originally only ideas, gain force 
as they are reproduced in the material conditions of society. The distribution of 
wealth and poverty turns in part on the actions of social and legal actors who have 
accepted ideas of race, with the resulting material conditions becoming part of 
and reinforcement for  the  contingent  meanings understood as race.” (p.10) 
Lopez’ concept moves beyond understanding race as simply people’s skin color and 
taking it into the sphere of power, politics and law-making. 
 In a similar fashion, Frankenberg (1993) defines whiteness in three ways: as 1) “a 
location of structural advantages of race privilege,” 2) a “standpoint” from which white 
people look at themselves, and 3) a “set of cultural practices that are usually unmarked 
and unnamed” (p. 1). The materiality of whiteness (i.e., access to home loans and to 
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political elites) is interconnected with the discursive dimensions of being white 
(Frankenberg, 1993; Lewis, 2004; Bonilla Silva, 2006). Frankenberg operationalizes the 
materiality of whiteness as personal experience and economic advantage and the 
discourse dimension as the meaning of those personal experiences in constructing a 
cultural identity. Whiteness is both a “possessive investment” and “identity” that have 
“real consequences for the distribution of wealth and prestige and opportunity” (Lipsitz, 
2006, p.vii). Whites, Lipsitz argues, suffer less exposure to environmental hazards, 
residential segregation and home ownership discrimination. The “cash value” of 
whiteness allow individuals in this social group to access inside networks that help them 
find better employment than racial minorities in the U.S. (Lipsitz, 2006, p. xvii). Both 
Lipsitz and Frankenberg reject any biological or cultural explanation of race inequalities; 
they argue that the organization of social structures, material privilege, and racial 
narratives put whites on top of the racial hierarchy. Omi and Winant (1994) conceive 
racial stratification as the process of selection of a “particular human feature for purposed 
of racial signification.” Racial stratification is both structural and ideological and its 
perception is mediated by an array of competing racial political projects. In each society, 
we can find a multitude of racial political projects that attempt to reshape the form of the 
hegemonic racial stratification. The creation of a collective identity of the white working 
started took place during the first 65 years of the ninetieth century. Roediger (1999) 
argues that the American “(r)evolution helped to change the social meaning of whiteness 
by creating new possibilities –realized during the accelerated formation of the working 
class in the ninetieth century- to conflate terms like freeman or independent mechanic 
with white” (p.21). Between 1960 and 1980, the hegemonic racial project in the U.S. was 
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colorblindness, which rests on the idea that racial differences should be overlooked 
(Bonilla-Silva, 2006). Establishing a racist regime is not the only reason for the existence 
of spaces with a majority of white individuals (Lewis, 2004). The composition of 
overwhelmingly white settings is not random, Lewis explains, and is due to three 
phenomenon: a political commitment to exclusive policies in favor of white supremacy, 
2) the outcome of exclusive policies at a different levels (social clubs), and 3) the 
outcome of long histories of racial exclusion, even if those discriminatory policies are not 
pursued actively or aggressively in the present time (e.g., universities). Whites belong to 
a heterogeneous group with multiple ways to perform and recreate their identity and 
social advantages (Lewis, 2004). Whites may be aware of those advantages, but many of 
them do not label them as white privilege (Hartmann et. al, 2009). Bonilla-Silva (2006) 
claims that social class and other identities reinforce or diminish the racial prejudices of 
whites toward other minorities: “Those at the bottom of the racial barriers tend to hold 
wages of whiteness in support of the racial status quo. Whether actors express 
“resentment” or “hostility” toward minorities is largely irrelevant for the maintenance of 
white privilege” (p. 8). 
Racial inequality does not only manifest as active hostility toward people of color. 
Through in-depth interviews with over 200 participants, Di Tomaso (2013) finds that the 
ultimate privilege of whites are their the capacity for not being racist, because the “acts of 
favoritism that whites show to each other through opportunity hoarding and the exchange 
of social capital” contribute most to continued racial inequality and unequal outcomes 
(p.6). Di Tomaso defines opportunity hoarding as “passing along access to good jobs to 
their friends and family members” (p.9). Resources, in her view, are group-based, not 
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individually-based -an argument implying that individuals tend to share the resources 
between the people they interact with the most, in this case, whites tend to interact more 
whites, so their resources are enjoyed mostly by other white individuals. Di Tomaso 
shows how some blue-collar workers were embedded in a network that allowed them to 
get jobs with the help of their friends from school and, on one occasion, to send their kids 
to Ivy league universities. In more integrated, multiracial communities, race and class 
relations still work in favor of white elites. Mayorga-Gallo (2014) argues that spatial 
proximity does not lead to more interracial interactions or relationships, on the contrary, 
white, urban and middle class inhabitants in multiracial neighborhoods create the closest 
social ties with other whites, and delineate the types of “acceptable” behaviors between 
the individuals of the community.  
As an answer for long-standing class and racial inequalities, radical and liberal 
whites have been at the forefront of social justice since the 1960s (Lipsitz, 2006). They 
have created networks of activism that have addressed domestic and transnational 
injustices including the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s (Fernandez & McAdam, 
1988) and the Central American Solidarity Movement in the U.S. in 1980s (Courtin, 
1993; Nepstad, 2001; Smith, 2010). Whites in radical organizations, especially women, 
experience interracial relations in a different way than whites without political activity 
and their views about Latinos in general were more positive than their views toward 
African-Americans (Frankenberg, 1993). Racialization involves many different 
processes, especially regarding racial minorities. Pulido (2006) reveals the existence of 
“differential racialization” which is “the fact that different groups are racialized in 
distinct kinds of ways” (p.24). Like Frankenberg (1993) reveals in whites, Pulido shows 
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that, depending on the time, place and context, particular groups of minorities may be 
“subordinate, dominant, or some in an intermediate position” (p. 24), and geography also 
plays a role in this differential racialization. 
Race is not a standalone identity. Through the examination of black feminism in 
law studies, Crenshaw (1989) observes that there is not a single source of oppression in 
the case of African American women. To explain this complex process, Crenshaw uses 
the concept of intersectionality to describe oppression “like traffic through an 
intersection, which may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident 
happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of 
directions and, sometimes, from all of them” (p149).  Thus, intersectionality theory 
conceptualizes race as working in tandem with a multiplicity of social identities, such as 
class, gender, sexuality, ability, etc. 
Stuart Hall (1982) argues that race, as collective identity, performs a heuristic 
function of informing African American about their position in the society.  
“Race is therefore not only an element of the 'structures; it is a key element in the 
class struggle and thus in the cultures - of black labour. It is through the 
counterideology of race, colour and ethnicity that the black working class 
becomes conscious of the contradictions of its objective situation and organizes to 
fight it through, ” he explains (p. 347).  
Intersectionality does not only appear inside national-states, but also reflect 
geopolitical relationships between hegemonic populations and subordinate ones. Wekker 
(2016) explains that the construction of “white innocence” in the Netherlands is related to 
the history of the country as a geopolitical empire and principal actor in the slave trade. 
White innocence in the Netherlands, she explains, is constructed comparing through the 
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framing of the Dutch as “an innocent, fragile” country versus “a guilty, uncivilized, 
barbaric other, which in the past decades has been symbolized mostly by the Islamic 
other, but at different times in the recent past blacks (i.e. Afro-Surinamese, Antilleans, 
and Moluccans) have occupied that position” (p.15). Mohanty (1991) reveals how the 
construction of hierarchies in colonial India was related to the construction of racial 
ideologies that justified the primacy of white colonizers. Relatedly, Gilroy (1995) and 
Fanon (2008) show that the construction of blackness was a global project that put white 
men at the center. Gilroy (1995) explains that nationalist, racist and absolutist discourses 
have attempted to build an artificial identity gap between being black and European. As 
an alternative, he locates a transnational sphere called the “Black Atlantic”, which is “the 
stereophonic, bilingual, or bifocal cultural forms originating from, but no longer the 
exclusive property of, blacks dispersed within the structures of feelings, producing, 
communicating, and remembering” (p.3).  
Fanon (2008) took a more structural route in explaining the interplay between 
social structures and psychology in colonial mentality. He argues that the black psyche is 
a product of a social relationship in a colonized system in which the white individual 
exerts power, not only over the modes of production, but in the production of taste, use of 
language and emotionality.  Fanon proposes an ontology of the colonized that is negative. 
This ontology is embodied in the daily interactions of the Black man through “a racial 
epidermal schema” (p.89) 
Ontology does not allow us to understand the being of the black man be black; he 
must the black man be black; he must be black in relations to the white man. 
Some people will argue that the situation has a double meaning. Not at all. The 
black man has a no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man. (p.90) 
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Fanon assures that the negative ontology of the black individual consists of 
aspiring to be a white man and aspiring to be included in the society. In his view, black 
women want to marry a white man to become a member of dominant society, while a 
black man seduces a white woman to feel that he is dismantling the oppression, which he 
has been subject to. In these two examples, it is possible to see how Fanon observed the 
interaction between corporality, social structures and social psychology in the French 
Antilles.  
Another factor that Fanon stresses is the use of natural sciences and social 
sciences to naturalize the structural oppression of colonization. He echoes a study of 100 
Kenian “normal” brains in which Western scientists found inherent brain inferiority 
(p.13). The same applies to studies of the French psychoanalyst, Octave Manonni, on the 
complex of the colonized. Fanon contradicts Mannoni’s notion that the inferiority 
complex in the colonized is latent from childhood, long before any encounter with the 
colonizers. Fanon disagrees: 
Here we see the mechanism at work in psychiatry, which explain there are latent 
forms of psychosis that become evident following a traumatic experience. And in 
surgery, varicose 
veins in a patient are caused not by having to stand for ten hours, but rather by the 
constitutional weakness of the vein walls; the work mode merely deteriorates the 
condition further, and the employer’s responsibility is assessed to be very limited 
(p. 66). 
 
As we have seen in sociological approaches of critical race theory (Frankenberg, 
1982; Omi & Winant, 1994), intersectional literature on black feminism in the U.S. and 
whiteness in Europe (i.e. Crenshaw, 1989, Wekker, 2016) and postcolonial approaches to 
race (Fanon, 2008; Gilroy, 1997, Mohanty, 1991), the construction of racial categories, 
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especially the formation of whiteness in the U.S., is strongly related to the hegemonic 
role of the West, colonial legacies in the Third World, class hierarchies that position 
racial/ethnic minorities at a disadvantage and gender dynamics that aggravate the 
vulnerability of women of color. At the same time, the literature aforementioned confirms 
that an intersectional analysis of collective identities can situate the study of racial 
identities as a departure point. Considering the role of racial identities in strategic 
communications and organizations allows the researcher to expand the boundaries of this 
examination to include other channels of identity such as class, gender and sexuality in 
relation to the data. In this dissertation, I understand CISPES as a white setting that 
produces complex collective identities informed by political ideology. In this white 
setting, ideology plays a fundamental role as an organizing factor and disciplinary 
guideline for the organization. In the next section of the literature review, I will explain 
different concepts of identities and the role of identity formation in social movement 
organizations such as CISPES.  
Identities and social movement organizations 
 Hall (1981) distinguishes three conceptions of identities: the Enlightenment 
identity, the sociological and the postmodernist. The identity from the Enlightenment 
views identity as core of the human individual who has the capacities of reason, 
consciousness and actions. The sociological identity shows that the “awareness that his 
inner care of the subject was not autonomous and self-sufficient, but was formed in 
relation to ‘significant others’, who mediate values, meanings and symbols” (p.276).  The 
sociological identity connects the internal world of the individual with public worlds and 
greater society. Lastly, the postmodern identity has no essential or permanent nature, and 
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is a “moveable feat” “formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are 
represented or addressed in the cultural system which surround us” (p. 277). In the 
postmodern approach, identities are contradictory and are not aligned to structural factors 
such as race, social class and gender dynamics. 
Much of social movement theory attempts to understand the construction of a type 
of sociological identity that ties individuals to mobilizing actions and political structures 
and opportunities (McAdam, 2010; Mellucci, 1988). Some conceptualizations of social 
movements highlight the centrality of collective identities in social change. Social 
movements (SMO) are “organized groups challenging state institutions chiefly outside 
institutionalized political channels” (Bob, 2001, p. 38). Snow et al. (2008) explain that 
social movements are entities with “some degree of organization” that challenge or 
defend authority (p. 11), but also function as networks of activists and organizations 
(Krinsky & Crossley, 2014). Social movement organizations (SMOs) are complex and 
formal organizations that identify their goals in relation to a social movement, and against 
a counter movement  (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). In this case, CISPES is a SMO inside a 
broader social movement that aligns itself against the U.S. military and political 
intervention in Central America and, especially, in El Salvador. Organizations like 
CISPES create transnational advocacy networks that share ties with a diverse array of 
stakeholders such as organizations in civil society, the media, governments, and 
international organizations (Keck & Sikkink, 2014).  
Melluci (1989) argues that social mobilization occurs not because of macro-
structural forces (i.e. structure vs. superstructure in Marxist theory) or by individuals’ 
motivations (rational choice theory). Collective action, he assumes, is the product of 
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“purposeful orientation developed within a field of opportunities and constrains” (p.25). 
Melluci presents a constructionist model in which individuals construct their actions by 
creating cognitive possibilities and horizons while simultaneously defining their mode of 
mobilization. Through this perspective, social action is the product of interactions and is 
difficult to predict. Collective identity is at the center of this model, as Melluci elaborates 
his concept of identity in SMOs: “(c)ollective identity is an interactive and shared 
definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the 
orientation of their action, as well as the field of opportunities and constrains in which 
their action takes place.” Collective identity processes have three dimensions: 1) creating 
cognitive schemas related to goals, means and environment actions, 2) activating 
relationships between individuals and 3) making emotional investments. In short, the core 
of Melluci’s social action resides in interpersonal interactions, which forms the “we” 
inside social movements organizations.  This “we” is not a byproduct of class-
consciousness (Lenin, 1977), political structures (McAdams, 2010) or resource 
accumulation (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). For Mellucci, identities are the result of 
unconstrained interpersonal exchanges. By examining anti-Vietnam war protests in the 
1960’s and the movement of Solidarity with El Salvador in 1980s, Gamson (1991) 
extends Melluci’s tradition and locates the formation of collective identities in the 
interactions between activists.  Collective identity, as a sociocultural phenomenon in 
which diversity of individual identities coincides, is manifested through symbols and 
discourses. According to Gamson, collective identities have three layers: the 
organizational, movement and solidarity. He explains the difference between the three 
dimensions: 
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The organizational layer refers to identities built around carriers-the union maid 
or the party loyalist, for example or may not be embedded in a movement layer 
that is broader particular carrier. The identity of peace activists, for example, not 
rest on any particular movement carrier; many support different at different 
moments while subordinating all carriers to their movement identity. Finally, the 
movement layer may or may not be embedded solidary group identity, 
constructed around people's social location as workers (p.41). 
Friedman and McAdam (1992) argue that respect for specific rules that are 
connected to a collective identity is recreated within individual cognition and inside an 
organizational setting. Collective identities are “shorthand designations announcing 
statues- a set of attitudes, commitment and rules for behavior- that those assume the 
identity can be expected to subscribe” (Friedman & McAdam, 1992, p.157). De Volo 
(2000) proposes the concept of mobilizing identities, which are “idealized” symbols 
“promoted by the state or contending parties to create a collectivity out previously 
unorganized individuals and through this collectivity shape and channel their actions” 
(p.129). Mobilizing identities are strategically organized and structured by an activist 
organization and arise from the adversarial “we” versus “they”, in which “we” is 
constructed through interpersonal appreciation and the “they” through blaming the 
Contras –a U.S. backed Nicaraguan paramilitary force- and the U.S. government for the 
death of their children. The essence of mobilizing identities for De Volo is above all 
discursive, not structural. In her study of mothers in the Nicaraguan revolution, she 
assures that identity was not organic and was created by the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN in Spanish) in order to blame the counterrevolution, sponsored 
by the U.S., of the death of their children. The interactions between social movement 
organizations, state actors, and the opposition also determine the types of mobilizing 
identities. Bernstein (1997) explains why the LGBT community manifested their 
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identities in different ways according to region. While strident protests were common in 
New York City; in Oregon, LGBT collectives had a calmer, more dialogical strategy. The 
opposition of political elites against LGBT collectivities in New York led them to 
construct more adversarial identities than in spaces like Oregon 
De Volo’s vision of collective identities as essentially symbolic coincides with 
approaches to mobilizations in rhetoric and public relations. Burke (1989) argues that 
identities are “a set of interrelated terms all conspiring to round out their identity as 
participants in a common substance of meaning” (p.182). Rhetoric is the bridge “from 
faction to the universal” that creates collective “consubstantiality” (p.181-83). In Burke, 
“collective consubstantiality’ can be understood as a destination in the process of 
constructing collective identities, the transition from individual consciousnesses to 
collective “esprit de corps.” In New Zealand, narratives build collective identities in 
activist public relations against genetically modified products in New Zealand 
(Henderson, 2005). Advocacy groups managed identities through the tension between 
two narratives: New Zealand as a center of research excellence vs. New Zealand as a 
green paradise. Inspired by Charland (1987), Gallicano (2009) also shows that advocacy 
organizations use “constituitive rhetoric” as a tool to build loyalty inside organizations 
(p.323). Constitutive rhetoric is a strategy that displays public’s identity and ideology 
inside narratives or messages (Gallicano, 2009). Advocacy organizations formed a 
collective identity by referring to the staff and the members as collective family. 
Narratives were also important in the formation of transnational identities among 
activists involved in the Central American Solidarity movements of the 1980’s. In the 
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mid-1980’s, the U.S. Sanctuary Movement, an effort lead by U.S. citizens with strong 
religious ties, did not only address issues aimed at helping Central American refugees and 
stopping U.S. intervention in Central America, but also created stories that resonated with 
the identities of U.S. middle-class lives of the activists:  
Sanctuary worker’s critiques of inauthenticity focused on those aspects of middle 
class U.S. life that participants considered causes or products of poverty, injustice, 
and human rights abuses in El Salvador and Guatemala. These included 
alienations, consumerism, normalcy, secularism, individualism, materialism and 
numbness. (Coutin, 1993, p.157) 
Coutin (1993) described how Teressa Newman, an activist, compared her middle-
class life in the U.S. to the poverty of a Guatemalan community in order to critique 
abundance and consumerism connected to middle class life in the U.S. Teressa explains 
“Guatemalans laughed at North American visitors who brought suitcases full of clothes 
for short stays” (p.158). The effort of U.S. middle class activists to accompany 
undocumented refugees represented also an “encounter with the truth” (p.57). This 
interaction transformed the identities of American activists:  
“The problematic nature of being American led some sanctuary workers to define 
themselves as “North American” or less frequently, “Internationals.” Peter 
Lockhart, an EBSC volunteer, argues that it was arrogant to call oneself simply 
“American.” Peter noted, “When we say American,”…we don't think of 
Canadian, or Central America, or South America. We think of Yankees from the 
United States (Coutin, 1993, p.61) 
These narratives also helped create solidarity across ethnic, ideological and 
cultural differences between Salvadoran and U.S. Christians in the 1980’s. The figure of 
Archbishop Oscar Romero, assassinated by paramilitary death squads in El Salvador in 
March 1980, facilitated a transnational collective identity and a model of action for U.S. 
Christians who chose their allegiance to their religious ideals over their loyalty to their 
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national government (Nepstad, 2001).  Amongst other factors, U.S. activists learned their 
identity as Christian first through personalized accounts of the situation in El Salvador, 
transforming Romero into a hero. The similarities between U.S. and Salvadoran 
Christians’ experiences of persecution, the typology of the narrators who were priests, 
religious individuals who were trusted in the community and the strength of the 
institutional context of the churches in the U.S. Researchers have tracked the change of 
discourses and narratives over time to find how specific events reshape the terms of 
public debate on issues such as slavery in the U.S. in 19th century (Ellgson, 1995) and 
anti-nuclear energy movements (Benford, 1993). Bedford argues that through the creation 
of discourses and vocabularies, SMOs foster group solidarity and spirit de corps. 
 The examination of discourses and narratives help us understand the relevance of 
ideological artifacts in the formation of collective identities. However, as critical race 
theory shows, changes in discursive identities also imply changes in structural and 
organizational factors. For instance, liberal feminist organizations based in Washington, 
D.C. were more successful in influencing the media frames on abortion because of their 
superiority in education and knowledge of journalists’ demographics compared to their 
conservative competitors (Rohlinger, 2002). Rohlinger shows that framing is material 
too: 1) framing is not merely an ideological process but the product of organizational 
routines, and 2) the construction of collective identities in social movements is a 
permanent function of organizations. Bedford and Snow (2000) reveal that there are 
framing variations that can be understood through modifications in contextual factors 
such as political structures, values, and the type of audience. A “frame dispute” happens 
when members and organizations of a social movement compete to define the political 
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reality around them (Bedford, 1993 p. 677). For example, radical actors propose 
discourses in which the movement pursue structural reforms, moderates attempt to avoid 
strident rhetoric, and liberals build frames between these two extreme stances––radical 
and liberal (Bedford, 1993). The relationship between ideology and organizing 
techniques is demonstrated through the examination of the collective mobilization of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Munson (2011) proves that the Muslim Brotherhood survived the 
repression of the Egyptian State through the creation of a federated structure, which 
allows the flow of different ideologies and tendencies, and the reliance on hosting 
meetings in mosques as a way of avoid state surveillance. The use of mosques as a 
meeting space stressed the religious nature of the Brotherhood in comparison to other 
organizations such as the Egyptian Communist Party. 
Previous research on Central American Solidarity Movements (e.g. Donaghy, 
1990; Smith, 2010) have used McAdam (1982)  and McAdam et al. (1988) political 
process model to explain the formation of identity and collective action in the 1980s. 
McAdam (1982) argues that political mobilization take five steps: 1) Interpretative 
processes, 2) attribution of threat, 3) appropriation of existing organization collective 
identity, 4) Innovation of collective action and 5) development of shared sustained action. 
McAdam’s model embraces the many dimensions of collective action from the 
construction of cognitive frameworks in activists to the formation of organizations. Smith 
(2010) argues that the political process model can better explain the construction of 
Central American Solidarity Movement because it shows “both sides of the social 
dialectic, both the history-making human action and the action-shaping social 
environment” (p.88). Donaghy (1990) maintains that McAdam “overcomes resource 
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mobilization’s vast potential for generality, where virtually anything which has 
contributed to movement growth can be considered a resource” (p. 5). As a complement 
to his political process model, McAdam (1986) offers a model of high-risk/cost activism. 
In this model, he explained how the life experiences of the activists and interactions with 
other activists led specific individuals to engage in life-threatening situations. McAdams 
(1986) shows that the radicalization of activism creates a major activist identity (Figure 
1) (p. 69). 
Figure	1:	Model	of	recruitment	of	high-risk/cost	activism	
 
 
Viterna (2013) offers another account of how identity formation is related to the 
recruitment of insurgents in the Salvadoran guerrillas. Viterna remarks that structural 
factors are the reasons which collective and individual identities are modified. By 
examining the process of mobilizing the Salvadoran recruits who joined the FMLN, she 
shows that mobilization occurs when structural factors reshape the meaning of individual 
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identities and alter the membership networks of the activist. According to her, identities 
are formed after larger forces in the society influence the construction of social networks 
and the self. Viterna (2013) describes two types of identities: internal (how the 
individuals see themselves) and external (how the salient identity is understood by 
relevant actors in the society). She argues that organizations are looking for a prototype 
of activist identities that help them to advance their strategic goals.  
D’Emilio (1983) goes one step further and argues that construction of homosexual 
identities emerge with the consolidation of capitalism in the U.S. society. He explains: 
(I)t has been the historical development of capitalism-more specifically, its free 
labor system-that has allowed large numbers of men and women in the late 
twentieth century to call themselves gays, to see themselves as part of a 
community of similar men and women ant to organize politically on the basis of 
that identity (p.102) 
Through a historical review of the means of production in U.S. between the 
nineteenth century and late twentieth century, D’Emilio (1983) explains that collective 
gay life was fostered by changes in U.S. society from one in which the heterosexual rural 
family served as a self- sufficient center of material production to an institution in which 
of their members were wage laborers and the central reason for romantic relationships 
was emotional and not procreative.  He elaborates:   
As wage labor spread and production became socialize, then, it became possible 
to release sexuality from the “imperative” to procreate. Ideologically, 
heterosexual expression came to be a means of establishing intimacy, promoting 
happiness, and experiencing pleasure. In divesting the household of its economic 
independence and fostering the separation of sexuality from procreation, 
capitalism has created conditions that allow some men and women to organize a 
personal life around their erotic/emotional attraction to their own sex. It has made 
possible the formation of urban communities of lesbians and gay men and, more 
recently, of a politics bases on a sexual identity” (p.103) 
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D’Emilio does not claim that same-sex erotic predilections were born out of 
capitalism, rather, he argues that collective gay and lesbian identities –in a similar fashion 
in which Hall (1981) defines sociological identities- were possible under the economic 
conditions in the second half of twentieth century.  Those changes in the way the society 
was organized facilitated the emergence of the movement in favor of gay and lesbian 
rights in the 1960’s and 1970’s. D’Emilio’s (1983) view of gay identities in society align 
closely with the concept of “experience “and “class consciousnesses” in E.P. Thompson’s 
(1982) The Making of the English Working Class. Thompson explains that class-
consciousness is “the way in which these experiences (productive relations) are handled 
in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value systems, ideas and institutional forms” 
(p.10). In the English working class, the common experience was configured in a 
dialectic fashion: a cultural and material struggle between the wages laborers and the 
owners of the means of production. 
In the years between 1780 and 1832 most English working people came to feel an 
identity of interests as between themselves, and as against their rulers and 
employers. This ruling class was itself much divided, and in fact only gained in 
cohesion over the same years because certain antagonisms were resolved (or 
faded into relative insignificance) in the face of an insurgent working class (p.11) 
 
Thompson and D’Emilio, as well as Pulido (2006) -with her examination of how 
geographic dynamics in Los Angeles fostered different levels of racialization among 
minorities- reveal that the construction of collective identities is not merely a discursive 
process that precedes material conditions. Collective identities emerge from structural 
forces (economic, political, and cultural) that facilitate the formation of groups who share 
specific attributes and assemble collectively in favor of a cause. Some research of social 
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movement theory suggests that race can be a central factor in understanding the strategic 
differences between white and black activist organizations, especially in the civil right 
movements in 1960’s. Morris (1981) shows that African American activist use churches 
to boost the sit-in movements. Morris reveals that early sit-ins “were sponsored by 
indigenous resources of the black community; the leadership was black, the bulk of the 
demonstrators were black, the strategies and tactics were formulated by blacks, and the 
finances came out of the pockets of blacks, while their serene spirituals echoed through 
the churches” (p.749). In the case of white activists, college campuses became the central 
nodes for the recruitment of volunteers for the Freedom Summer in 1964 (McAdam, 
1986). With all this in mind, there is a self-evident truth: people build networks, 
especially political networks, with people they perceive as their kind, whether it be 
working-class individuals in England (Thompson, 1986), African American activists 
(Morris, 1981) or white American college students (McAdam, 1986). Lazarsfeld and 
Merton (1954) call these ties of common ancestry as “homophily” (p.23). In the U.S., 
white populations tend to build homophilic relations with other white peers based on their 
share lifestyles and segregated geography (Bonilla-Silva et al., 2006). However, 
according to Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954), homophily is not only material but also can 
be built on common “cultural values” (p.20). For people to experiment belonging to a 
specific group, it is not enough to merely be similar to others- in this case having the 
same racial identity- but to share a common view of the world with other members of the 
network. It is here where ideology intervenes. In the next section, I will introduce 
definitions of terms such as ideology, discourses, discourse practices and habitus that will 
help show the ways ideology and materiality intersect in collective identity formation.  
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Ideology, discourse, identities and dialectic 
According to Hall (1996), ideology is a “(s)ystem of meaning, concepts, 
categories and representation which make sense of the world” (p.334). These concepts, 
categories and representations give people an imaginary relation “to the real, material 
conditions of their existence”. Ideology precedes the formation of discourses. Hall (2000) 
defines discourses as “ways of referring to or constructing knowledge about a particular 
topic of practice: a cluster (or formation of ideas, images and practices), which provide 
ways of talking about forms of knowledge and conduct associated with a particular logic, 
social activity or institutional in society” (p. 6) 
Hall (2000) adopts the concept of discourse from Foucault (1971, 1980). He 
argues that, at a micro level, a discourse is a group of statements that work together to 
create a “discursive formation” (Hall, 1992, p. 201). The relationship between statements 
in a discursive system should be regular and systematic, not random. Any changes in the 
cluster of ideas in discursive systems modify the entire explication of the political reality. 
Discourses are collective artifacts and do not depend on individual actions (Hall, 1991).  
The underlying force behind discourse is power, either to challenge the status quo or 
reinforce it (Hall, 1992). Discourses are historically situated and change over time (Hall, 
2000). 
A discourse is constituted by two elements that interact in a dialectical way: 
discourse formation (the statements) and the discursive practices, which are defined by 
Hall (1992) as “the practices of producing meaning” (p.201). For example, white western 
discourses have defined blacks as “frightening, cunning and glamorous crooks in New 
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York cop stories” and have framed the indigenous population as people with primitive 
nobility and dignity on one side, and savagery and barbarism, on the other (Hall, 1991, p. 
21). 
 Hall’s work (1991, 1992, 2000) allows us to see a dialectical force between 
discourses and the ways that discourses are produced. In Bourdieu’s perspective (1991), 
this dialectic is about discourses and structural factors that influence the creators of the 
discourses and their audiences: 
“Specialized discourses can direct their efficacy to the hidden correspondence 
between the structure of the social space within which they are produced, the 
political field, the religion field, the artistic field, the philosophical field, and the 
structure of social classes within the receptions are situated and in relation to 
which they interpret their message” (p.410). 
Bourdieu (1991) also assures that unconscious dispositions influence the 
production of discourse. Habitus, he argues, is comprised of the insentient constitutions 
that allow an individual to have practical sense of their behavior in the social game 
(Bourdieu, 1993). Habitus has a long process of inculcation, starting in childhood, and 
prepares the individual to behave in specific environments. Habitus does not imply 
character traits, it refers to social and cultural conditioning that supports the reproduction 
of social norms and hierarchies (Bonilla-Silva et al., 2006). In the world of social 
meaning, political entities achieve their maximum ideological effect “by exploiting the 
possibilities contained in the polysemy inherent in the social ubiquity of the legitimate 
language” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 39). 
Throughout this literature review, I have shown that the role of white collective 
identities in public relations has been understudied and that critical, historical and 
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postcolonial approaches to public relations can provide important insights about the ways 
people with power can use their privilege as instruments of resistance against colonial 
and political-economic oppression. In the case of CISPES, white, middle-class, educated 
activists utilized their resources to activate CISPES’ strategic public relations campaign 
in the context of the Reagan administration.  
Secondly, I have explained the importance in understanding racial formation as 
both material and ideological phenomena that require a historical perspective. As critical 
race theory and postcolonial literature reveal, racial identities and hierarchies change over 
time and need constant reassessment, especially regarding its relationship with other 
intersectional identities such as gender, social class and sexuality. Intersectionality shows 
that identities are flexible and that public relations help to maintain and transform them 
inside organizations. Thirdly, I have reviewed how social movement theory 
conceptualizes collective identities as discursive artifacts, while other theories purport 
that these identities are formed through structural forces that push people to form groups 
and to assemble. As I mentioned before, this is a false dichotomy because the formation 
of collective identities is a dialectic process between discourse (ideological) and 
materiality (structural). Finally, I have given definitions of relevant terms such as 
ideology, discourse, discourse practices and habitus. The concept of habitus, the 
unconscious dispositions in which the society trains individuals for the social game, helps 
us understand the reasons why CISPES’ white college-educated activists were central in 
the Salvadoran solidarity movement. Through document analysis and interviews, I show 
how their habitus influenced the types of public relations strategies that CISPES planned 
and developed in the 1980s.  
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It is important to note that CISPES’ activism took place before the term 
“intersectionality” became widely used in U.S. academia and advocacy. Crenshaw (1989) 
proposed it in the late 1980s and, soon after, the term entered the vocabulary of the U.S. 
left as it faced the end of the Cold War period. However, many members of CISPES were 
troubled by the issues discussed now through the notion of intersectionality, which brings 
to the fore-complicated relationships between race, class, gender, and sexual orientation, 
albeit these identities were not necessarily central to their mission. 
In this dissertation, I examine the ways collective identities are constructed 
through public relations discourses and campaigns. I call these types of identities 
mobilizing organizational identities, and they are sustained by the construction of 
ideologies that give meaning to collective mobilizations.  These mobilizing 
organizational identities are heavily affected by structural factors such as racial 
dynamics inside and outside organizations, political climate, social class background of 
participants and gendered processes. 
With all these in mind, I propose three research questions: 
RQ1: What were the themes of discourses that CISPES produced for its internal 
audiences and how they varied or evolved from 1980 to 1990? 
RQ2. What were the public relations strategies CISPES used from 1981 to 1991 to 
influence public opinion and political agendas? 
RQ3. What was the role of race, class, and gender in the making of CISPES and the 
construction of their discourses? 
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CHAPTER IV  
            METHODS  
Operationalization 
Mobilizing organizational identities can be studied through a dialectical method 
that involves the ideological and the material dimensions of organizations. The selection 
of my research methods is inspired by the dialectical approaches of Bourdieu, Hall, 
works in Critical Race Theory (Frankenberg, 1992; Omi & Winant, 1994, Lewis, 2004) 
and social movements research (e.g., Ellgson, 1995). It is impossible to understand the 
discourses of CISPES without understanding the impact of intersectional identities in 
CISPES’ practices, especially in the early 1980s.  
I use a mixed method approach: discourse analysis (Hall, 1991) and qualitative 
interviews. In both methodological pathways, I take a historical perspective, which 
examines public relations retroactively (Hon 2015; Stacks, 2011). A historical case 
studies perspective has helped scholars in the creation of models that explain the 
relationship between internal and external forces that shape organizational settings 
(Anderson et al., 2006; Hon, 2015; Yin, 2017). 
The first method consists of a discourse analysis of documents produced by 
CISPES and the second employs in-depth interviews with former CISPES staffers; both 
methods are qualitative. These two approaches provide methodological triangulation in 
this research, which attempts to corroborate the findings produced by each approach and 
achieves a richer and stronger explanation of the phenomenon, in this case the public 
relations of CISPES (Rothbauer, 2008).  In the following section, I describe each of the 
approaches and operationalize basic concepts that make up my examination.  
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Discourse Analysis 
I have examined 56 of CISPES’ internal documents, which belong to an archival 
collection in the Wisconsin Historical Society in Madison, Wisconsin. I visited Madison 
to access the archival collection in summer 2016. This is a purposive sample because I 
only chose documents produced by CISPES. These documents include materials such as 
pamphlets, minutes, press releases, strategic plans, letters, banners, and brochures. To 
examine these documents, I use the software ATLAS TI to develop themes and codes. 
Due to the random selection of the sample, I obtained CISPES’ documents from the years 
1980 to 1990, with the exception of 1982, 1983 and 1989. I will discuss the years that are 
not listed here under the limitations of this dissertation. 
In this research, discourse will be operationalized as the statements that explicitly 
define organizations, people, or situations. In this case, I code each statement by date and 
by target. According to Lindenberg (1976), target is the entity to which the “actor acts 
upon” (p. 155). In this case, the actor is CISPES. I focus on examining the discourses of 
five targets: the U.S. government, the government of El Salvador, CISPES, FMLN, the 
people of El Salvador and the U.S. people. Previous literature on the Central American 
Solidarity Movement in the U.S. (Perla, 2008; Smith, 2010) shows that CISPES 
attempted to define these six targets as a way to mobilize activists against the Reagan 
administration. 
 
I adapted McCracken’s (1988) five-step method of analysis of interviews (1) 
utterance, 2) observation, 3) expanded observation, 4) observation, and 5) theme) into a 
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way to examine discourses. However, my adaptation only includes four of McCracken’s 
stages: 1) utterance, 2) first moment of observation, 3) second moment of observation 
and 4) themes. Stage 3 and 4, in my view, are repetitive, thus not applicable to my study. 
According to McCracken, the first moment “treats each utterance in the interview 
transcript in its own terms, ignoring its relationship to other aspect of the texts” (p. 42). In 
the summer of 2017, I read the documents and created 45 coding sheets in which I 
transferred information such as the date of the document, the origin, the discourses, the 
public relations tactics and the names of people mentioned in those documents. The first 
moment of observation, in which the researcher transforms the utterance into preliminary 
categories, occurred in December 2017.  I created 284 codes from 406 quotations and the 
codes were divided by years (1980, 1981, 1984, 1985-1986, 1987, 1988, 1990) and the 
codes related to CISPES’ strategies and tactics were grouped in five groups: media 
strategy, street strategy, political strategy, fundraising strategy and tour strategy. 
McCracken argues that the observation stage “takes the observations generated at 
previous levels and subjects them, in this collective form, to collective scrutiny” (p.42). 
The second moment of observation happened in early January, 2018 when I assembled 
the discourses by year and by target. Finally, the fourth stage –themes- in the examination 
of discourses took place in late January, 2018. I created a timeline that tracks the 
appearance and disappearance of the most common CISPES discourses between 1980 
and 1990, but also the discourses that only emerged sporadically. With this, I probe the 
core discourses that helped to create a mobilizing organizational identity in CISPES. 
I limit my examination to written documents and do not include audiovisual 
material. This examination took place before conducting in-depth interviews with former 
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CISPES staffers and volunteers. After several phases of codifications and recodifications, 
I found that from over 200 codes in the discourse analysis, 28 appeared systematically in 
CISPES’ public relations material between 1980 and 1990. First, I organized the 
discourses by year. Later in each year’s diagram, I inserted a group of categories that 
explain the type of the relationship between the discourses and the six targets: the U.S. 
government, El Salvador government CISPES, FMLN, the people of El Salvador and the 
U.S. people. By understanding the history of the discourses, we can learn the manners in 
which CISPES tried to define itself and its friends (people of El Salvador, U.S. people, 
FMLN), as well as its adversaries (U.S. government and the government of El Salvador). 
Also, the examination sheds lights on the mobilizing organizational identity that CISPES 
instilled in its activist base through public relations. 
As I mentioned before, the 28 discourses are divided into six target groups: the 
U.S. government, El Salvador government, CISPES, FMLN, the people of El Salvador 
and the U.S. people. The discourses regarding the U.S. government are separated by their 
references of two out three branches of the U.S. government: the executive branch and 
legislative branch. Previous literature (Smith, 2010) shows that the activist groups who 
oppose the U.S. foreign policy targeted these two branches of the U.S. government 
strategically. Depending on the nature of the issue mentioned in the discourse, the 
discourses on El Salvador government are divided into three categories: political, military 
and economic. If the discourse referred to the role of the El Salvador government, it was 
categorized as a political discourse. When the discourse referred to the Salvador military 
forces and its human rights abuses, I code them as a military discourse. Economic 
discourses describe economic inequality or poverty in El Salvador. As a target actor, 
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CISPES had two types of discourse: speeches that describe the nature of CISPES (coded 
as “nature”) and discourses that represent the organizations in relations to other targets or 
actors (“relational”). According to the same rationale, I divided the other three target 
actors (Salvadoran people, U.S. people, and FMLN) into the same two discursive 
typologies: nature vs. relational.  
The first step in answering this question is to provide discursive “snapshots” of 
CISPES’ discursive system by year. The examination of each year’s discursive systems 
reveal changes in the domestic and international context. Finally, I show a timeline that 
reveals the most pervasive discourses that appeared in CISPES’ public relations between 
1980 and 1990. As a needed annotation, I do not provide exact names and date of 
CISPES’ internal documents with the purpose to protect the confidentiality of the 
information and the people who prepared it. However, at the end of this dissertation, I 
attach a reference list with abbreviated titles of all the primary sources I used here. 
Interviews 
By reviewing the coverage of The Washington Post and The New York Times on 
CISPES between 1981 and 1991, I selected seven initial participants. This is a purposive 
and convenient sample. These participants were CISPES’ staffers in Washington D.C., 
Los Angeles, Chicago, New York and Oregon. From these initial seven participants, I 
expanded the total number of participants to 12 through the use of snowball sampling 
(Browne, 2005). Nine of the twelve participants were white and three identified 
themselves as Latinx or Salvadoran. Six identified themselves as women and six, as men. 
Eleven worked directly with CISPES and one organized Salvadoran refugees in the U.S., 
but coordinated activities with CISPES.  All of them had a college degree or were in the 
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process of achieving college degree when they joined CISPES and the solidarity 
movement. Ten of them have English as their first language and two, Spanish; however, 
all of the participants are bilingual. From the sample, four participants enrolled in Ph.D. 
programs after their involvement in CISPES; four have master’s degrees or medical 
school education and four, bachelor degrees only. Two participants indicated their 
involvement in student protests against the Vietnam War between 1962 and 1972 and 
eight started their activist life in late 1970s or early 1980s. Only one informant joined the 
organization in late 1980s, specifically in 1988.  
I used a semi-structured interview protocol aimed at probing the life stories of 
participants and their experiences with CISPES. The interviews lasted between 50 
minutes and two hours. Two were conducted in person in Oregon, while 10 occurred via 
telephone or Skype. The participants interviewed on telephone or Skype were located in 
San Salvador, California, Washington D.C., Pennsylvania and New York.  
One strategy to approach my participants was to make them think about 
themselves in retrospect, and reflect on their memories and thought processes in 
the1980’s, or when they were active in CISPES. I also told my participants about samples 
of CISPES documents I found and asked them about the history of the artifacts and what 
they perceived to be the purpose, strategy, and ideology behind the documents.  Later, I 
asked them about how they became involved with CISPES and their histories as activists. 
My questions not only probed participants’ political awareness, but also how CISPES 
operated in terms of public relations strategies on a national scale. What were the goals of 
the public relations strategies? Who was in charge? Why did they consider 
communication an important tool? I asked participants about the political and public 
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relations ideologies that they held back then, and about their views of the U.S. 
government, the FMLN, the U.S. left, and the civil rights movement. Finally, these 
interviews also aim to reveal the mechanisms that CISPES utilized to monitor the 
privilege of their members and to promote the leadership of people of color. Previous 
research on the Central American Solidarity Movement in the U.S. has explored the 
reasons and history of activists who joined those organizations (Smith, 2010), but none of 
them have focused on radical activists such as those in CISPES. Previous examinations 
have not paid attention to the relevance of race, class, and gender in the performance of 
those organizations. My interview protocol followed four core sections: individual 
background, activist history, personal ideology, CISPES (constraints and advantages), 
and historical context. I stopped recruiting participants when I reached a level of 
saturation with interview #12. Saturation is reached when the interviews no longer 
provide new information about the phenomenon in question and the participants only add 
anecdotal information (Taggs, 1985; Small, 2009). Guest et al. (2006) argue that 
saturation can be reached with 12 interviews.  
In the interviews, I operationalize race as the self-identification of the participants 
in locating themselves in a specific racial category (Hartmann et al, 2009). With 
participants who identify themselves as white, I try to understand what whiteness meant 
to them in the moment they were involved in CISPES, and in what situations they 
became aware of their race and its role in their activism (if any). Self-identification is also 
used again in participant descriptions of their social class and gender. The process of self-
identification represents only the beginning of the conversation about the larger issue of 
understanding privilege and how it was revealed in their lives. Privilege here is the 
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individuals’ interpretation of their advantages in the performance of activist work; this 
could be based on race, class, language skills, or gender. For the examination of the 
interviews, I use the research software Atlas TI. 
The analysis of my interviews was based on the methodologies of Taggs’ (1985) 
life stories and Rubin and Rubin’s (2011) examination of concept, themes and events as 
the three core elements of qualitative interviewing. In social science, Taggs argues that 
life stories of participants in collective movements are important only in that they provide 
fresh information about the behavior of the group in which the researcher is interested. In 
Taggs’ methodology, time sequence is important. This is the reason why I explored how 
participants remember their childhood, college years and the events that led them to join 
CISPES or the Central American Solidarity Movement in 1970s and 1980s. The 
commonalities between a participant’s life events and the conditions in which they were 
involved can suggest how structural factors such as race, social class, gender, nationality, 
immigration status and language skills facilitated or constrained their activism. Rubin and 
Rubin (2011) define concept as a term “that represents an idea important for your 
research”, themes as “summary statements and explanations of what is going on”, and 
events as the “occurrences that have taken place” (p. 207). The identification of events 
helps me pinpoint the incidents that influenced the public relations of CISPES, as well as 
the construction of collective identities through individual life histories. When 
commonalities between the participants’ experience were found, I created concepts that 
suggest the existence of a collective process that involved CISPES activists in specific 
conditions. As Curtin and Gaither (2005), Logan (2011) and Pompper (2005) show, the 
public relations strategies and tactics are closely related to the formation of identities.  In 
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order to identify CISPES’ philosophy behind their political acts, I observe and compare 
the definitions that each participant gave me about the ideology of the organization. I 
paid attention to concepts, events or themes that explained racial conditions that are 
related to other intersectional conflicts such as class and gender. In this dissertation, 
racial themes are defined as situations that evoke interactions between different racial and 
ethnic groups, and gender involves the relevance of women and gender relations in 
CISPES’ political discourses. I conceptualize themes about social class as connected to 
issues of poverty and inequality in El Salvador and the United States. Finally, I classified 
the “disputes” between members of the organization that are present in the interviews. I 
am interested not only in understanding the conflicts in the organization, but how they 
were solved for the stability of the organization. In the “how”, I tried to understand the 
role of ideology in conciliating the internal differences and helping CISPES to survive as 
a coherent organization. In social movement theory literature, “framing disputes” are 
defined as the debate between members and organizations to define the reality in specific 
frames (Bedford, 1993, p. 677).  In addition to interviews and documents, I used 
historical information that complements the perspectives of the participants. The 
quotations in this dissertation are not a literal reproduction of the interviews. I have 
edited the conversations to provide a readable version of the participants’ opinions. In 
some occasions, the participants do not complete the sentences or skip words. Though, 
the edits have not modified the meaning of their views. Only one of the interviews was 
conducted in Spanish. I translated the interview from Spanish to English. 
Positionality and limitations 
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Rubin and Rubin (2011) and McKee (2003) argue that the interpretation of the 
researcher is part of the methodology. By defining the themes, concepts and events, every 
researcher creates an overall interpretation of a social phenomenon. My experience as a 
Salvadoran man who was born and raised in El Salvador and who has befriended many 
CISPES activists over the years oriented both my attitudes toward the participants and the 
relevance of some categories in the analysis, especially the ones related to racial 
dynamics in the U.S. and the geopolitical views of the organization. My upbringing 
during the Salvadoran civil war (1980-1992) facilitated the creation of a strong rapport 
with the participants and the topic of my research. I knew “by heart” the historical 
background of the conflict and the complicated nature of the CISPES struggle. 
However, my identity as a brown man with a marked accent made the discussion 
about the racial constitution of CISPES unpredictable, especially with white members of 
the organization. In some occasions, my questions about the whiteness of CISPES were 
seen by some participants as a mechanism to provoke an apology from them. In those 
moments, I reminded them that I have a non-judgmental approach to the issue. I was 
direct in stressing that I was not representing any faction inside CISPES and did not have 
the ulterior motive of inflaming old conflicts. My role, I told them, was to understand, 
more than to judge the past with categories of today. In other terms, participants offered 
candid accounts of the lack of diversity in the organization in 1980s, while a small group 
of participants acknowledge the lack of reflection about the conditions that enabled the 
formation of CISPES as white organization. In general, white participants never directly 
recognized that their educational background and racial heritage became assets for the 
efficiency of the organization in its struggle against the U.S. administration.  The 
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situation was different from the perspectives of the two Salvadoran participants who 
acknowledged that the college education level and racial background of CISPES activists 
helped the Salvadoran cause to gain some visibility in the U.S. congress and the media. In 
general, having previous connections with the participants helped me develop a 
conversational environment that enabled fruitful and sincere interactions.   
I have to acknowledge that one of the limitations of my dissertation is the scarce 
number of interviews that I conducted with Salvadorans. In my conversations with 
Salvadorans (one conducted in English and the other in Spanish), I attempted to 
understand the intersections between CISPES and other organizations funded and 
operated by Salvadoran citizens, specifically refugees. By interviewing Salvadoran 
participants, my intention was not to explicate the forms and mechanisms of their 
political mobilization in the U.S., but to understand how the interaction with Salvadorans 
influenced CISPES’ work. More interviews with Salvadorans could have brought a more 
complex and rich view of the mutual learning process between Salvadorans and U.S. 
activists in the 1980s. Another limitation is that, due to lack of time and financial 
resources, I could not review and scan documents from the following years: 1982, 1983, 
and 1989. I also did not have enough time to see the events that led CISPES to revamp its 
messaging. However, the years that I have used are representative of the universe of 
documents housed at the Wisconsin Historical Society.  
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 CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS OF RQ1 AND RQ2 
The three research questions are the pieces of a puzzle of two larger models. 
These models are the process of intersectional recruiting and the ideological identity 
model of public relations. Concerning strategic communications, the latter is inserted 
within the former. By answering each of the research questions and proposing two 
models that emerged from the examination of this historical case study, I demonstrate the 
relevance of structural factors in forming collective identities and the instrumental nature 
of public relations in building, preserving and renegotiating organizational shared views 
of the self.  
 From a total of over 28 themes in CISPES’ public relations, I found that eight 
systematically appeared more than three times in the organization’s documents from 
1980 to 1990. These are: 1) The U.S. government wastes money on wars, 2) the U.S. 
government is an accomplice of the Salvadoran government human rights abuses, 3) the 
U.S. has long history of intervention in Central American, 4) El Salvador has a brutal 
government, 5) the U.S. is creating another Vietnam in El Salvador, 6) the U.S. escalates 
military participation in El Salvador, 7) Salvadoran people are politically active and 8) 
CISPES is a multiracial organization (Figure 2). These eight themes are the core of what 
Burke (1989) calls the “collective consubstantiality’ of CISPES’ social mobilization. 
With these themes, the organization instilled in its base the “esprit de corps” in which the 
collective identity of its members was based on a transnational and radical view of the 
role of the U.S. in Central America and the world.  
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Nepstad (2001) and de Volo (2000) show the centrality of social movement 
organizations in the formation of collective identities in activism. In the case of CISPES, 
and by looking at their discursive themes, we can appreciate that its mobilizing 
organizational identity connects at least four discursive locations: Vietnam, El Salvador, 
Central America and the U.S. These places are not only geographic but represent 
thematic and historical coordinates that give CISPES an ideological horizon to conduct 
its mobilization. Although CISPES has a transnational inspiration, the location of its 
praxis is in the U.S. Through the examinations of the discourses by year, I show how 
Vietnam represents the moral and economic failure of a super power to impose its 
domination in the Third World. El Salvador and Central America are the new episode of 
resistance against Washington’s desire to perpetuate right-wing military governments as 
it happened in Chile in 1973. The themes in CISPES discourses coincide with the 
articulation of Third World Left in the U.S. The Third World Left differentiates itself 
from other liberal organizations because of its internationalist views of the conflict in 
Central American and a discourse that conflates self-determination calls with a radical 
critique of the capitalist system (Pulido, 2006; Berger, 2006; Hobson, 2016).  In order to 
show a complex answer to this question, I will bracket the themes by year and provide 
historical information that helps to understand the emergence, the consolidation and the 
disappearance of different themes. 
What were the themes of discourses that CISPES produced for its internal 
audiences and how they varied from 1980 to 1990? 
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Figure	2:	CISPES’	themes	1980-1990		
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1980: Creating the polarization and defining the struggle 
                                    
Figure	3:	1980:	Defining	the	struggle		
 
 
In late 1980, the year CISPES was founded as a network of grassroots 
organizations, the activist organization focused on defining the role of the U.S. executive 
branch regarding the struggle of El Salvador (Figure 3). The then President James Carter 
still advocated for a foreign policy with emphasis on human rights (Carleton & Stohl, 
1985). Many liberals believed that the Carter administration had the ability to control the 
El Salvador’s military by supporting a junior officers movement which was committed to 
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protecting human rights and democracy (Peceny & Stanley, 2010). In October 15, 1979, 
this movement led a coup d’état that overthrew the conservative administration of Carlos 
Humberto. The officers promised to end the human rights abuses conducted by the army 
and implement political and economic transformations such as land reform and the 
nationalization of banks and foreign trade (González, 2018) 
In this context, CISPES defined the U.S. government as an actor with a “long 
history of intervention” that spends “millions of dollars” on being the “accomplice” of 
the government of El Salvador, which is “brutal”, “weak” and “irrelevant” for the 
national interests of the U.S. In doing this, the U.S. was contributing in the “escalation” 
of domestic unrest in El Salvador and “producing more repression.” Two undated 
booklets published by CISPES, which appear to be released in 1980, established strong 
connections between the U.S. government and the government of El Salvador. In U.S. 
Military Involvement in El Salvador 1947-1980, the organization argues, “U.S. 
involvement in El Salvador is only a part of its overall policy in Central America, in the 
Caribbean, and in South America.” CISPES’ point was that the U.S, military and 
economic assistance to the Salvadoran government “has promoted, and actually implied, 
increasing repression of the great majority of the people (including the Church), and lack 
of democracy.” 
In this polarized discursive system, CISPES defines the U.S. and El Salvador 
governments as its adversaries. At the other extreme, the U.S. “people” needed to show 
solidarity with the people of El Salvador: “The hatred that such a policy generates in 
these people against the United States should provoke a greater opposition within the 
U.S… as should our sense of responsibility as U.S. citizens to end such unjust policies”. 
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In 1980, CISPES started to outline the contours of its discursive system in which the U.S. 
and El Salvador governments are intimately tied, in the same way Reagan connected the 
FMLN with Cuba and the Soviet Union, during his inauguration in January 1981 
(Gutman, 1988). 
1981: The emergences of the allies 
On May 3, 1981, at “least” 20,000 demonstrators protested U.S. policy toward El 
Salvador in front of the Pentagon in Virginia (de Onis, 1981) (Figure 4). The New York 
Times reported that many of the activists belonged to committees in solidarity with El 
Salvador throughout the country and arrived at the capital by bus from distant places such 
as Florida and Wisconsin. The chapter of CISPES in Madison, Wisconsin, organized a 
round trip to Virginia in which the main slogan was, “No more U.S. aid to El Salvador.” 
In 1981, CISPES’ public relations material defined more actors within the narrative of the 
Salvadoran conflict, including itself.  The organization described itself as a “multiracial,” 
“nonsectarian” and “domestic” entity. In the edition of “El Salvador Alert!” published on 
June 1st, 1981, CISPES described the Pentagon demonstration as a social movement that 
was as diverse as possible: “Blacks, trade unionists, religious worker, anti-war 
organizers, gay rights groups, representatives of third world movements and solidarity 
organizations were all present”. “The Alert,” as CISPES activists call it, was the official 
news outlet of the organization. Jeffrey, who was Alert’s editor in the mid 1980s, 
described the newsletter as CISPES’ instrument to “educate” and inform its base in times 
when mainstream media did not sympathize with the Salvadoran revolutionary 
movement. 
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The protest at the Pentagon was a response to Reagan’s two-pronged strategy: 1) 
increasing military and economic aid to El Salvador by bypassing Congress, and 2) 
establishing a propaganda campaign to define the FMLN as a communist organization 
plotting against the U.S. (Gradin, 2006; Leogrande, 1998; Smith, 2010).  On February 
23rd, 1981, the State Department published a “white paper” called “Communist 
Interference in El Salvador”, in which the U.S. government reveals that the FMLN 
reached out to communist governments in the world to acquire arms (U.S. Department of 
State, 1981). In El Salvador: a people in struggle. A brief of overview, CISPES portrays 
the U.S. government as the puppeteers that were pulling the strings of the Salvadoran 
army: 
With the country on the brink of revolution, younger reform-minded military 
officers were used by the U.S. State Department and the salvadorean oligarchy, to 
overthrow Romero and put in place a military-civilian junta which promised 
sweeping reforms. The U.S. supported junta failed to fulfill its promises and the 
situation in El Salvador grew progressively worse. The death toll in the first two 
weeks of the junta’s rule exceeded the rate of deaths for the first 9 months of the 
year under Romero. Right-wing elements regained control (…) 
 
In CISPES’ narrative, the people of El Salvador were in a state of continuous 
organizing and struggle. Salvadoran civilians represented ultra-politicized subjects who 
were trying to consolidate a political project using “a different route” than “electoral 
change.” CISPES argues for “mass organizations, initiated non-violent campaigns to 
demand land reform, increase waged and better way of life.” In CISPES’ discursive 
system, the battle in El Salvador was a conflict between the U.S. and its allies and 
“stronger “, “popular democratic revolutionary forces.”  CISPES, through the Alert, 
framed its support for the social movement as an “American tradition” of “people from 
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all walks of life who believe that intervention is alien to American ideals of Liberty and 
self-determination.” 
With the staunch anti-communist agenda of Reagan, the newsletter saw Congress 
as a window of opportunity to influence the U.S. government:  
“The message is clear that Capitol Hill has grave doubts concerning White House 
policy toward El Salvador (…) of the five major conditions contained in the 
amendments, three could not be certified unless radical changes occur in El 
Salvador prior to October (…) The “compromise amendments” received 
overwhelming support in committee only because the American people were 
asking for much more: an end to U.S. involvement in El Salvador  
 
CISPES was referring the conditions that the House Foreign Relations Committee 
and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee imposed by any approval of military and 
economic assistance to El Salvador (The New York Times, 1981). Amongst the 
conditions were to communicate to the leaders of both chambers of Congress that El 
Salvador’s Government was 1) not “engaged in consistently violating internationally 
recognized human rights,” 2) “achieved substantial control over its armed forces”, 3) “is 
making progress in implementing essential economic and political reforms,” 4) “is 
committed to holding free elections” and 5) “has demonstrated its willingness to 
negotiate a political resolution of the conflict.” (97th Congress, 1981).  In January 1981, 
death squads in El Salvador assassinated two U.S. land reform advisors: Michael 
Hammer and Mark Pearlmann, as well as a Salvadoran official, José Rodolfo Viera.  
Since the end of the Vietnam War in April 1975 and through the early 1980s, the 
U.S. Congress increased control over the ability of the Executive branch to engage in 
foreign wars (Gradin, 2006).  In 1981, the shadow of Vietnam was still lingering over 
American politics- a fact that CISPES used as political discourse against Reagan. In a 
letter written in Chicago in April 25, 1981, CISPES’ Labor Task Force communicated to 
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its base that the organization feared “that growing U.S. involvement in the internal affairs 
of El Salvador is leading us down a disastrous path of another Vietnam.”  This discursive 
move in the Alert argues that the El Salvador and U.S. governments have the “ruling 
elite” as an ally: 
Ruling elites launched unprecedented violence against the populace, financed by 
armed forces oligarchy, paramilitary groups (…) Target of repression were 
peasants and urban trade union leader, and catholic priests. 
In 1981, CISPES’ discursive system became more sophisticated by defining a  
group of actors that were absent in 1980:  the FMLN, the people of El Salvador, and 
CISPES itself. The discourses also show a shift in CISPES’ strategies and tactics. The 
battle against Reagan would occur in the Congress, where the organization tried to put 
sand in the wheels of Reagan’s administration. 
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Figure	4:	1981:	The	emergences	of	allies		
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1984: The closing of congressional path 
By 1984, the congressional conditions to stop military and economic aid to El 
Salvador in Congress had deteriorated (LeoGrande, 1998) (Figure 5). During 1981, the 
Reagan administration sent around 20 million in emergency support to the Salvadoran 
army. Since 1982, Congress rapidly approved a sustained increase in the assistance to the 
Central American government. According to GAO (1990), in 1982 the U.S. military aid 
reached $80 million, a year later it was $83 million, but by1984, the assistance almost 
tripled to $220 million. If at the beginning of the 1980s, CISPES expected that the 
Congress would help them to contain Reagan’s doctrine, by 1984, the situation was 
turning the conflict into a normalcy. The election of a new president in El Salvador fit 
perfectly into the script of this new normalcy. On March 25, 1984, the Christian 
Democrat, José Napoleón Duarte, was elected as president of El Salvador after four years 
of a government controlled by a civilian-military junta and an interim president. On May 
21st, 1984, Duarte met Reagan at the White House and they agreed on a joint 
communiqué in which they “reaffirm strongly that the abandonment of El Salvador and 
Central America in the midst of a continuing armed struggle serves neither the interest of 
their two nations, nor those of the community of free countries” (American Presidency 
Project, 2018). 
A report written by the organization Medical Aid to El Salvador, in possession of 
CISPES, showed that the air capabilities of the Salvadoran army had improved.  The 
document reports air bombings in Tenancingo (a north central municipality) at the end of 
September 1983. “The operation was purposely bombed by the Salvadoran Air Force in 
its efforts to kill guerrilla,” the report states. In the same document, the activists argue 
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that the “U.S. embassy seems to be in agreement with the Salvadoran government that the 
civilians getting bombed probably deserve it.” As a conclusion, they affirm that the “U.S. 
role in bombing was a greater than earlier believed” and “they have collected numerous 
testimonies on the use of white phosphorus and napalm in Vietnam.”CISPES was looking 
at the air advantage of the Salvadoran army as the main issue to define in its next major 
strategic turn.  
 
Figure	5:	1984:	The	Closing	of	Congress	
 
 
1985-1986: Stop the Bombing 
 Throughout 1984, the U.S. media informed publics about vigorous air bombings of 
El Salvador with material donated by the U.S., government (Hedges, 1984) (Figure 6).  
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The airpower was a considerable advantage for the Salvadoran government against the 
FMLN that struggled to retain the control in some remote areas. With aerial actions, the 
Salvadoran government attempted to reduce the expansion of FMLN’ sanctuaries. 
According to Corum (1998), the Salvadoran government, with American equipment, 
began bombing rebel villages in Chalatenango and the Guazapa Mount. Using 
information provided by a faculty of the Air War College, located in Alabama, Corum 
estimates that aerial bombardment with Cessna A-37 aircraft totaled 227 in all 1983, but 
in June 1984 alone, there were 74 A-37 aerial bombs.  
By the end of August 1984, CISPES started the implementation of a large-scale 
campaign: “Stop the Bombing in El Salvador”, that attempted to reveal the cruelty of 
aerial actions that targeted Salvadoran civilians and simultaneously put pressure on the 
U.S. Congress (Donaghy, 1990; Vellela, 1988). The campaign was fully embraced by the 
organization between 1985 and 1986. As expected, the discursive innovation during those 
years was to focus on the aerial bombardments. They held the U.S. responsible for its 
support of the Duarte’s government. In a letter dated June 6th, 1985, Amy Brodigan, 
CISPES’ Legislative Director, requested its members to exert pressure on their 
representatives: 
Ask your Congressperson to support the recommendations of Reps. Leach 
and Miller (D-CA) and Senator Hatfield's (R-OR) paper on El Salvador. It 
calls for an end to U.S. support of the aid war, a mandatory redirecting of 
economic and development aid to social change programs, and a strict 55-
person limit on U.S. advisors in El Salvador. Strengthen the human rights 
restrictions. 
 
 On September 21st, 1985, the Midwest Regional Office, located in Chicago, 
accused the Reagan administration of “(r)ecent shipment of twelve additional attack 
helicopters to the Salvadoran Air Force, which only increases the importance of our work 
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in exposing Duarte and the air war in El Salvador.” On October 1st, 1985, the CISPES 
Northwest Regional Office informed its base about this method “used in this air war 
against the civilian population are as horrifying as the statistics”. The same day, the South 
East Regional Office in New Orleans informed that the Salvadoran government, since 
1982, “has been bombing its own people” and has killed “thousands of civilians.” The 
New York city chapter stresses the alleged connection between death squads and the 
Salvadoran government: “right wing military and paramilitary death squads sought to 
crush all signs of opposition (…) They continued to organize and demonstrate despite the 
bullets and bombs used against them.”  CISPES’ discursive system continued tying the 
U.S. to El Salvador’s governments, but between 1985 and 1986 in particular they utilized 
discourses about aerial bombardments. 
 CISPES complemented protests with an alternative approach to assist El Salvador 
through grassroots organizations in El Salvador, many located in places under the control 
of FMLN’s rebels. In March 1986, the Midwest regional Office called for “a door-to-
door canvass to raise T-800 for Medical Aid to El Salvador and [to] raise the visibility of 
the bombing with "Stop Bombing El Salvador" window signs.”  Medical Aid to El 
Salvador was a Los Angeles-based organization that distributed aid in FMLN’s 
sanctuaries, the same ones the Salvadoran army was bombing at the time (Peace, 2012). 
Ten days after the Earthquake of October 10th in El Salvador, CISPES’ national office 
promoted channeling the humanitarian help through the National Union of Salvadoran 
Workers (UNTS in Spanish), an organization with close ties to the FMLN, “in addition to 
NEST, Medical Aid for El Salvador, and the Salvadoran Medical Relief Fund.” NEST is 
the acronym for New El Salvador Today, an organization founded in the San Francisco 
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Bay Area in 1981 (Share El Salvador, 2018). The Salvadoran Medical Relief Fund 
trained community health-care workers and provided medical care to UNTS members 
(Squires, 1987). CISPES’ international approach included condemning U.S. policy 
toward Nicaragua. On September 21, 1985, the Midwest Regional Office endorsed the 
campaign: “Let Nicaragua Live”, and collected funds for the victims of the war against 
the Contras. The recipients of this aid were not regular individuals, but, in CISPES’ 
discursive system, they were mythic characters who were in close alignment with the 
strategic goals of the FMLN. In March’s newsletter, CISPES New York argued that the 
violence of aerial bombardment and other human rights abuses aspire “to destroy popular 
support for the FMLN/FDR through terror.” In CISPES’ view, these Salvadoran subjects 
have created communities that “have set themselves a twofold goal: to survive the war 
and to lay the groundwork for a society based on the principles of human rights and 
democracy.” 
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Figure	6:	1985-1986:	Stop	the	Bombing			
 
 
 
1987: The National Referendum Campaign 
In 1987, the public relations material shows CISPES’ efforts to frame the 
situation in El Salvador as a dilemma for the U.S. government (Figure 7). In a document 
of the Midwest Regional Office, CISPES locates the US government’s predicament after 
seven years of war in El Salvador and with no end in sight: “The U.S. must now choose 
between the two remaining options, escalating U.S. intervention or allowing the 
Salvadoran people to achieve a negotiated, political solution to the war.” On August 14th, 
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1987, the FMLN accepted the offer of Duarte to meet for negotiations by mid-September 
of the same year (Farah, 1987). However, Duarte’s plan was derailed by the assassination 
of the human rights activist, Herbert Anaya in El Salvador by death squads on October 
26th, 1987. The killing was enough justification for FMLN’s renunciation of returning to 
the negotiation table with the Salvadoran government (Associated Press, 1987; OAS, 
1988).  
In 1987, CISPES’ goal was to increase pressure on the U.S. Congress to support a 
peace agreement between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government. In a CISPES 
Congressional update on March 13th, 1987, the organization’s headquarters in 
Washington D.C. announced about a “democratic party policy on Central American” that 
emphasized “seeking a negotiation, regional settlement.” CISPES’ strategic team was 
aware that inside the democratic party some voices were suggesting “no aid to the 
contras, but at the same time increase” economic pressure on Nicaragua” and increasing 
the aid to “Central American democracies,” in which El Salvador was included. CISPES’ 
pressure on Congress followed two strategies: a grassroots national campaign and intense 
lobbying at the legislative level. Along with other grassroots organizations that supported 
the end of U.S. intervention in Central America, CISPES launched the campaign called 
The National Referendum to End the War in Central America in February 1987. In a 
letter on February 5th, 1987, the organizers publicized that the campaign attempted to 
“ask people to vote for the referendum to end the war on street corners, in shopping 
centers, at churches and at our workplaces.” The campaign tried to “reach a new audience 
not usually contacted and ask them to take a stand against the war.”  The principal 
objective of the campaign was to increase the pressure on “Congress to stop contra aid 
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and military involvement in the rest of Central American through signature gathering on 
the ballots (sending them in prior to the votes) and specially timed pressure tactics.”  
Another CISPES document estimated that at the beginning of the campaign, over 30 local 
chapters from 22 states joined the effort. 
 On February 27, 1987, the main message in CISPES’ congressional update of the 
campaign in Congress said it “should continue to be that we want a resolution of 
disapproval. End contra aid now. No aid to El Salvador and Guatemala.” CISPES 
headquarters in Washington D.C. monitored the status of bills and other legislative 
actions regarding the U.S. aid to El Salvador through the deployment of its staffers to 
Capitol Hill. On February 12th, 1987, CISPES assessed the influence of The National 
Referendum to End the War in Central America on Congress’ attitude toward the issue. 
The work that is being done by our committees and other organizations calling on 
members of the Senate Foreign Relations committee to get rid of the $300 million 
is being heard in Congress according to congressional staff people. Please let your 
committees know that their work is having impact. 
 
The CISPES national office in Washington D.C. believed that there was a window 
of opportunity after the Iran-Contra Scandal emerged in November, 1986 (Brown, 2018): 
“The Iran-contra affair has indeed opened the eyes of the American public of the 
falsehoods and illegalities of the current policy toward Central America.” The Iran-
Contra Affair was a secret U.S. government deal that involved selling arms to Iran and 
investing the money from that operation in arming the Contras, a U.S. backed insurgency 
that attempted the overthrow of the Sandinista government of Nicaragua.  
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Figure	7:	1987:	The	National	Referendum			
 
 
1988: The legitimation of FMLN 
The National Referendum to End the War in Central America, along with the 
lobbying strategy in Congress were deliberate processes to move CISPES toward the next 
step in their political mobilization: the quest to legitimize the FMLN as an actor that is 
representative of the people of El Salvador (Figure 8). In 1981, the governments of 
France and Mexico recognized the alliance between the FMLN and the Democratic 
Revolutionary Front (FDR in Spanish) as a representative political force (Tamayo, 1981). 
This diplomatic gesture elevated the international profile of the FMLN, but Reagan’s 
position from the beginning of his tenure was to tie the Salvadoran insurgency with Cuba 
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and the Soviet Union.  The FMLN’s strategy was a “two track policy” of negotiations and 
insurrection. In both strategies, military force was required to leverage the insurgency 
position at the negotiation table (Farah, 1988). Along with the FMLN’s position, Duarte 
suffered terminal cancer that kept him away from the spotlight during this time.  
Through the monitoring of U.S. Congress, CISPES’ political operators observed 
signs in the late 1980s that some circles inside Washington D.C. might be considering a 
political exit from the Salvadoran conflict. Morris, responsible of CISPES’ congressional 
strategy, argues that it was a “gradual process” where it became clear that “there is not 
going to be a solution without the FMLN.” In the late 1980s, Samantha, a CISPES staffer 
on the West Coast, stated that the line of the organization “was to raise visibility of the 
FMLN.” On January 23rd, 1988, in a communication regarding the planning of the 6th 
Annual Midwest CISPES Conference, the Midwest regional office called all the 
committee “to expand their El Salvador program and to go on the offensive in order to 
protect, legitimize, and build the popular movement in El Salvador.” 
In the discourse analysis of CISPES documents from1988, we can attest that the 
organization defined the state of the FMLN in three themes: the FMLN can create a 
government, the FMLN is winning the war, and the FMLN is organizing an insurrection. 
In October 1988, a document explains how CISPES activists were involved in a new 
campaign called Steps for Freedom. CISPES headquarters in Washington D.C. states that 
the Salvadoran people demand “the formation of a government which truly represents a 
majority of the people, a government of national consensus.” This government would be 
achieved through a “national dialogue, involving the FMLN/FDR, the government, and 
the popular movement.” The other two themes (FMLN is winning the war and FMLN is 
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organizing an insurrection) are evident in a communication from the Midwest Regional 
offices in Chicago to all the local chapters in the area. CISPES Midwest assumed the 
“rapidly” expanding “opposition movement” in El Salvador was a fact; a “fact” that 
could be leveraged by “the promotion and legitimization of the FMLN/FDR as a key 
part of [their] support for the movement.”  
By 1988, the talks between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government, 
initiated in 1984, became stagnant. Three situations contributed to the stagnation of 
the dialogue: the decline in Duarte’s health, the eventual end of the Reagan 
administration in the early 1989, and the potential victory of right-wing Republican 
Nationalist Alliance (ARENA in Spanish) in El Salvador’s presidential election in 
March, 1989. CISPES’ self-definition relies on the themes of Block the Pentagon, a 
one-day non-violent blockade outside the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. On 
October 18th, 1988, over 1,000 activists protested there. At least 250 of the 
demonstrators were arrested (CISPES, 2018a). CISPES (2018a) framed “Block the 
Pentagon” as part of CISPES’ campaign El Salvador: Steps to Freedom that attempted to 
stop the U.S. military aid to El Salvador. The blockade replicated the 1967 protest 
opposing the war in Vietnam that gathered over 30,000 demonstrators (Bates, 1967). 
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Figure	8:	1988:	The	legitimation	of	FMLN	
 
 
1990: The end is near 
As in 1989, in 1990, many of the themes related to the strengthening of the 
FMLN in the battlefield (FMLN’s military strength is an advantage) were combined with 
themes that framed the guerrilla as a responsible political force (that the FMLN should be 
part of the negotiations) (Figure 9). In this period, there was an emerging discussion 
about race relations within CISPES, acknowledging that the organization was 
overwhelmingly white. On April 1990, a staffer of CISPES’ Southwest regional office – 
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which coordinated CISPES chapters of Southern California, Arizona and Nevada - 
reported that at the 1990 CISPES national convention in January the organization decided 
“to become a multiracial solidarity organization.” In the opinion of the staffer, CISPES as 
a “mostly white organization” was beginning “the process of becoming a multi-racial 
solidarity organization.” The organization envisioned a new time in which the 
congressional work was a “means”, but not an end.  
By April 1990, U.S. assistance to El Salvador suffered a huge blow after the 
killing of six Jesuit priests and two of their collaborators in the midst of the FMLN 
military offensive in November 1989. After the slaying of the priests, the Bush 
administration told the newly elected Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani that ''we 
would accept nothing less than a thorough investigation'' (Pear, 1990).  Between 
November 20th-21st, 1989, – four days after the assassinations – the House of 
Representative and the Senate voted bipartisan resolutions (409 to 3) that warned the 
Salvadoran government that the resolution of the Jesuit case would be instrumental in the 
allocation of more U.S. assistance (Pear, 1990). From a geopolitical perspective, the fall 
of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989 represented the beginning of the end of the Cold 
War and the future dismantling of the block of communist countries.  
In February 1990, the U.S. supported the role of the United Nations as the broker 
of a peace agreement between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government (Goshko, 
1990). On April 4th, 1990, both sides signed the first pact about the rules and objectives 
of the negations. The new environment favored triumphs for CISPES. On October 23rd, 
1990, CISPES headquarters celebrated a political defeat of the Salvadoran government in 
Congress: 
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A political blow was dealt on October 19 to the Administration’s El Salvador 
policy with the Senate Vote (74-25) to withhold 50% of U.S. military aid to the 
Arena government. A second vote, on the Graham-McCain amendment to 
condition any cuts in aid a unilateral FMLN ceasefire was closer. 
 
Days before the vote, the Bush administration had lobbied to “dilute” the cut to 
the U.S. assistance to El Salvador (Krauss, 1990). For CISPES’ political operators, the 
vote marked “a new phase” in Congress and represented a “psychological boost to the 
popular movement, and the FMLN in their quest to remove the obstacles to a negotiated 
solution based on demilitarization.” Fourteen months later, on January 16th, 1992, the 
FMLN and the Salvadoran government signed a peace agreement in Mexico City. In a 
year and a half, the two sides had agreed to transform the Salvadoran political system via 
24 constitutional reforms that weakened the power of the Salvadoran army to the civilian 
government and created a new set of institutions such as the National Civilian Police.  
The themes of CISPES’ discourses reveal that the principal role of the 
organization from 1980-1990 was containment of US policy toward El Salvador first, the 
anti-communist agenda of the Reagan administration and later, to put pressure on the 
Bush administration to support negotiations with the FMLN. The CISPES discourse 
system also shows the perseverance of the organization to define its friends and foes by 
repeating eight core themes that drove the organization on the intricate, complex and 
transnational nature of the Salvadoran conflict. These themes were: 1) The U.S. 
government wastes money on wars, 2) U.S. government is accomplice of the Salvadoran 
government human rights abuses, 3) the U.S. has a long history of intervention in Central 
America, 4) El Salvador is a brutal government, 5) the U.S. is creating another Vietnam 
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in El Salvador, 6) the U.S. is escalating military participation in El Salvador, 7) 
Salvadoran people are politically active and 8) CISPES is a multiracial organization.  
However, the consistency of these messages throughout this longitudinal 
discourse analysis needs to be complemented through the examination of these themes at 
specific junctures during CISPES’ campaigns. I address this by providing a microscopic 
view of the discursive system through seven historical discursive categories between 
1980 and 1990. They are: 
1) 1980: Creating the polarization and defining the struggle 
2) 1981: The emergences of the allies 
3) 1984: The closing of congressional path 
4) 1985-1986: Stop the Bombing 
5) 1987: The National Referendum Campaign 
6) 1988: The Legitimation of the FMLN 
7) 1990: The End of the War is Near 
By putting together these seven historical segments, I see CISPES’ longitudinal 
narrative in three parts: 1) 1980-1981: the presentation of characters in CISPES’ 
discursive system (friends vs. foes) and the problem (reducing damage from Reagan and 
advocating for the FMLN), 2) 1984-1987: CISPES’s definition of its primary spaces for 
political action (Congress and the streets), and 3) 1988-1990: CISPES finds a solution to 
its problems by moving its focus from reducing the damage to framing the FMLN as a 
responsible and powerful actor in the a negotiated solution. 
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Figure	9:	1990:	The	end	is	near			
 
 
What were the public relations strategies CISPES used from 1981 to 1991 to 
influence public opinion and political agendas? 
  
 
96 
From the data produced by the interviews with CISPES activists and the 
examination of documents, I observe a rationale behind the design, implementation and 
evaluation of public relations in the organization. I call this “centralized-decentralized” 
public relations. This “centralized-decentralized” public relations approach consisted of 
concerted strategies designed and led by the organization’s headquarters in Washington 
D.C., and decentralized executions by regional and local chapters throughout the U.S. 
This is especially true after 1985, when CISPES decided to become a national 
organization instead of a network of grassroots organizations (CISPES, 2018a; Donaghy, 
1990; Van Goose, 1988). The analysis of this “decentralized-centralized” approach led 
me to find five types of public relations strategies (media, street, political, fundraising, 
and tours). Each one of the strategies had a series of tactics that coalesces around the idea 
of challenging the U.S. government by using the resources of CISPES activists, who tend 
to be white and college educated.  
A decentralized-centralized public relations  
My interviews reveal that a majority of participants, during their tenure in the 
organization, worked in local and regional offices, as well as in CISPES’ headquarters. 
Between 1985 and 1990, Barbara, Morris and Jeffrey were at the headquarters. Laura was 
a regional representative, but in the early 1990s, she moved to the headquarters. Vincent 
joined the NYC chapter, later worked in the headquarters, and finally landed in a local 
chapter in the East Atlantic region. Samantha was a staffer in a sister organization in the 
Pacific Northwest, but later moved to CISPES’ offices in New England and the West 
Coast. Claudia also had the role of staffer in the Midwest and West coast offices. Alvaro 
worked in the headquarters, and later moved to coordinate a CISPES regional office on 
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the West Coast. Robert and Marla stayed active in its local organization, which was an 
affiliated and semi-autonomous organization that had a larger scope that included 
solidarity actions for the entire Central American region. Marco continued working in an 
organization comprised of Salvadoran refugees, and Gabriela withdrew herself from 
activism on El Salvador and finished her doctoral degree in a California university. 
As one of the principal CISPES strategist since 1985, Morris argues that the 
effectiveness of the organization was developing a reduced set of strategies that produced 
a multitude of tactics. Morris revives: 
If you have everybody in a concerted way in a campaign, not doing similar tactics 
but having the same strategy, you're going to be more effective. That's true of any 
movement, right. I don't feel that it's only a CISPES issue, I would say that today. 
That's one of the lessons of CISPES; you punch above your weight. In other 
words, we were tiny; if you really think we had 100 (staffers) and…20 chapters 
and another 200 groups that are affiliated – I forget the exact numbers. We were 
pretty visible, present and effective at what we did because of that fact and 
because we did have a group of people that were very committed to participating 
and developing the strategy, and then carrying it out. Again tactics can be flexible, 
but if you have the same strategy or similar strategy, you’re ultimately going to be 
more efficient. 
 
Morris also argues that at the center of concerted strategies was the goal of developing 
messages that transform what many saw as radical ideas into “mainstream discourses”. In 
the eyes of Morris, the efforts of CISPES to initiate local referendums about U.S. 
assistance to El Salvador in the early 1980s – in cities such as San Francisco, Portland, 
and Eugene – reveals the efforts of transforming a fringe cause into a national movement. 
He called this effort “mainstreaming”:  
But one of the things about CISPES, even though by any outside observer can 
consider us Left, we were very tactically flexible. We wanted to reach out to the 
broadest audience, reach out, get involved as many people as possible and find 
ways to engage people in creative ways. And that's what attracted me to CISPES. 
It wasn't dogmatic, you've got to do things one way tactically or you know that 
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you have a strategy; you have a goal, which was to stop the U.S. War in El 
Salvador and to support the struggle. 
 
CISPES’ emphasis on transforming its messages into a mainstream code seems to 
confirm Mundy’s (2013) findings on LGBT organizations at the state-level. Mundy 
argues that LGBT organizations crafted their message using “mainstream” language that 
catered to general publics. This means that their discourses about marriage equality were 
“non-combative,” “positive” and communicated “the importance of diversity, the breadth 
of diversity within the LGBT community, and how that diversity reflects society as a 
whole” (p. 388). 
Barbara, also working at the headquarters, assures that CISPES planned its 
campaigns in ways that included input from regional and local representatives:  
If it was huge campaigns, we had, there were quarterly meetings called the 
national advisory committee meetings, and so they would be discussed there and 
approved, and those were based on representatives throughout the regions. Or if 
there weren’t a meeting coming up, there would be like a communication; it 
wasn’t like the national office just decided, “this is the campaign we are going to 
do.” There was like a process with the regional coordinators to talk about, “this is 
what we are proposing, can you guys talk about this and tell us what you think 
and give us your input.” Then based on that, we might go for it. And usually, 
people knew it was based on what the need was down there, so the feedback was 
really just tweaking it and making it be a better campaign. Once in awhile, there 
were some issues about some stuff, like people had other work going on, but it 
usually worked. 
 
As a regional coordinator, Laura recalls that she had to travel at least “twice a 
year” to the capital to have strategic meetings with CISPES staffers that lasted “3-5 
days.” From those encounters with regional representatives, CISPES would produce 
materials and suggestions of activities: “We would usually come up with the base (of the 
campaign), and we would send that to the country. So everyone would have a press 
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release. Obviously, local things were going on, you had to adjust it”. Later, Laura 
explained the role of a centralized strategy in regional mobilization: 
We would have local protest but there was kind of a message so a lot of it was we 
would strategize. We would always start our meeting with an analysis of our 
reality and so we would base and do prototypes, so the committees would not 
have to reinvent the wheel. That’s how we were able to get our message and have 
such a broad impact. I think through that multiplying (process). Our democratic 
process was important, people could give input on the strategies; write papers for 
our conventions and even (attend) to the regional managers meetings.  
 
As regional coordinator, Laura serves as the connection between the national office and 
the local chapters and other affiliated organizations. “Some people made fun of me as 
being the most democratic regional director, that I would bring up the opinions of the 
committees. Other people were just like made [the decisions] more top down. I listened to 
people and made strategic battles to build consensus [with local chapters],” she 
remembers. 
 Claudia and Samantha shed light on the complications involved in assembling 
public relations strategies and tactics in the chapters. From their testimonies, I argue that 
staffers in the local chapters were responsible for preparing materials and organizing the 
collective mobilization of members and allies. Claudia recalls that she was responsible – 
in a chapter in the Midwest – for writing the newsletter to CISPES’ donors and doing “a 
lot of press work” for the protests. “I was on the radio and TV stations… and then we 
were always going out to churches, communities, anybody who would meet with us. And 
I did a lot of that work, especially in the summer of 1988,” Claudia recalls. She explained 
that before each protest “we would decide who would do media work by event…There 
wasn’t just one person in charge, we would build it collectively and in a coalition, and we 
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would divide roles.” However, Claudia asserts, she would take “the communication role” 
because she was the staffer. 
Samantha, who worked in an affiliated organization in the Northwest, explains 
that the model in which she was embedded was “more democratic than some CISPES in 
a way.” She illustrates her role as the only staffer, especially being the intermediary 
between the leadership and the volunteers: 
It was a general meeting that would run, so I wasn’t making decisions. I was 
implementing them, so if we were doing a fundraiser, I would be in charge of 
recruiting the volunteers or creating a committee to recruit the volunteers. I would 
be in charge of working with the group to think about a fundraiser. I was in 
charge of gathering everyone together into organizational groups that made sense 
to carry out the work and also recruiting new members, so it was kind of 
everything. But I wasn’t making the decisions because that was in general 
meeting. Although I was certainly helping to shape them, I would support work 
on the agendas, send out all the mailings, get people to come, all of that. It wasn’t 
without power. 
 
Robert recalled that the volunteers and members of his local chapter used to meet 
periodically to write column opinions, which they later submitted for publication in local 
newspapers. Samantha also remembers the use of paid and unpaid media, especially the 
ways the organization pitched stories to journalists in the late 1980s: 
At the time we also had a radio show on KCC because they were very friendly, 
maybe it was once a month, where we would come on and discuss issues in 
Central America. We had friendly people; certainly, the Guard was trickier. We 
did some paid advertising in the Guard, we cultivated people, but they were just 
harder editorially, but the Weekly was sort of more lefty weekly press, and KCC 
definitely would cover us and we had good contacts there. 
Barbara remembers that the media tour in which CISPES reached out to local audiences 
using tactics such as testimonies of Salvadoran refugees generated a good amount of 
journalistic coverage in small towns. She recalled: “We would go around to college 
campuses and community events and did press work, you know local press work, in small 
towns or whatever, so that was a big thing,”  
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In their interviews, Samantha, Morris, Vincent and Jeffrey all seemed to agree 
that CISPES’ public relations improved by strengthening their relations with national 
media. Morris recalls that hiring a former reporter who helped them have access to elite 
journalists was key: 
We hired a person with media experience in the late 1980s. That bumped up our 
exposure on access because she knew exactly how to talk to the national press, 
and it's again when you could send a press release out. And if you had contacts in 
the media, you got a response. I would deliver press releases all over the 
Washington D.C. to all the major news outlets. I was on Nightline you know 
because we had the strategy that was on thing because we had somebody who 
knew how to do that. I think that at the local level people were just very creative. 
Vincent argues that the sophistication of the public relations was correlated to the 
professionalization of CISPES: 
We became, as a national organization, much more professional. I mean 
disciplined, efficient, serious, practical, trained. All of those things were part of 
becoming more professional, for example, our communications, both internal and 
external, including reaching the media. 
Jeffrey remembers that from the hiring stage, CISPES consolidated two streams public 
relations: internal and external. In the first stream, it was the newsletter “El Salvador 
Alert” – in which Jeffrey and Alvaro participated – that educated their memberships and 
served as an alternative source of information. In the second stream were the new staffers 
who had to do the “mainstreaming” into the national media. In 1988, the national 
headquarters had the opportunity to use those accumulative capabilities after it was 
revealed that the FBI had CISPES – alongside dozens of other Central American 
solidarity movements – under surveillance since 1980 (Shenon, 1988). The scandal 
sparked congressional hearings and dozens of the news articles, contributing to the 
dismissal of the FBI Director, William Sessions. Morris acknowledged that moment was 
“the only time we got substantial national media.” He recalls that the issue was framed by 
the media as “political harassment by the FBI of CISPES and other Central American 
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groups” in the U.S. However, he argues, that this episode in CISPES’ history was an 
exception: 
We focused on local television, local newspapers, and also we did a lot of tours 
with Salvadoreans that got a lot into local newspapers. We made alliances with 
other organizations, faith-based groups, labor unions, because we were trying to 
build coalitions and often those voices were more effective than ours about 
getting the message out. 
 
CISPES’ internal documents, propaganda material, and newspaper coverage 
demonstrate the interactions between a concerted strategy – led and developed by the 
headquarters in agreement with regional and local levels – and the decentralization and 
“flexibility” of the tactics. The newsletter “El Salvador Alert” was an example of how a 
project that started as an effort of CISPES headquarters in Washington D.C. was rapidly 
replicated on a national scale. In June 1981, CISPES published the issue number 9 of “El 
Salvador Alert” in which the organization communicated that the “May 3rd march” on 
Washington that “turned out” “tens of thousands” of demonstrators against the U.S. 
assistance to El Salvador. The “Alert”, as CISPES’ activists called the medium, included 
the reactions to the march by representatives of the Salvadoran insurgency: 
The turnout didn’t go unnoticed by the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), 
the political front of opposition forces in El Salvador. Arnoldo Ramos of the FDR 
told the protestors “…the greatness of this march will fill the hearts of my 
compatriots with hope and enthusiasm to continue their struggle. 
 
The 1981 Alert also provided activists with an analysis of El Salvador’s government, the 
role of the CIA in Central America and a list of literature and videos about the 
Salvadoran situation. The publications listed political documents written by the FMLN-
FDR and movies such as El Salvador: Revolution or Death, filmed by a group of Dutch 
filmmakers. This movie was an important tool in recruiting both U.S.-born and 
Salvadoran activists.  
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By 1986, the “Alert” model had been replicated by the Chicago CISPES chapter. 
The local committee published the “Chicago Alert,” which made announcements about 
protests that would take place in the state of Illinois and give space to CISPES’ national 
campaigns. “Chicago Alert” also publicized the public meeting with the Rep. Frank 
Annunzio that took place at the Church of Our Lady of Mercy in Chicago.  
The “Chicago Alert” chapter connected CISPES’ actions with the “Stop the 
Bombing” campaign. Indeed, the newsletter framed the encounter with Rep. Annunzio as 
part of its efforts to persuade the Congress about stopping U.S. support of the aerial 
bombardment of rural areas in El Salvador:  
(T)he meeting is the result of months of pressure and work by the CISPES 11th 
Congressional District Stop the Bombing Campaign. As reported in the last 
CISPES newsletter, Annunzio entered a statement into the December 2 
Congressional Record vigorously opposing sending military aid to El Salvador 
and noted that U.S. support for the Duarte government is directly linked to the 
bombing of civilians. The Campaign is planning a large and effective meeting to 
show Annunzio that his constituents support his position and to encourage him to 
take further action. Annunzio agreed to the public meeting on January 3 in his 
first face-to-face meeting with members of the Campaign. The congressman told 
Campaign representatives he would not vote for military aid for El Salvador and 
has reservations about voting for economic aid. 
The “Stop the bombing” campaign that ran from 1984 through 1986 is an 
example of CISPES’ decentralized-centralized approach to public relations. Donaghy 
(1990) explains that the campaign was planned by a few members at CISPES’ 
headquarters in Washington D.C and later went national: 
Campaign planners told (CISPES) chapters about the bombing and the new 
campaign, and informed them rather than push one uniform set of tactics, the 
campaign is designed to allow for the maximum amount of flexibility and 
creativity in implementation by committees. The important thing is to plan a local 
campaign which effectively meets the goals. 
Like it happened in Chicago, the Portland Central American Solidarity Movement 
(PCASC) – an affiliated organization to CISPES – joined the campaign and produced 
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flyers calling for people to join the protests and support its fundraising:  
PCASC is planning to put this sign (Stop Bombing El Salvador) in Tri-Met buses 
to make tens of thousands of Portlander aware of what Project Censored, the 
national media watch-dog committed, called the number one censored story of the 
year: the U.S. sponsored bombing of El Salvador… Please send us your 
contribution, and helps us cut through this media black out. 
 
PCASC also organized a “nonviolent direct action” at the headquarters of FLIR systems, 
the company that shipped the helicopters that the Salvadoran government was using for 
aerial bombings. 
     The “Stop the Bombing” campaign also motivated innovative actions by other 
local chapters. Morris recalls how CISPES New York City displayed a balloon in the 
form of a bomb at Macy’s Day parade in 1989. The New York Times (1989) reported 
about the event: 
Seven people received summonses for disorderly conduct yesterday after they 
briefly joined the Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade with a black balloon 
shaped like a bomb that read, ''Stop U.S. Bombing of El Salvador'' on one 
side and ''No Vietnam War in El Salvador'' on the other. The seven inflated 
the balloon and joined the parade at 62d Street and Central Park West about 
10 A.M., a police spokesman, Sgt. Raymond O'Donnell, said. He said police 
officers pulled the group off the parade route at 61st Street. One of the 
demonstrators, Connor Walsh, 23 years old, of 45 West 11th Street in 
Manhattan, said the group wanted to call attention to United States support of 
the Government of El Salvador in that country's internal war. Yesterday's 
demonstration was sponsored by the New York chapter of the Committee in 
Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, which supports Salvadoran rebels. 
''We feel there's a real danger of a larger conflict developing in El Salvador 
and of a new Vietnam War,'' Mr. Walsh said. 
 The connections between the strategic role of CISPES headquarters and the 
relevance of local groups as reproducers of tactics was evident in “Steps To Freedom,” a 
national campaign comprised of eight organizations – including CISPES – that were 
against U.S. military assistance in the region. On February 5th, 1987, the campaign was 
launched and had the goal of “making visible the opposition to the war through the use of 
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creative events and the use of radio and print ads” and “bring organizations together at 
the national and local level on a Central America grassroots campaign.” The campaign 
placed duplicated ballot boxes on street corners, malls, city halls and other public 
institutions. Volunteers encouraged people to vote in favor or against the U.S. role in the 
region. One of the campaign tactics was a blockade against the Pentagon on October 17, 
1988. In a letter to its members before the blockade, the coalition, through CISPES, 
announced: “379 women and men have committed themselves to risk arrest at the 
Pentagon to publicly oppose the U.S. war being waged in El Salvador and throughout 
Central America.” The coalition sent a package of materials to the local groups, which 
included information about the blockade and the goals of the campaign. 
The strategies 
The “centralized-decentralized” approach was at the center of the development of 
the organization’s public relations strategies. Morris explains that in CISPES, the 
communication strategy would be “in support of ” its political goals and “not leading 
that.” After conducting an analysis of CISPES’ internal documents and interviews, I have 
created a table that systematizes CISPES’ strategies into five groups (Table 1). Each 
strategy consisted of many tactics and was activated in different locations, which means 
that geographic place has a relationship to collective actions that occurred. 
The media strategy consists of all the tactics that involved the relationship 
between CISPES activists and people in the media industry. In this strategy, we can find 
tactics such as paying for ads on U.S. media, placing op-eds in newspapers, press 
conferences, media workshops for activists, the “El Salvador Alert,” the effort to 
cultivating relationships with journalists to facilitate friendly coverage, and the 
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production of radio shows. Claudia, Samantha, Robert, and Jeffrey all explained that the 
media strategy was mainly designed and coordinated by paid staff, but with the 
participation of many volunteers. This role of volunteers was essential in the publication 
of opinion editorials that attempted to frame the situation in El Salvador as a U.S. 
intervention war. The coalition of Steps to Freedom, in which CISPES was one of the 
eight organizations, had a direct goal to pay for advertisements in newspapers and radio 
stations. In the late 1980s, CISPES developed a multi-year campaign called “El Salvador 
Public Information Campaign,” which produced TV announcements that attempted to air 
on national TV (CISPES, 2018c). The “El Salvador, Public Information Campaign,” 
complemented the organization’s effort in lobbying, organizing, and fundraising. In 1986, 
CISPES hired Ellen Braune who became the organization’s Communication Director 
until 1990. Braune was one of the strategists of the “El Salvador Public Information 
Campaign,” and its primary goal was to reach out mainstream media and book CISPES 
national representatives in news shows. Before joining CISPES, Braune was a former 
editor and producer at CBS, NBC and PBS. The location of this strategy was remote and 
could be initiated from the headquarters in Washington D.C. or from any regional or local 
committee. 
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Table 2: CISPES public relations strategies and tactics (1980-1990) 
Media Strategy Street Strategy Political Strategy Fundraising 
Strategy 
Tour Strategy 
- Ads on U.S. 
media 
- Op-eds 
- Letters to Media 
- Press 
conferences 
- Press Releases 
- Media 
Workshops 
- Creation and 
distribution of The 
Alert and 
Venceremos 
Magazine 
-Cultivating 
relationships with 
journalists 
-Production of 
radio shows 
- Protest 
Salvadoran 
Consulates 
- Demonstrations 
U.S. branches of 
government 
- Alternative Aid 
- Canvassing 
- Endorsing 
congressional proposals 
- Correspondence to 
Congress 
representatives 
- Correspondence to 
Salvadoran officials 
- Alliances 
- Movie Nights 
-Vigils 
- Monitoring Congress 
 
- CISPES Budget 
preparation 
- CISPES raises 
money for 
earthquakes 
- Direct Mail/ 
Phone 
- Donating 
CISPES 
Washington 
- Door to Door 
Collect 
- Fundraising 
plans 
- Medical Aid to 
El Salvador 
- NEST 
- Salvadoran 
parties 
- Work-A-Day 
Celebrations 
- Pledges of 
Resistance 
- Selling Books 
- FMLN 
speakers 
- U.S. 
musicians 
- U.S. speakers 
- Delegations 
to El Salvador 
- Benefit 
concerts 
Location: Remote Location Political 
Buildings 
Location: Congress/ 
Remote/Universities/ 
Churches 
Location: Street, 
Remotely, 
CISPES, 
community 
centers, 
universities 
Location: 
Universities/ 
El Salvador 
 
 The street strategy consists of all the protests that the organization used to visibly 
repudiate the actions of the U.S. and El Salvador governments in El Salvador. There are 
numerous examples of these actions such as the Pentagon Blockade in 1988 and the 
march against the Pentagon. On February 14th, 1986, CISPES’ Southwest regional office 
in Los Angeles, through an internal document, called its members to “to hold 
vigils/pickets/demonstrations to protest the offensive and to send delegations to the 
Consulate of El Salvador.” In the 1988 Pentagon Blockade, CISPES attempted to 
simulate “the building of a cemetery of grave markers on the grounds of the Pentagon 
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bearing the names of those killed on disappeared in El Salvador.” The locations of the 
street strategies were public buildings, but also some private buildings if the company 
had ties to the U.S. assistance to El Salvador. As Derville (2005) shows, a radical 
organization such as CISPES used “humiliation” among their public relations strategies 
(p. 528). These types of actions distinguish more radical organizations from moderate 
ones. 
 The political strategy consisted of all the actions CISPES took to influence U.S. 
policy-making in the federal, state and local levels. The political strategy also included all 
the efforts to form new CISPES chapters. Unlike the street strategy, the political strategy 
– more than to merely humiliate the U.S. government – tried to have a direct impact on 
the work of U.S. politicians. The most relevant tactic was CISPES’ correspondence with 
politicians both in the U.S. and in El Salvador. In March 1986, the CISPES Midwest 
Office estimated the engagement of its membership in favor of the “Stop the Bombing 
Campaign “by looking at the numbers of telegrams and letters sent to U.S. and 
Salvadoran politicians. They calculated that over a few days, their members had sent 
“over 20 telegrams” to Duarte, “over 20 telegrams” to the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador, 
“70 letters sent to Congressional Representatives,” and made “several phone calls to 
Congressional offices.” On June 6, 1986, CISPES headquarters informed its membership 
that Salvadoran activists remained in custody of the Salvadoran authorities. “It's 
imperative to continue pressure on the U.S. Embassy, Duarte and Congressional 
representative to stop the repression against human rights organizations and release the 
members captured by the Treasure Police,” the press release states. In the same 
document, CISPES announced that the organizations and individuals from several states 
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had sent telegrams to politicians. They publicized that 15 telegrams were sent from 
Massachusetts, two telegrams from Lexington, Kentucky, two from Chicago, four from 
Iowa City, five telegrams from Santa Cruz, California, eight telegrams from Eugene, 
Oregon, and 20 telegrams from Seattle. CISPES also reported a phone banking campaign 
in Tacoma, Washington. Another tactic in their political strategy was CISPES’ support of 
alternative ways to provide material assistance to the people of El Salvador. In March 
1986, CISPES Midwest called its members to support the New El Salvador Today 
(NEST), an organization that supported civilians in war-torn areas throughout El 
Salvador. CISPES explains the organization’s goals: “NEST is a non-profit foundation 
which supports material aid projects organized by the popularly elected councils, groups 
in the countryside of El Salvador which replace the militarism of the Duarte government 
with democracy.” 
 The fundraising strategies were comprised of all the actions aimed at gathering 
monetary contributions for CISPES’ political goals. The most frequent fundraising tactic 
was through mail/phone contacts. Days after the earthquakes of October, 10th, 1985, 
CISPES’ headquarters invited its members to donate “through independent humanitarian 
aid channels.” They also planned to start phone banks, canvasses and “collections at 
street corners, churches, and schools.” In June 1981, the “El Salvador Alert” announced 
that the organization “has been growing very quickly” in hopes “to build a strong national 
movement,” but they were “desperately in need of funds.” “If we do not receive 
substantial funding in the next months, we will be unable to continue our work through 
the summer and launch massive campaigns in the fall,” CISPES internal document states. 
The fundraising goal was to receive $25,000 by “September 1” 1981. Members and 
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supporters could send their contributions to a P.O Box in Washington D.C. 
 The tour strategy consisted of journeys that involved a series of stopovers both in 
the U.S. and in El Salvador in which CISPES members were able to communicate the 
organization’s goals across international regions. In 1984, the CISPES South East office 
communicated to the headquarters that they were organizing a tour with progressive 
speakers to cities in Georgia and Florida. Among the speakers was Charles Clements, a 
medical doctor and human rights advocate who volunteered as medical staff in areas 
under the control of the FMLN. Another type of tour involved delegations organized by 
CISPES that visited El Salvador gather first-hand knowledge of the situation there. 
Delegations were public relations tactics because in the minds of CISPES’ organizers, 
bringing U.S.-born citizens to Central America could have a ripple effect in recruiting 
new people to the organization and, at the same time, serve as testimonies for CISPES’s 
lobbying efforts. Barbara explains part of the rationale behind the delegations to El 
Salvador: 
We wanted for people to see first hand what was going, not just hear from us, but 
having their own experience. (We want them) to use that experience to come back 
and strengthen the work that they were doing, and give them more credibility, and 
hopefully more access to another circle of people to help them to know what was 
going on down there. When they go meet with their congressional representative, 
they can say, I saw this, I talked to this person who had been in jail and this is 
what had happened…. Maybe, we could have done more, but I think they were 
probably one of the most effective things that we did, and even we were able to 
take Gus Newport, the mayor of Berkeley. 
 
Samantha put the effectiveness of the delegations in religious codes: 
If you put it in religious terms, it’s conversion. You know, which means it’s a 
turning of the heart and because you know for Americans -and particularly for 
middle-class Americans- live in a bubble…. And you go, and it’s a very intense 
experience, you see the reality of the poverty, the shantytowns, the effects of the 
war, you hear testimony from people, you talk to folks there. It’s a consciousness 
that you suddenly see. I will stand for the integrity of that intense experience 
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though. It was intense, and there is a way in which I can look back now and sort 
of distrust (of people saying they) give you like nothing but the truth. But (in the 
case of CISPES) it wasn’t wholly managed, there were chances to get out and talk 
to people, and the testimonies were true. I mean bombs were being dropped; 
people were being shot, that was true. Especially after the peace accords, we used 
to have meetings with the American Embassy, that was always really fun. 
 
Claudia recalls that CISPES sent at least one delegation to El Salvador every 
month and to be part of the delegations. She noted that the travelers had to be interviewed 
by a CISPES staffer before being approved to go. She explained that the delegations were 
based on the concept of accompaniment, “which was the idea to let the people in the 
Salvadoran struggle know that they weren’t alone.” Accompaniment also means “to build 
witness to what happened, to bring it back to the United States, and then to also offer the 
small amount of safety that our bodies could offer.” Claudia acknowledged that the 
presence of U.S. citizens in war-torn areas in El Salvador was an asset against police and 
military brutality: “Sometimes they wouldn’t attack a march if they knew people from the 
United States was in it, sometimes they wouldn’t raid a particular office, if they knew 
people from the United States were in it.”  
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CHAPTER VI  
            FINDINGS OF RQ3 
RQ3. What was the role of race, class, and gender in the construction of these 
discourses?  
 I argue that similarities among the majority of CISPES’ U.S.-born activists 
(white, college-educated, with strong connections with activists of color) became the 
principal precedent for activists in joining the organization. In particular, I believe that 
the most precious asset of CISPES was its whiteness, and what whiteness signifies in 
U.S. society. With U.S. Congress being 95 percent white (Bialik & Krogstad, 2017), the 
whiteness of CISPES staffers was fundamental in building strategic relationships with the 
Washington establishment and, simultaneously, with its white- majority activist base. 
Bonilla-Silva et al. (2006) and Di Tomaso (2013) confirm that whiteness is an asset that 
provides individuals access to social capital and job opportunities. Educational level and 
language skills were also fundamental prerequisites for doing CISPES’ strategic work. 
My examination of the organization’s public relations strategies and tactics show that 
some of those activities required activists to possess a college-level education or be 
somewhat sophisticated and politically savvy. They had to execute duties such as writing 
press releases, monitoring the voting records in Congress, planning fundraising activities 
and pitching stories about the Salvadoran solidarity movement to the U.S. media.  
McAdam (1986) and Viterna’s (2016) models of activist and insurgency 
recruitment have influenced this dissertation, especially the ways in which both theorists 
thread the relations between life-experience, structural factors and identity formation. 
However, I argue that both models - especially McAdam (1986) - overlook the centrality 
  
 
113 
of racial identities, and other intersectional identities, in the recruiting of activist 
organizations, especially the ones with a majority of white members. In the same tenor, 
public relations theory, with the exception of Mundy (2013, 2016) and Edwards (2013), 
have avoided acknowledging that the organizations will appear to be insufficient in 
providing higher-ranked positions to practitioners of color or practitioners who originated 
from the lowest echelons of our society.  In many situations, people of color occupy the 
lower echelons of our society. 
 Interviews with CISPES staffers reveal that the participants were aware that the 
organization was a white-majority space, but at the same time, their narratives show that 
the “nature” of this white-college educated organization was strategically negotiated 
between the white leadership and Salvadoran refugees with strong ties to the FMLN and 
other popular movements in El Salvador. Many of these refugees were undocumented, 
but had a rich history of political organizing in the Salvadoran left. The life-stories of 
CISPES participants probe the historical processes that facilitated the emergence of 
CISPES in the early 1980s. The mobilizing organizational identities of these white, 
educated activists were facilitated by their early memories of witnessing racial injustices, 
or what I call “the racialization of political life stories”. 
The role of race and other intersectional identities (e.g. social class, education 
level and gender) in the recruitment of staffers and volunteers in CISPES is better 
explained by the process of intersectional recruiting, a model that I propose here. 
Secondly, understanding public relations as an instrument to preserve the organization’s 
collective identity lies at the core of my ideological identity model of public relations. 
Both models are historical in the sense that they follow the life stories of the participants 
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and their political trajectories from their childhood to their enrollment in CISPES. The 
uniqueness of my approach is that race represents an entry point to examine the 
foundations of these organizations. The models I propose here are rooted in their 
historical contexts and should not be seen as fixed artifacts. However, I argue that racial 
and economic factors in the U.S. that contributed to the formation of CISPES have not 
been overcome since the 1990s. 
 By using a life-story methodology (Taggs, 1985; Rubin &  Rubin, 2011), I paid 
attention to the sequences of events that led CISPES activists to embrace the organization 
and its causes (McAdam, 1986). The sequence of events is traced back to the activists’ 
childhood memories, their experiences in college and the description of the factors that 
motivated their participation in CISPES. By examining common themes of collective 
behavior, rather than anecdotal accounts or personal opinions (Taggs, 1985), I found that 
the majority of CISPES activists (9 out 12) experienced six life- stages in their 
involvement with the organization until 1990 (Figure 10). The exceptions to the process 
were Vincent, Claudia and Laura, who were recruited by CISPES in college or high 
school (Figures 11 and 12). The three participants who did not report that they were 
involved in other activist organizations outside campus before joining CISPES are 
represented in stage 4 of the model. However, the majority of my participants followed 
what I call the model of the process of intersectional recruiting, which results from the 
dialectical interaction of two underlying forces: 1) the necessity to create a white 
organization that effectively challenged Reagan’s foreign policy and 2) the strong 
relationships with Salvadorans in the U.S. who became a sources of inspiration, political 
advice and resources for CISPES’ activism.  
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Process of intersectional recruiting 
The stages of the process of intersectional recruiting are: 
1. The foundations of the radical individual 
2. The racialization of political life stories 
3. “Despertar de la conciencia” (awakening of consciousness) triggered by an event  
4. Rehearsals for radical politics 
5. The formation of the white organization  
6. Reconfiguration of the white organization: the awakening to gender and race 
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Figure	10:	Process	of	intersectional	recruiting	
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Figure	11:	process	of	intersectional	recruiting	of	Laura	and	Claudia	
 
  
Figure	12:	process	of	intersectional	recruiting	of	Vincent	
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The foundations of the radical individual 
When the participants were questioned about their childhood, they tended to 
provide explanations related to their parents’ occupations and ethnicity, the geographic 
location of their upbringing and parents’ political leanings. During my conversations with 
U.S.-born activists, the description of their social class varied from wealthy to working-
class. However, among activists,  there were two underlying themes: 1) the break from 
tradition and 2) the continuation of radical heritage. The first theme was found with 
individuals from wealthy and conservative backgrounds who acknowledged their 
privilege but interpreted their time before attending college as a place where they escaped 
(Vincent, Robert, Gabriela and Barbara). On the opposite trajectory, participants from 
somewhat progressive upbringings (Laura, Samantha, Marla, Claudia and Jeffrey) or who 
grew up in El Salvador (Marco and Alvaro) see their early years as a heritage that they 
continued later in life through their work in CISPES. 
 Regarding the theme of breaking from tradition, Vincent, – a white male raised in 
New York City – who was born in a small town in Pennsylvania, describes his 
background in a privileged Irish-American family: 
I’d say I was you know, I’m pretty bourgeois. My father was a university 
professor. My mother had inherited some money and so we were not wealthy, but 
we were quite comfortable and then she inherited more money so we were kind of 
wealthy. I was born in 1957 when my dad was teaching at X University, and then 
he was hired and spent the rest of his career at Y University in Pennsylvania, in 
this small town in Pennsylvania, which is where I grew up. I think of that as my 
hometown. So I grew up in a small college town in Pennsylvania, but then when I 
was 12, I moved to New York and I sort of went back and forth for the rest of my 
youth between that town and New York, and in many ways that’s still how my 
life is. 
 
Regardless of his class background, Vincent was brought by his mother as a child 
to anti-war demonstrations in the 1960s. “There was a peace center right in my 
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neighborhood, you could walk in there and be given something, if they needed flyers 
handed out, at the time, ” Vincent recalls. To escape from his bourgeois background, 
Vincent began working in “progressive” political campaigns before finishing high school. 
Robert -a white man from Connecticut- also came from a similar privileged 
background. His father was a science university professor who worked in several Ivy 
League universities.	“My father is a geneticist so he was working on the tracing of the 
roots of corn; he worked with the University of Agriculture of Mexico,” he calls to mind.	
Robert reveals his struggle with his parents’ conservatism: 
My parents’ politics were pretty conservative and I was conservative too in High 
School. But I went from that to seeing things in a really completely different way 
over those four years. Some through class and some through outer class 
experience, both.   
His tension with his privileged past has led Robert to call himself “a declassee 
 intellectual,” a politicized individual detached from his social class origins.  
Barbara -a white woman grew up in New Jersey- remembers her working-class 
household:  
My father when he got back from the war… he never graduated from college… 
My mother was a professional tap dancer and didn’t even finish high school 
because both of her adopted parents passed away and she had to make a living. So 
that was their educational background. 
 
Despite this, Barbara broke with her “very conservative family”, as her father was 
upset by her involvement in the protest against the war in Vietnam in the early 1970s. 
Gabriela - a white woman from Northern California- also had origins in the working 
class. Gabriela’s mother worked as a grocery clerk at a supermarket. However, her 
parents got divorced in early 1960s. “And so my parents divorced when I was nine and 
my mom raised my sister and me just by herself with no help from my dad, he was a 
deadbeat dad, I think he once gave her 100 dollars. But basically she took care of us on 
very little income, so I think that also affected me, growing up just barely making it,” she 
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remembers. Gabriela’s grandparents and parents were Republicans too, however, they 
were “struggling to try to get ahead in the middle class.”  For Gabriela, the dream of 
upward mobility for her parents “was a lot of lies they were swallowing.”  Gabriela did 
not buy her parents narrative of the U.S. society. 
On the opposite trajectory, Laura – a white woman- feels like the inheritor of a 
progressive tradition. Laura lived her childhood in the suburbs of Cleveland, Ohio. “My 
mother studied history and my father dropped out of high school and was in the Navy and 
started his own business. So we're a middle class family in Cleveland,” Laura remembers. 
Laura’s mom was Catholic and taught in “impoverished areas of Cleveland”. “I guess 
part of the social justice teaching of the Catholic Church rubbed off on me,” Laura 
argues. In a similar fashion, Jeffrey- a white man in his 50s- grew up in Salem, 
Massachusetts “in a middle class family” with a father who was a teacher and in summer 
a “merchant marine.” Jeffrey’s father belonged to multiple unions in Massachusetts. 
Samantha’s father was an Episcopal priest and her mother a Catholic house 
maker, both, she confesses, “white” “New England Yankees”. Samantha-a white women- 
recalls her childhood in Worcester, Massachusetts:  
We had this urban ministry and we were in a very much of an immigrant, very 
poor, working class neighborhood in Worcester, Massachusetts when I was young 
and that was very formative for me. I went to a public school, but when I say 
immigrant, it was in transition, it was all immigrant, like we were but a long time 
ago. 
 
Samantha’s parents were active in the civil rights movement through their 
membership to episcopal and catholic churches. Samantha recounts her mother’s 
activism: “my mom was active, I mean she was the wife of an episcopal priest, so she 
was really active in the Roman Catholic Peace and Justice Group and I just remember her 
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talking about what was going on in Central America.” Marla- a white woman from New 
Jersey, who has resided a long time in the Pacific Northwest- relates her progressive 
politics with her upbringing in a family of protestant missionaries. Claudia originates 
from mixed race home with an Irish-American mother and a Mexican immigrant father. 
She recalled that both of her parents met in in anti-racist activism in Chicago. Morris 
originates from a white family in Los Angeles with “mixed” political inclinations, but 
with “kind of a liberal framework in general.” 
The two Salvadorans involved in CISPES trace back their origins with the 
working-class in the cities of Sonsonate and Santa Ana. Alvaro - a Salvadoran man- grew 
up in Sonsonate expressed that father was a “well-known” journalist who was awarded 
“journalist of the year in 1971,” but his mother was a market vendor. Alvaro’s parents 
met in an electoral campaign in the early 1950s. Both parents supported the conservative 
official party in El Salvador. “My mother was a political organizer inside the market,” 
explains Alvaro who acknowledged that his father also did a little activism for 
conservative causes. However, his father, as a journalist, developed strong relationships 
with “left-wing politicians.” Contrary to the U.S.-born activists, Alvaro reclaims the 
political heritage of his family, but he projects it in a radical way: “I was born in a 
political activism environment, of knowing the critiques against the government, as well 
as the position in favor of the government. I got to know people who were military and 
municipal leaders,” he acknowledges. Marco’s father was a car mechanic and his mother 
owned a small grocery store in her house. Marco -a Salvadoran man- was born and raised 
in Santa Ana, a city located in the Western side of El Salvador. Like Alvaro, Marco 
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describes himself as a follower of the political history of his family. However, Marco 
located his family’s history of activism in the opposition: 
My family was always in the opposition, my mom's brother was a diputado 
(legislator) in the family for the Partido Acción Renovadora in 1955-56.Also, 
there are teachers in my family, in the past some were teachers. They professed 
the idea of democracy in El Salvador. 
 
As I have shown in the stage of the foundation of the radical individual, one 
group of participants frame themselves as disrupters of their family tradition, while the 
other, as followers of a radical heritage. This is in line with previous research observing 
that white activists follow different life paths in joining organizations (Thompson, 
2001). However, I can see that Salvadoran activists reflect a vision of how their family’s 
political past influenced their radical views. These finding are not definitive and more 
interviews are needed. For example, although he was born in a conservative family, 
Alvaro sees a political continuum, or bridge, between his radical left activism and the 
more conservative views of his parents. Marco has a similar vision, arguing that the role 
of one of his relatives in electoral politics is closely related to his revolutionary praxis. In 
other words, the dilemma that U.S. born activists face between understanding their family 
background either as a disruption and or as a continuation might not be true for 
Salvadoran refugees who came to the U.S. in the 1980s. A potential explanation for these 
two different approaches could be that Latin American people, especially in 1980, had a 
strong tradition of left-wing politics and many expressions of leftist politics originated in 
“conservative” institutions such as the Catholic Church and the Christian Democratic 
Party (PDC in Spanish). For example, Alvaro recalls how his experience as a Catholic 
catechist in his teenage years represented a step toward radicalization. For Salvadoran 
leftists, the ranks of the Catholic Church were fertile terrain for recruitment of cadres, and 
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they adapted their practice and ideology to this long-standing tradition (Alvarenga, 2016). 
Between the 1960s and 1980s, a progressive reading of Catholicism and the emergence of 
the Liberation Theology facilitated the overlapping between radical politics and old 
religious symbols (Chavez, 2014).  Thus, the conflation of an early type of mass 
mobilization and a new revolutionary praxis promoted a framing in which Salvadoran 
radicals understood their past as a continuation of their parents, regardless of their 
political leanings. 
The racialization of life stories 
The second stage of the process of intersectional recruiting shows how CISPES 
activists understood issues of race connected to their childhood. I call this racialization 
of life stories. This is the mechanism that activists use to explain their collective 
mobilization through racial themes before attending college.  Out of 12 CISPES activist I 
interviewed, two grew up in El Salvador and ten were born in the U.S.; seven of them 
(Morris, Laura, Samantha, Marla, Robert, Morris, Claudia) use examples of racial 
injustice to explain their political awakening. With the exception of Laura, I did not ask 
directly about their perception of race in their childhood; however, six participants argued 
that witnessing racism was as an important component in their radicalization. The 
interviews reveal that, before attending college, U.S. activists born in the U.S. were 
already connecting the racial injustices in the U.S. to the role of their government 
globally. 
Laura recalls two events that helped her connect domestic racism to U.S. foreign 
policy. As a child she remembers the house of a black family that was “burned out by 
KKK sympathizers.” In the 1980s, Laura recalls how the death of four Catholic religious 
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leaders in El Salvador shaped her political identity.  “I was a senior in high school and a 
freshman in college when Archbishop (Oscar) Romero was killed and four U.S. 
churchwomen were killed, and one of those women was from Cleveland,” she explains. 
Laura refers to Sister Dorotohy Kazel, who worked training catechists in La Libertad, El 
Salvador, and was killed by Salvadoran death squads in December of 1980. Romero was 
also assassinated in March 1980. Like Laura, in March of 1980, Samantha was in high 
school and the killing of Romero was the subject of her mother’s activism. By then, her 
family had moved the center of its activism from the U.S. civil rights movement in the 
1960s to the struggle of Central American people. Before attending college, Samantha 
recalls how her interaction with seminarians marked her awareness of the role of the U.S. 
in the world: “We also had seminarians come and visit us that we would have from 
Nicaragua and this would be in like pre-revolution in like 77’ or 78’ and so I remember 
just being sort of surrounded by and hearing about what was happening.” 
Earlier in life, in the early 1970s, Samantha experienced racial tensions in her 
elementary and high school in Worcester, Massachusetts: 
Most of the families were Irish, French Canadian - Quebecois, and Italian but the 
neighborhood was very much in transition economically, but also ethnically from 
that sort of white ethnic groups, immigrant groups, still identifying very much -
like they went to their French-speaking church or their Italian church or the Irish 
church-to Dominican, Puerto Rican, Cambodian, and now the neighborhood is 
also Chinese and Vietnamese, but it’s all Asian and Latino now. So the tension 
was this transition and the larger context was in the mid 70s the Boston Busing 
Crisis, so and I remember feeling very much, because of my family, my family 
totally identified with the black families in the busing crisis and with the newer 
immigrants and feeling kind as an outsider within that school because the White 
racism was strong, let’s put it that way, but it also in a context of economic 
dislocation so that’s important to know too that a lot of our fathers were losing 
their jobs. And then we moved to, from there for high school only for my high 
school, to a small town outside of Worcester which was wealthier, sort of semi-
rural, on it’s way to being sort of a higher economic status, tech community, 
eventually, but that was also in transition, so they still had townies, there was still 
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a factory, now long gone, now it’s a shopping mall. But at the time it was in 
transition to sort of townie culture to – you know what that means, kind of like 
local, mostly White, Irish, French Canadian kids to more upper class, upper 
middle class tech workers of all kinds of backgrounds, that was also happening 
when I was there. But the school itself was very white. 
 
While Claudia’s parents met in an anti-racist demonstration in the 1960s, she also 
recalls that their activism had moved from focusing on civil rights to the conflicts in 
Central America. Claudia was nine when Romero and the American churchwomen were 
killed. She recalls the rationale behind her parent’s activism with El Salvador:  
Those (the assassination of Romero and the nuns) were very big deals in my 
house, even though we weren’t Salvadorans or anything, (they were big) because 
of my parents’ activism in the progressive Catholic Church. So those were things 
that I knew about [since] very very young and I knew that the United States, the 
role that you [know] United States had. 
 
Claudia recalls doing activism against the U.S. intervention in Central America at thirteen 
years old. She was fourteen when she was first arrested for civil disobedience. Still in 
high school, on May 19th, 1985, Claudia protested the commencement speech of 
Salvadoran President, José Napoleón Duarte, at the University of Notre Dame (Christian, 
1985).  
 While Laura, Samantha and Claudia’s memories can be seen as intersections 
between racial inequality and the role of the U.S. abroad, Marla, Gabriela, Morris and 
Robert recount other situations in the 1960s and 1970s that helped them build bridges 
between racism and geopolitics before attending college. Marla believes that the faith of 
her “parents and grandparents,” as Protestant missionaries, instilled in her “a sort of 
regional, national, and international connection” with religions from other latitudes. In a 
different tune, Gabriela argues that her political identity was already latent in elementary 
school: 
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I was just really becoming aware of imperialism in its various forms. First in 
Vietnam, but also in Latin America. I started thinking, you know in school, K-12, 
very little of this is taught or discussed. I remember a little bit some of my 
teachers in high school talking about Vietnam and what was going on there like 
the My Lai Massacre, things like that. But I just remember thinking, “Hey, there’s 
a lot going on here that’s not okay.” I wouldn’t say I had a label for it, like a 
certain ideology that I was aware of. I just felt like there’s injustice happening 
globally, and the country I live in is very much involved and responsible for a lot 
of that injustice. 
 
In high school – in the early 1970s – Gabriela witnessed the racism of her 
neighbors in the agricultural area of north San Francisco. “There were lots and lots of 
migrant laborers and I worked in the fields picking fruit, so I saw the inequalities and the 
suffering and the bad treatment of immigrants as I was growing up. And that really upset 
me a lot,” Gabriela remembers. She also felt conflicted when her neighbors called 
Mexicans “lazy”:  
I would be like “wahh [exhales],” “what?!” you know, “They’re doing all the hard 
work! And they're getting almost no, you know very little pay, and they've got the 
whole family out there, the little kids are helping… ” and it just struck me as so 
unjust and upsetting, so I think from early on. 
 
In 1970, before finishing high school, Gabriela went to protest against the Vietnam war in 
Northern California.  
Morris began to link the drafting of his cousin for the Vietnam war with the 
acknowledgement of the conditions Chicanos were living in Los Angeles. Chicanos were 
the only non-white group in Morris’ high school.  
I was on the track and cross country club and you know I had friends there who I 
started to think about what life was like for them versus what life was like for me 
as a White person, so you know I started thinking about these issues very early on 
and in towards the latter part of my high school years, [I] participated in anti-war 
activities. 
 
Robert’s connection with Latin America occurred in 1961 when he was 12 years old. “I 
spent a whole year living in Mexico City, my dad worked in Chapingo and I learned 
  
 
127 
Spanish in Mexico, so I speak Spanish. I went to the American School in Mexico City 
and it was a half day in Spanish in terms of Spanish instruction,” he recognizes. Later in 
life, that experience in Mexico contributed to Robert’s participation in diverse activist 
organizations that ranged from solidarity with the people of Chile to supporting Cesar 
Chavez’s United Farm Workers in the Pacific Northwest. 
In the case of Jeffrey and Vincent, I was not able to discern, through the 
examination of their interviews, how, before attending college, they connected themes 
related to racism with the global role of the U.S. Like Morris, Barbara acknowledges that 
the Vietnam War was a catalyst for her political consciousness in the early 1970s. 
Vincent also traces his radicalization back to the participation of his mother in 
demonstrations in the late 1960s in New York City. As a teenager, he worked “on a 
presidential campaign, for the democratic nomination for a very progressive candidate.” 
As I have shown through the life-stories of 7 out of the 10 U.S.-born activists, 
they were prone to reflecting on racial matters before attending college, in part due to the 
overarching frame created by the Third World Left and dramatic events in which 
members of the left were involved. It is clear that the Third World Left had an influence 
in the U.S. between the 1960s and 1980s providing a more accessible frame to activists 
(Berger, 2006; Pulido, 2006). Thompson (2001) shows that white anti-racists were 
influenced by international events. However, my argument here is not that race and 
international perspectives are inherently connected, but that the understanding of race and 
geopolitics are strongly mediated and connected by ideology. I also argue that knowledge 
about geopolitics shape activists’ understandings about domestic race relations. 
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The awakening of consciousness 
The third stage of the process of intersectional recruiting is, what I call, the 
awakening of consciousness or, in Spanish, “el despertar de la conciencia.”  In this case, 
the awakening of consciousness means gaining a political awareness about how the U.S. 
government affects the quest for social justice in Latin America, as well as in U.S. soil. 
This stage is provoked by a series of historical events that led the majority of U.S.-born 
activists – by then college students – to realize the connections between the domestic role 
of the U.S. government and the conflicts in Latin America. I recognize two different 
ways that college activism influenced the life of CISPES activists: 1) For nine out of the 
12 activists (Barbara, Robert, Samantha, Marla, Vincent, Jeffrey, Marco, Alvaro and 
Morris), college activism was a time of experimentation before joining other radical 
groups outside campus and 2) college as the means to join CISPES directly (Laura, 
Vincent and Claudia). 
College activism as experimentation 
In the early 1970s, Barbara was a college student in a Midwestern university. The 
Kent State University shootings on May 4th of 1980, represented a turning point in her 
life. “We were walking the streets and some of my friends were saying, ‘no we shouldn’t 
be following all of these people, we are just being sheep.’ We are not, we are standing up 
for what’s right,” Barbara recalls.  Like Barbara, Robert, Samantha, Marla, Vincent, 
Jeffrey and Morris, they recall college as the stage in which their commitment 
strengthened. The exception to this case was Laura, who was recruited by CISPES in 
college, and Marco and Alvaro, who attended college in El Salvador prior their arriving 
to the U.S. as undocumented immigrants.  
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For Marla, the turning point in her activism occurred when some of her friends 
were arrested as freedom riders. The freedom riders were activists who challenged 
segregation in Southern states by riding interstate buses in mixed-race groups. Marla 
recalls: 
Their landing in jail was very impressive. I wasn’t there, I was in the college 
health clinic with all freshman with measles and pneumonia which gave me a lot 
of time to think and the thought process was that my friends are in jail for 
something I say I also believe, values I also hold. 
 
Years later, Robert remembers that an awakening of consciousness happened on 
April 18th, 1969, when the Afro-American Society took over Cornell University’s student 
union building for 36 hours.  Robert believes that in a two-year span, his identity entered 
into a leftward trajectory:  
The years at Cornell were very radicalizing for me because it was the years of the 
Vietnam War and in addition to the Civil Rights Movement. And so many things 
happened in the 60s that were really crazy and led me to really change what I 
thought about things quite a lot. So by the end of 71’, I was really quite alienated 
with the rest of society as it was. 
As a freshman at a California university in 1971, Gabriela remembers the 
movement in solidarity with Chile as the moment in which her commitment with the 
struggles of Latin Americans grew deeper. “There was great concern among the peace 
community in the United States that there would be an intervention to overthrow 
Salvador Allende and we were working against that. And then of course he was 
overthrown,” Gabriela states. For Morris, the war in Vietnam triggered his activism. As 
an undergraduate in California, Morris started chapters for political organizations and got 
involved in progressive politics. Morris graduated from college in the 1970s. 
In 1983, Samantha recalls the bombing of rural villages in El Salvador by the 
Salvadoran air forces and the funding of the Contras by the U.S. as the most important 
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episodes in her college activism. “We used to go out and do little demonstrations at the 
post office cause’ it was the only installation of the federal government, we used to march 
around with signs,” she recollects.  Jeffrey also remembers participating as a college 
student in community campaigns in Massachusetts. 
Regarding the role of Salvadorans in CISPES’ orbit, college was also a route for 
radicalization and joining the revolutionary forces. As a student of engineering, and after 
participating in activism in high school, Alvaro joined a strike in a textile mill, and he 
remembers:   
I wanted to participate in a student organization and somebody told me that there 
was a strike (…) I showed up and told the workers that I wanted to help them and 
they interrogated me about the reason I wanted to join the strike. They were afraid 
of being infiltrated by snitches. I informed them I was a student of engineering, 
they asked if I can draw letters and I responded that I have drawn since I was a 
kid. They want me to draw signs and banners. I spend all that night drinking 
coffee and listening to revolutionary songs. 
 
In the mid 1970s, Alvaro’s work as student activist took him from being a new member 
of the organization Universitarios Revolucionarios 19 de Julio (Revolutionary Students 
19th of July) to be a leader of a revolutionary organization with ties to the insurgency of 
the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación (Popular Forces of Liberation).  
 Marco was a student leader at the University of El Salvador. His connections with 
the student organization came from his roots in Santa Ana. During his college years, 
Marco occupied the position of president of the student government and belonged to the 
same organizations that Alvaro did.  Alvaro and Marco had to leave college and El 
Salvador due to the level of repression from the Salvadoran army against student activists 
and others. In 1979, Marco was kidnapped by paramilitary at the entrance of the 
university and decided to leave El Salvador. Months later, Alvaro went into hiding after 
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the death-squads showed up at his house. “I got only three options: staying in El Salvador 
and die, becoming a “guerrillero,” or leave the country altogether,” he recalls. Alvaro left 
and came to the U.S. 
College as the mean to join CISPES 
For Laura, a movie turned her life inside out during her freshman year in an Ohio 
college: 
I was 18…we went to see it and it was called “El Salvador Revolution or 
Death” and it was made by Dutch journalists and they were killed, some 
were killed while making the film. They filmed everything, they filmed 
Romero and they filmed his funeral. They also filmed the people training 
who joined the FMLN, they filmed national guardsmen lining up, 
student’s dead bodies. It was very graphic and so it was kind of shocking 
and I was appalled that it was the U.S. government, my government, 
funding that war which I think we were on the wrong side against the 
people so it was a grave human rights violation. After I saw that film, 
some Puerto Ricans told me about a meeting that was being called by the 
National Lawyers to form a chapter. It was to form a solidarity committee 
and about a month or two later, we became a chapter of CISPES.  
 
After that experience, Laura climbed the organizational ladder from being a founder of 
the CISPES chapter in an Ohio university to a national leader at CISPES headquarters in 
Washington. D.C. There was no intermediate step. In 1983, Vincent did something 
similar after joining a CISPES chapter in a university in New York. In May 1983, 
Vincent was hired to coordinate a door-to-door national campaign at CISPES’ national 
office: The National Neighborhood Protest. Vincent explains how in that campaign, 
CISPES deliberately tried to equate the war in Vietnam with the Salvadoran conflict by 
using similar symbols. 
The goal of the campaign was to put up billboards around the country and the 
billboards had a great image of the helicopter, we all know that helicopters 
suggest counter insurgency, right? Vietnam, a huge helicopter, this image wasn't 
from Vietnam, but it looked like Vietnam, exactly, and above it said, “no Vietnam 
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War in Central America”. And we put up 70 billboards around the country and 
raised the money for the billboards by going door to door. 
 
Vincent stayed in CISPES for few years more in different positions and in different 
locations. 
Claudia went almost directly from high school to a position in CISPES in 
Chicago. Later, she moved to California as the Los Angeles CISPES chapter director. In 
this case, radicalization happened at home and in the demonstration against U.S. 
interventions in the early and mid 1980s. 
The process of recruiting reveals the role of college as a major catalyst in the 
awakening of the political consciousness of CISPES activists. However, the majority of 
the activists had a stage between college and joining CISPES in which they acquired 
organizational skills, tactical repertoires, and a collective identity aligned with the Third 
World Left. In the fourth stage, rehearsals for radical politics, the majority of CISPES 
activists practiced the skills they gained in college or in other political settings before 
joining CISPES.  
Rehearsals for radical politics 
 Rehearsal for radical politics is the stage in which CISPES activists participate in 
an array of other radical causes before formally joining the organization. This moment is 
different from stage three because it occurs outside of college campuses. Of the twelve 
participants, nine of them reported participating in other activist organizations before 
joining CISPES. The three exceptions (Claudia, Laura and Vincent) reveal that they were 
recruited on campuses by CISPES and their adult activism in 1980s and the early 1990 
was entirely dedicated to CISPES. The activism of this period is clearly influenced by the 
political upheaval of late 1960s. McCarthy and Zald (1973) argue that structural factors 
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caused the political effervescence of the late 1960s. They claim that three factors explain 
the emergence of a social movement industry:  
Three related propositions are advanced: (1) the growth of mass higher education 
creates a large pool of students whose discretionary time can be allocated to social 
movement activities; (2) as the relative size of the social service, administrative 
and academic professions increases, more and more professionals can arrange 
their time schedules to allow participation in social movement-related activities; 
(3) a relative increase in discretion over work-time allocation permits the 
emergence of transitory teams to engage in socio-political activities (p. 10)  
 
McCarthy and Zald (1973) believe that these structural changes transformed the 
realm of activism into a professional field. “Movement leaders in this matrix become 
social movement entrepreneurs. Their movements' impacts results from their skill at 
manipulating images of relevance and support through the communications media,” they 
argue. Following McCarthy and Zald’s explanation (1973), I believe the ebullience of 
social activism in that period facilitated the participants’ combined activism in favor of 
radical movements in the Third World with struggle for racial equality in the U.S. This 
allowed them to create networks with a diverse array of activists. 
Marla moved to the Pacific Northwest in 1966. After arriving there, she 
participated in the Vietnam Day Committee, a coalition of diverse organizations that call 
for the end of the U.S. military intervention in Vietnam. From 1969 to the mid 1970s, 
Marla focused on the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, an 
organization that attempts to bring together women from different political and 
ideological traditions in favor of permanent peace.  Marla recalls how she moved her 
interest for a new project in line with the values of Martin Luther King:  
And then starting in late 1974, I worked for CAC, which is now the Community 
Alliance for the County, but it was an initiative that was clearly concerned about 
Vietnam and it was a national organization. Martin Luther King was involved in 
it; actually, he was the chair of the organization at the time of his death. 
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In the fall of 1972, after leaving Cornell, Robert moved to small city on the west 
coast. There he volunteered for Cesar Chavez’ United Farm Workers of America. “My 
wife actually did work for the union in Deleno in 1971. I had some connection. For 
example when Cesar Chavez came to the city in ‘74, I was his bodyguard and my wife 
was his assistant,” he recalls. In 1976, Robert also funded a committee in favor of the 
mobilization for a democratic Chile and the anti-apartheid effort for South Africa. His job 
as a pressman made him responsible for designing and printing pamphlets, fliers and 
invitations for various causes ranging from the anti-intervention movement to the 
women-run national food whole sellers movement. Robert belonged to a co-op of 
printers. In 1977, he published a pamphlet for the Committee for a Free Chile. In the 
document, the Chilean dictatorship Augusto Pinochet appeared with a Nazi cap. The 
leaflet informs that “President Carter, worldwide advocate of human rights, HONORS 
GENERAL PINOCHET by an invitation to Washington for the ceremony of the signing 
of the Panama Canal Treaty Today, September 7”. The pamphlet implored U.S. citizens 
to “speak out against Carter’s support of the FASCIST regime of Pinochet.”  
Like Robert, Barbara embraces the cause of Chile. After she moved from the 
Midwest in the mid 1970s, she hosted Chilean refugees in her group house. She also 
worked in the alternative food system. However, she vividly recalls how a coalition of 
activist organizations coalesced against the demolition of the International Hotel, a low-
income residential hotel where, she says, “elderly Asian people lived”:  
The Asian community there basically called for solidarity. And we organized as 
security teams, because we had also done anti-war protesting and the different 
organizations and work projects would have done security teams to deal with the 
events we had during the Vietnam War, before that was over. There would be 
mobilizations around the hotel down in Chinatown, I mean we would literally be 
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circling around the block. Thousands of people would come out on the weekends 
to protest and to be visible, with the understanding that one day they were going 
to try and knock it down and we were willing to put our bodies between the 
knocking ball and the hotel. (…) It was pretty well known, and then one night, we 
got a phone call like at 1:00 in the morning saying it was happening. Everybody 
got down and we circled the hotel and obviously, they had more equipment than 
we did, and we pretty much got the shit beaten out of us. The worst people who 
got it were the ones upstairs upside, and then those of us in front, and by early 
morning, they had gotten control of it. 
 
Gabriela went off to Mexico City to conduct research for her senior thesis in the 
mid- 1970s. In Mexico, she met political exiles from South America and Central 
America. “I learned a lot about the history of European and US imperialism in Latin 
America and people’s struggles with that, and the efforts to bring about democratic 
change, and again, how countries like the United States would try to thwart those efforts, 
even when we supposedly were a model for democracy,” Gabriela recalls. 
In late 1977, the possibility of a revolution in Nicaragua began to emerge in 
radical circles. Between 1977 and 1978, while living in a predominantly Latino 
neighborhood in the Bay Area, Morris got involved in activism in favor of the 
Nicaraguan revolution. “I remember my door being knocked on and Nicaraguans sort of 
petitioning and raising money for the struggle in Nicaragua,” he remembers. Also, Morris 
belonged to the Alliance for Responsible Employment and Admissions Policies 
(AREAP) that advocated for Affirmative Action in California. 
In 1986, as a senior in college, Samantha went to Washington for an internship in 
a left-wing think tank: 
I actually didn’t do the research on El Salvador, I was focused on Chile and this 
was what, 13 years after the coup, and Jamaica. But the whole purpose was to 
write what was happening in Latin America, so I was surrounded by people who 
were writing about the military operations in El Salvador, and obviously, the 
Contra war. 
Like U.S.-born activists, Salvadoran participants also interacted with other 
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organizations before establishing closer ties with CISPES. After being persecuted by the 
Salvadoran army, Marco and Alvaro arrived in Los Angeles as undocumented 
immigrants in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Marco arrived before Alvaro, and in 
California, he joined a solidarity movement in favor of the Salvadoran revolution, which 
was comprised of Salvadoran and Latin American immigrants. Marco and Alvaro called 
the organization as simply the comité- committee in Spanish. Eventually, Marco became 
the national coordinator. Marco remembers how organizations in support of Salvadoran 
refugees created links with radical movements back in his native country. “Early 1980, 
the four committees decided on the sympathy for the mass organizations of El Salvador. 
And mine was an organization that sympathized with BPR. So we found an organization 
that was trying to be familiar with members of the BPR,” he recalls. BPR stands for 
Bloque Popular Revolutionary (Popular Revolutionary Block), a multi-sectorial 
organization with ties to the FPL – one of the five guerrilla organizations that formed 
eventually the FMLN. Marco’s organization participated in demonstrations against 
human rights abuses in El Salvador and created their own newsletters and propaganda in 
Spanish. For propaganda purposes, Marcos’ committee created a sophisticated logistic on 
the West Coast.  
We even had at one point people in Seattle, we usually gave them a printer for 
them to print their own newsletter because we basically organized them in a way 
that you can produce your own activities and publicize them, so they would ask us 
because we could buy them in Los Angeles at a cheaper price. 
 
Unlike CISPES, Marco says that the audience of their organization was Salvadoran 
refugees and not U.S.-born activists:  
We started with about 100 people that were well organized, that were members of 
different committees by neighborhood. We started expanding and expanding and 
we started to have many activities to collect money, people sold pupusas, tamales, 
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horchata, quesadillas. My mother used to make quesadillas also, my brother who 
was a cashier at the bank, he started to go out and sell this product so we could get 
money to buy printers and paper and all of that. And also of course, to help 
refugees and people who didn't know. You know, we help each other. 
 
Alvaro met Marco in Los Angeles during the exhibition of the movie 
“Revolutionary or Death,” the same movie that CISPES used to recruit Laura in Ohio in 
1981. In the meeting of the comité, Salvadorans, many undocumented and with limited 
proficiency in English, sang revolutionary songs and organized social activities. “By 
1981, we stopped being just a few and we became hundreds of Salvadorans, 300 people, 
that met each Sunday – in the same way Catholics go to mass – in a basement at the 
People’s College Law in Los Angeles,” Alvaro states.   
Alvaro recalls that the organization of comités was inspired by the example of the 
Nicaraguan refugees in Los Angeles who met “at the corners of the MacArthur Park” 
between 1978-1979. Those meetings at MacArthur Park, Alvaro argues, facilitated the 
interactions between Salvadorans, Nicaraguans and California Chicanos: 
The Nicaraguans protested against (Anastasio) Somoza and supported the Frente 
Sandinista (he refers to the Sandinista National Liberation Front) and some 
Salvadorans supported the Nicaraguans. Little by little, Salvadorans started to get 
to know each other and believed they could do something similar and show 
support for the Salvadoran revolutionaries. Later, Chicano college professors 
supported the Salvadorans.  
 
Alvaro believes that symbolism helped create the connections between Salvadoran 
refugees and Chicanos intellectuals. “You have to remember that Chicano ideology, 
created in the 1960s, had our lady of Guadalupe and (Ernesto) Che Guevara as icons,” he 
recalls. Alvaro also remembers how a Chicana law student, Angela Sanbrano, offered the 
“comité” a place to meet at the People’s College of Law.  According to CISPES’ website, 
Sanbrano “was the bridge that brought the Salvadorans and the gringos together and kept 
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us all motivated.” (CISPES, 2018d). 
The stage of rehearsals for radical politics shows that before joining CISPES as 
full-time staffers, U.S.-born and Salvadoran participants had the opportunity to interact 
with diverse networks of activists that advocated for various causes. That experience 
trained them in organizing skills such as legislative analysis, public relations tactics, and 
coalition building. But also, the involvement strengthened their goal to create an 
organization with global goals that acted domestically. Prior to joining CISPES, the 
participants operated in spaces where racial equality and anti-imperialistic goals 
connected. For example, Barbara worked on issues of racial justice such as the 
International Hotel and, simultaneously, supported Chilean refugees. Robert protested 
against the Apartheid in South Africa and mobilized against the Chilean military 
dictatorship. Morris joined a door-knocking campaign in favor of the Nicaraguan 
Revolution and defended Affirmative Action in California through AREAP. In the case 
of Marla, she was a peace activist, especially against the war in Vietnam, but founded an 
organization against the U.S. intervention in Central America. Finally, Marco and Alvaro 
joined an organization for Salvadorans that was inspired by Nicaraguans, but was 
materially supported by Chicano Californians in the early 1980s. The most important 
product from this rehearsal that eventually shaped CISPES was the strengthening of ties 
between U.S.-born participants – a majority white, college-educated group– and 
Salvadoran refugees who possessed strong organizing cultures and a clear revolutionary 
ideology. As we will see in the next stage, CISPES functioned as a majority white 
organization, but received strong guidance from Salvadoran radicals. Some participants 
argue that the majority of members were female. In the words of some participants, the 
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fact that CISPES was a white organization made its strategic goals clear. 
 
The formation of a white organization  
The creation of the white organization had two parts: the co-creation of a 
collective identity, and the formation of the white organization. The first phase takes 
place between 1979 and July 1980, the year when American activists initiated the effort 
to form a national organization (Van Gosse, 1988). The second phase occurred between 
July 1980 and early 1990, when women and people of color started to reclaim a 
discussion about gender and race relations within CISPES.  
Early co-creation of collective identity 
This section examines the interactions between U.S.-born activists and 
Salvadoran radicals prior the creation of CISPES (1979) and in the year of its inception 
(1980). With the term co-creation, I mean that the collective identity of CISPES was a 
product of the relationships between U.S. and Salvadoran radicals. These forces helped 
define CISPES’ purpose, ideology and organizational strategy. Co-creational dynamics 
between Salvadorans and American radicals accompanied the organization throughout 
the 1980s and were both sources of peace and conflict inside CISPES.  
Since 1975, in the U.S. there were a series of efforts to support Salvadoran 
revolutionaries, which back then, were split in between several organizations such as 
FPL, the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP in Spanish) and the Salvadoran Communist 
Party (PCS in Spanish)  (Donaghy, 1990). However, by 1979, some of the strongest 
organizations dedicated to support the Salvadoran revolutionaries were the Frente de 
Solidaridad Popular Salvadoreño (Salvadoran Popular Solidarity Front) in Los Angeles 
and the Comité de Apoyo a la Lucha Popular Salvadoreña Farabundo Martí (Committee 
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of Support of the Salvadoran Popular Struggle, Farabundo Marti) (Van Gosse, 1988). On 
the West Coast, Barbara and Marco argue that their relations with Salvadoran radicals 
were through the BPR, an organization with ties to the FPL. Barbara recalls that first time 
she met Salvadorans with connections with the BPR was in San Francisco: 
It was just the way the organizing was done and then listening to them talk about 
what was going on and I think the thing that I’ve always, and I continue to admire 
about the Salvadoran revolutionary process is that it’s from the bottom up, its 
community-based organizing, you know the CRM, that was the Coordinadora 
Revolucionaria de Masas, was to me, that’s what drew me in because that’s the 
level of work that I like. You know, like right there on the ground. And it was all 
these different sectors coming together, and from there the political… those who 
participated in the struggle… and for that the political revolutionary class 
continued. And I don’t want to be a leader, I don’t want to be out in front, I want 
to be like out on the streets with the masses.  
 
Morris remembers that he encountered Salvadoran radicals through his work 
advocating for Affirmative Action in San Francisco. “We were very involved in 
supporting Affirmative Action and we just had activities on campus. I invited someone 
from Casa El Salvador, to come and speak about El Salvador and I was really moved by 
everything that he said,” he evokes.  
The formation of the white organization 
In July 1980, after meeting with members of a political wing of the Salvadoran 
insurgency the Frente Democrático Revolucionario (Democratic Revolutionary Front in 
Spanish with acronyms of FDR), a group of U.S. activists agreed to initiate a national 
solidarity effort that would eventually hold two conferences: one in Los Angeles and a 
second one in Washington D.C. Close to seven-hundred people were involved in these 
two conferences, from religious representatives to unaffiliated leftists (Van Gosse, 1988). 
In October 1980, CISPES was officially founded after the Washington D.C. conference 
(CISPES, 2018). The concept of CISPES as a white organization means two things: 1) 
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the fact that CISPES was formed and constituted by a majority of white activists, and 2) 
CISPES was a white organization because it used white racial privilege in conjunction 
with the higher education of its members as assets to influence public opinion and 
policymaking. 
In the early 1980s, Morris recalled his interest in joining a “comité”. However, a 
Salvadoran activist told him to wait. “The Salvadorans encouraged me to actually, instead 
of working with them, because they were trying to organize the Salvadoran community 
primarily, they said, why don't you go work with CISPES, that's where Northern 
American solidarity work is being done,” he remembers. Smith (2010) assures that the 
Central American Solidarity Movement was over 90% white and college-educated. 
During my examination of internal documents and conversations with people who have 
access to CISPES archives, I did not come across information about the demographic 
makeup of CISPES. However, through the interviews with the participants – whether 
they were whites, Latinos or Salvadoran-born – all of them agree that the organization 
had a majority of white activists. Barbara acknowledges that “definitely” CISPES was a 
“white organization.” Vincent asserts that “there were a few Latinos and very, very few 
African Americans,” but the class background from the white population was more 
diverse. Laura believes that the organization “was definitely white middle class, but I 
think people that were working on bringing diversity and undoing oppressive behaviors.” 
Alvaro and Claudia calculate that over 80% of CISPES activists were white. Alvaro’s 
estimation is that it “was between 85-95% Anglo Saxons.” Claudia takes a step further 
and argues that the majority of members were female. She bases the interpretation on her 
experience as a staffer in the CISPES regional office in Chicago and as a leader in 
  
 
142 
CISPES Los Angeles. Roberto does not concur with Claudia: “It was more mixed, I 
think, but there were a lot of women involved. I don't recall CISPES being 
overwhelmingly women here. I think it was mixed.” Robert worked in a chapter in the 
Pacific Northwest. 
Regardless of the composition of the entire CISPES membership, the 12 
participants had a similar educational background during the time that they worked with 
CISPES: all of them had attended college. From the 12 participants, 8 worked as staffers 
in CISPES, two were volunteers (Robert and Marla) and one was a leader in the 
Salvadoran refugee movement who coordinated activities with CISPES (Marco).  I 
interviewed 10 U.S.-born participants; nine identified themselves as white and one as a 
Latina (Claudia). I understand my sample is not representative of the universe of the 
organization, but this research seems to confirm Smith’s (2010) findings. Smith (2010) 
found that the vast majority of the members of the Central American Solidarity 
movement in the U.S. in the 1980s were white with a college education. Although there is 
no quantitative proof of the organization’s demography, all the participants expressed a 
belief that CISPES was a white organization.  
Since its founding, CISPES’ ideology coalesced with its two strategic goals: to 
stop the U.S. intervention in El Salvador and to support grassroots revolutionary 
movement in El Salvador. “It was about intervention but also about progressive 
movements. I mean, the revolution in Nicaragua was empowering to a lot of people here. 
We saw it as a really hopeful thing. So people thought that maybe that could happen in 
other places too,” Robert recalls. Barbara adds to the definition of being critical with the 
“U.S. role” in the region. Morris assures that to achieve those two goals, CISPES would 
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“do things one way tactically, or you know that you have a strategy, you have a goal.” In 
Claudia’s opinion CISPES’ ideology attempted to attract as many activists as possible:  
Personally, I wanted the FMLN to win the war, and I wanted them to develop the 
kind of country that they wanted, you know, I wanted that. I wanted El Salvador 
to do with its country what it would do without U.S. interference. I wanted that! 
And I think the creation of alternatives and southern strategies and all that kinds 
of things, I think that many people believed that. But other folks who were just 
liberal democrats who just didn’t want their tax dollars go to – and we could stand 
side by side, because in the end I wasn’t fighting for socialism and they weren’t 
fighting for democracy, we were fighting – you know that’s why, the two goals: 
support, you know, the FMLN and the civilian struggle in El Salvador, and cut off 
the aid. 
The interviews with CISPES activists reveal that CISPES’ ideology was 
deliberatively crafted around its organizational purposes to prevent being framed as too 
ideological by the Reagan administration, while at the same time, attract as many recruits 
as possible. These recruits originated from diverse ideological backgrounds and 
ideological traditions. 
Rationales for whiteness 
In questioning my participants about the rationale behind the whiteness of the 
organization, I differentiate two themes: whiteness as strategic tool, and whiteness as an 
unconscious force. In the first theme, the participants provide strategic reasons for why 
CISPES became a white space. In the second one, I observed that some of the U.S.-born 
activists assure that they were not aware of the influence of race in the work of the 
organization. This, I call unconscious rationale. Frankenberg (1993) argues that 
whiteness is a structural location that provides white people with a “standpoint” to look at 
themselves and at the same time, cultural practices that are “unmarked and unnamed” 
(p.1). In this case, I want to look at these two dimensions of whiteness and its role in 
CISPES organizing and communication. In CISPES, the strategic reasons were more 
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frequently mentioned that the unmarked ones. 
Whiteness as a strategic tool 
The sub-themes that define whiteness as a strategic tool for CISPES can be 
divided into three: 1) whiteness as a negotiated asset, 2) U.S. citizenship as a 
responsibility, and 3) whiteness as the only resource available. 
Whiteness as a negotiated asset 
In the eyes of Alvaro and Marco – the Salvadoran activists who arrived to the 
U.S. as refugees in the early 1980s – whiteness in CISPES represented the privilege that 
U.S. citizens had to influence U.S. policy-making in favor of the revolutionaries in El 
Salvador. Salvadoran radicals, including the FMLN, encouraged the formation of an 
organization exclusively for U.S. citizens, which in the 1980s meant it was a 
predominantly white organization. Alvaro gives a candid explanation about this: 
Remember that the circles of power respond to its constituency, but it is not the 
same as me, as a U.S. citizen or American citizen – whatever you want to call it – 
with my appearance as Latino, my capacity of influence is limited if you compare 
it with somebody who is blond, blue eyed and with white skin. The system is like 
this. You got me? The U.S. Anglo Saxons are very humane and sophisticated in 
the analysis about the wars that their government begins. Therefore, they tend to 
get involved in those causes. Please don’t lose perspective that in anti-nuclear 
movements, the majority were whites, the same with anti-apartheid movements. 
 
Marco agrees with Alvaro that whiteness was an asset for the Salvadoran cause. 
“They were more resourceful and they knew it was possible (to influence U.S. foreign 
policy).We had people that had already been in solidarity with Chile, with Nicaragua, and 
with Vietnam. They knew better than us, we didn't know these things,” Marco reflects, 
who also added that he believed Americans liked “our commitment.” 
Marco also recognizes that the creation of CISPES was a deliberate decision to 
funnel the organizing capacities of U.S.-born activists. Salvadoran radicals felt 
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unprepared to organize American activists on American soil: 
In practice, we realized that they were more effective in organizing themselves 
but we were too small, we couldn't grow at the pace they did, if we were trying to 
have people. And also, we discussed among us and recognized that we could not 
look like we were conspiring against this country because we were not, so we 
wanted them to talk to other of their fellow citizens. We thought that it was more 
legitimate that Americans can talk to Americans. And also we learned a lot 
because we came with the same rhetoric that organizations had in El Salvador, so 
at times, we were not careful enough to convince anybody, to persuade anybody 
to help us. So they were more, and they also chose the speakers among us. Some 
of us were more tactful than others and also some of us started to learn to speak in 
English. 
 
Alvaro and Marco argue that Salvadoran radicals, like themselves, faced two 
structural constraints in their organizing efforts against the U.S. government: being 
undocumented and a lack of fluency in the English language. “For some Anglo Saxons, it 
was harder to communicate, understand or believe in a Salvadoran who does not speak 
English and had a different skin color, hair type,” Alvaro remembers. Marco reveals that 
the majority of people in the comité were undocumented with a few people “with (U.S.) 
citizenship.”  
Furthermore, Alvaro also acknowledged that Salvadoran radicals were aware that 
whites were more inclined to participate in solidarity movements than other racial groups.  
They (whites) had the appropriate spaces and conditions to get involved in these 
causes. Meanwhile, African Americans are struggling against racism and 
alleviating poverty. There are social limitations. Therefore, we always need to put 
in context the reasons of the predisposition of Anglo Saxons to participate in 
humanitarian mobilizations. 
 
Morris and Barbara – both white and college-educated– agreed that they 
established a non-authoritarian relationship with the Salvadorans. Barbara says, “they 
(Salvadorans) told us what was going on down there… it wasn’t a bunch of North 
Americans or Americans deciding to work with CISPES, it was based on the needs of the 
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Salvadoran people.” She continues by stressing that Americans were clear about the “the 
role of our government” and “knew it was wrong”. In her opinion, what made CISPES 
strong was the organization’s relationship with Salvadorans. Between 1979 and 1980, 
Morris asked a Salvadoran about joining his organization but they responded, “there's this 
group that might be forming called CISPES.”  
Gabriela recalls that she was recruited in Los Angeles because her CISPES 
recruiter – who was a Salvadoran man – saw her as “middle class, white, educated”. “We 
had some free time, we had some resources, discretionary income, not a lot, though as 
students. I mean students in general don’t have a lot, but middle-class students are more 
likely than working class students,” she evokes. Samantha gives an example of how her 
origins influenced her effectiveness as an activist: “New England has some culture really, 
and it was good to have someone who understood New Englanders, I mean these little 
rural towns with their Central American groups, they needed someone who could talk 
their language, it’s a cultural thing.” Laura argues that she was aware that the majority of 
CISPES was “white and middle class,” but they worked hard to “bring in diversity.” On 
September 20th, 1985, the CISPES Midwest regional office reminded the entire collective 
in its area (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio and 
Wisconsin) that in all of its hiring will follow affirmative action guidelines “approved at 
the CISPES National Convention” of 1985. They referred to the national convention that 
took place on August 25th, 1985 (CISPES, 2018b).  
In the same document, CISPES reminds them that the organization’s effort should 
encompass three factors: “the needs of the Salvadoran people, the U.S. climate, and the 
capacity and interests of member committees.” Focusing on “the need of the Salvadoran 
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people” differentiated CISPES from other organizations. For Samantha, CISPES’ 
activists always felt a strong connection with Salvadoran radicals, especially with 
members of the FMLN. “I certainly felt like the best organizers I’ve known were 
Salvadorans and that I was organized, in the sense, by and with Salvadorans so I 
wouldn’t discount any of the organizing they did to pull us in and make us very 
committed for the long haul,” she explains. Vincent argues that CISPES’ centering 
Salvadorans and the Salvadoran struggle meant that the organization was a “North 
American Front” of the Salvadoran “democratic struggle.” 
CISPES operationalized the Salvadoran people through their contacts with 
Salvadoran radicals and members of the FMLN-FDR. Marla remembers the instrument 
that crystalized the common binding with Salvadorans were the personal meetings with 
FMLN representatives. Almost breaking into tears, she recalls the profound emotions that 
meeting Salvadoran radicals provoked in the 1980s: 
Their visits were absolutely, absolutely, very, very important to making us feel 
that way, right. That we were part of something and that everything that we were 
doing – now remember, because we weren’t Salvadoran and we weren’t being – it 
wasn’t our family members that were being picked up in the middle of the night, 
right. We weren’t the one’s being grabbed off the bus, but a connection to the 
Salvadorans in many ways in what kept that so, so… I mean we gave up 
everything, you know. In those years I worked 12-14 hours a day, you know. And 
you know, CISPES didn’t pay you any money. It barely paid you enough to pay 
the bills, barely, but we were – this was a labor of love. And it was a love and a 
belief and a connection. I cry, I cry thinking about it, you know. And not just the 
FMLN representative in the United States, but the tours that we would do with 
people in the popular movement and the connections and the time that we spent 
together and listening was … and it was the way because we couldn’t bring 
everybody to El Salvador to see, right.  
 
Marco stresses that U.S.-born activists were truly “compañeros” (comrades). The 
word compañero is widely used in the Latin American left to refer to members of the 
same political organization or people with the same convictions for radical change. 
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Marco reminds us of this emotional bond that formed between Salvadorans and 
Americans:  
We loved them, we were very appreciative of them and they were very 
appreciative of us. Of course, we had our own personalities and our own 
chemistry but basically they really fought for us and helped us in a very genuine 
way, I would say. That is why I say that we came to this country and we entered 
from the front door to this country because the American people, and when I say 
American people I'm not limiting it to whites, but also to blacks. 
 
The speeches of Salvadoran radicals were fundamental in increasing the “esprit de 
corps” in CISPES and also connected people in El Salvador to those in the United States. 
The organization used the voice of Salvadorans in two powerful public relations 
products: speeches in CISPES’ internal activities, and testimonies for people in the 
Congress and in the media. Two examples of the first product are the ways in which 
CISPES highlighted the participation of teach-ins and conferences. In April 1981, 
CISPES organized a teach-in in Wisconsin that included the speech of a representative of 
the FMLN-FDR.  The same can be read in the program of the 1985 CISPES Midwest 
Conference. At the conference, activists had the option to attend a lecture by a FMLN-
FDR representative or a workshop on internal organization and street work. 
Alvaro assures the deep ties between CISPES and Salvadoran radicals were a 
win-win situation for both sides: 
There was a close and permanent communication between the FMLN’s Political 
Commission of International Relations in order to exchange analysis (and 
CISPES). The FMLN was interested in learning how to deal with the U.S. 
congress, which was each legislator, each governor, in order to adjust their policy 
of managing (U.S) intervention. From the other side, CISPES wanted to know 
how the revolutionary movement was advancing. Therefore, there was exchange 
of information and analysis that resulted in mutual  
 
Another avenue of cooperation between Salvadoran and U.S.-born radicals was 
through the testimonies. CISPES contacted Salvadoran activists such as Marco or Alvaro 
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in order to find people who were ready to provide their life-stories to strategic audiences 
such as Congress people and the media. Marco recalls that American activists reached out 
to him to be part of a picket line in a hunger strike at an immigration detention center. “I 
was invited, myself and others, to be part of a reading station to start a program in 
Spanish to give the news in Spanish,” he evokes. Marco also remembers that U.S.-born 
activists bailed 100 refugees out from the detention center. Alvaro said that CISPES visit 
to Congress included “testimonies (of Salvadorans) and reports of human rights 
violations. There was a parallel between CISPES’ work on a national scale and what the 
Salvadorans used to do in their refugee organization.” Morris argues that the testimonies 
of Salvadorans “made all the difference” in influencing U.S. public opinion: 
 “ We went to Reno (with) a Salvadoran refugee. We attracted a large crowd of 
folks – you know it was Lake Tahoe – and we stayed with a guy who was a 
blackjack dealer. I'll never forget it. He (the Salvadoran) was a passionate person 
who cared about things. We got in the local paper there in Lake Tahoe, but it 
wasn't just Los Angeles, San Francisco, you know standard places you go, you 
know, so the voice of the Salvadorans was critical to moving everything forward 
because it was the people to people connection. 
 
Barbara explains that CISPES tried to recruit testimonies focusing on specific 
themes, but getting Salvadoran activists to the U.S. was a major obstacle. However, once 
they found a good testimony they were able to travel and put on events. “People in all 
these local events were so enthusiastic and interested and wanted to find out what was 
going on and support. It was like a shot in the arm for them because they could see the 
impact on the people in the country (El Salvador) in terms of what was going on down 
there,” Barbara remembers. 
Marco recalls that a U.S.-born sympathizer in Los Angeles provided his 
organization of Salvadoran refugees with a mailing list of wealthy donors. Marcos was 
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doing fundraising in favor of Salvadoran refugees who were emigrating from El Salvador 
to Honduras to escape from military repression in 1982. “I saw donations coming from 
Bolivia. I was out of my mind. So they (U.S. activists) had power that we couldn't dream 
of!” he evokes. 
U.S. citizenship as responsibility 
Among U.S. activists, the sub-theme of U.S. citizenship as responsibility suggests 
the responsibility that many Americans felt to stop their government’s behavior, which in 
turn contributed to the emergence of a white organization. Gabriela argues that CISPES 
was an opportunity to correct the trajectory of the U.S. government toward El Salvador. 
White people who were somewhat removed from what was going on, (got) a 
chance to do something. You know, we could see that things were not right, we 
were really opposed to the foreign policy of the United States, toward Central 
American countries. And we also felt like it was a people to people thing. We 
wanted a role, we wanted to reach out, we wanted to connect with people, and 
show our solidarity by doing what we could do to spread information, or collect 
money, or… things like that.  
 
Claudia argues that the reason of the involvement of many U.S. citizens in CISPES was 
“the actions of our government that intervened in El Salvador, and so it was our 
responsibility then to fix that.” Barbara says that the responsibility to stop the actions of 
the U.S. government was accompanied by the duty to respond to the Salvadoran people.  
“We just responded. We would have been idiots had we not responded,” Barbara stated. 
Whiteness as the only resource available 
Robert explained that in places like the Pacific Northwest the only way to do 
activism in favor of El Salvador was through white people. Robert argues that the number 
of Salvadorans and people of color in general were dramatically small compared to where 
he used to live: 
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There weren't that many people of color in town. I mean E. was voted the capital 
of the KKK in the 1930s and there were sun-down laws until the 1950s. And 
that’s an interesting history. If you talk to anybody about the era or the NAACP, 
they can tell you better than I can. It was like the African American performers 
couldn't stay in hotels in the 1950s. They stayed in Willy N’s house. So there 
weren't that many Latinos either. I used to know a guy by the name of Alfonso C. 
who worked here in the 60s and he has stories.   
 
Whiteness as an unconscious force 
Although the majority of U.S.-born activists offered strategic explanations about 
the demographic makeup of CISPES during the 1980s, Morris and Barbara also 
acknowledge that there was an unconscious behavior that facilitated the consolidation of 
CISPES as a white organization. After I asked Barbara why she thought CISPES became 
a majority white organization, she argues that there was “no conscious strategy to change 
that, to make that be different.” She emphasized that as CISPES “got older, there was 
some, some legitimate criticism could be made.” Morris made the observation that 
interaction between strategic and unconscious factors might have been the reason that 
CISPES was so white: 
Unless you are conscious about those dynamics, and you know you sort of follow 
what's the easiest, what sort of just happens to you. You start one way, it's hard to 
change an organization, because it started that way, and frankly part of it was to, 
Salvadorians reached out to white, college educated. It was also sort of the 
community and who they were trying to influence. So I don't know, it was a 
combination of factors and once something gets started that's pretty much all 
white, it's very hard to change it [laughs], I mean you know it's very hard to 
change, and so you know we would make outreach efforts and – but mostly that 
was done in coalition, so in other words it wasn't like we were like "hey, let's just 
organize white people", you know that wasn't what we were trying to do. But 
instead of trying to organize you know, it seemed what was going to be more 
effective was if we made alliances with other organizations. (…) 
 
As I have exposed in stage 5, we can see how the formation of CISPES as a white 
organization was the product of the conflation of strategic decisions – actions and points 
of view of the Salvadoran conflict and how to solve it – as well as unconscious behavior. 
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Frankenberg (1993) explains how whiteness is a standpoint and uses “unnamed” factors 
in her analysis of white women in California (p.1). However, in CISPES, we can also 
observe that Salvadoran radicals also had the perception of whites as having more 
resources than racial minorities in the U.S. From the beginning of CISPES, Salvadoran 
radicals aimed at recruiting white college radicals who were perceived as strategic allies 
in the struggle to influence Reagan’s foreign policy. In order to create a powerful 
organization, Salvadoran radicals preferred that U.S.-born activists form their own 
organizations, instead of joining organizations led by Salvadoran refugees, many of them 
undocumented.  
The dialectic between strategic and unconscious behavior in CISPES is not 
isolated from the structural factors that surrounded the organization. As I mentioned 
before, in 1980, the year in which CISPES was formed, the percentage of racial 
minorities was 20.4% of the U.S. population, and 94% of the legislators were white 
(Bialik and Krogstad, 2017). In 1980, 6.4% of the population was Latino and there were 
only ninety-four thousand Salvadorans in the U.S. (Terraza, 2010). These numbers 
suggest that Salvadoran radicals had to influence white people in order to have political 
significance in the U.S. Furthermore, CISPES’s birth and growth happened during a time 
in which the values of the Third World Left and the Black Power movement were 
relevant in radical movements in the U.S. (Pulido, 2006). The black power movement 
called for white radicals to organize themselves in radical organizations in order to 
dismantle white supremacy (Berger, 2006). As I show in the next stage of the process of 
intersectional recruitment, internal and external pressure eroded the foundation of 
CISPES as a white organization.  By external, I mean all the domestic and international 
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events that influenced the changes in the nature of the organization. 
Reconfiguration of a white organization: awakening to issues of gender and race 
Before the CISPES national convention, that took place in Washington D.C, on 
January 13th, 1990, a group of women members of CISPES wrote a paper calling for the 
organization to foster a conversation about oppressive behaviors inside the organization, 
including sexist behaviors (C-Span, 1990; Newman, 2018). This was only the first out of 
two papers known in CISPES as the “hippo papers”. Newman (2018) describes the paper 
as a document that “dealt primarily with the more typical problems of sexism in the left 
and therefore focused more on problems with white men, such as men being given more 
attention for their political ideas and dominating discussions, and the like.” Claudia was 
20 years old when she helped write the “hippo papers”. Laura, in her late 20s, signed the 
document. Both worked as staffers for a CISPES regional office. Claudia argued that 
another reason for the “hippo papers” was sexual harassment inside the movement:  
(I)n particular, we talked about something, especially some of the negative 
dynamics between the Salvadorans and the people in the United States. In 
particular, some of the machismo and sexist attitudes of the Salvadoran men with 
the North American women, and both CISPES and the FMLN were very angry 
with this. The FMLN, I know that the high command discussed this paper. The 
FMLN high command was very upset with it because they felt like it wasn’t 
reflexive and they felt like North American women would come and seduce 
Salvadoran men and that we weren’t talking about that, and then they brought up 
exoticism of the Salvadoran revolution and Salvadoran fighters.  
 
Laura illustrates the reason behind the documents: 
These FMLN representatives would speak in different communities, they were 
kind of like rock stars and a lot of the women would be attracted to them, but they 
didn't realize they were married or they had a girlfriend in every other town. I 
don't want to say that everyone was like that. I remember a couple of issues. Some 
of the people who came from El Salvador had inappropriate relationships and they 
were on tour and we had to actually get off the tour. Being in the national 
leadership, I had to deal with some of those issues directly. But we couldn't be 
saying we were against racism, sexism and homophobia and then had somebody 
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be sexually harassing someone and putting that person on tour. 
 
Jeffrey believes that the “hippo papers” responded to the hegemony of white men in an 
organization that Claudia and Morris argue had a majority of women. “It was the women 
who started the conversation and from there it extended to look at issues of homophobia 
and racism, but it was started by the women in focusing on who held power in the 
organization and the fact that all through the 1980s there were very few women in our 
national administrative committee,” Jeffrey expressed. Vincent recalls that the issue was 
not only harassment but also about managing sexual relationships in CISPES:  
There were quite a lot of sexual relationships with women in the organization. 
This is not unique to Salvadoran men. This is a problem in the left in general. 
Men might not even be attractive, but they are seen as being powerful or they're 
interesting, can have a lot of sexual relationships with women, but it compromises 
leadership in my opinion. 
 
Claudia and Laura recalled that the document had a profound impact in the 
preparation of the convention. Claudia remembers that the director of CISPES, Angela 
Sanbrano, tried to stop the publication. “And we said no, and the national office refused 
to send this paper out and we said we would send it on our own. We would send it to all 
the committees if the national office refused to send it,” Claudia evokes. At the 1990 
CISPES convention, the organization committed itself to reviewing its practices 
regarding gender equality; protection for sexual minorities, and the marginalization of 
people of color (CISPES, 2018a). 
Morris, in a position of leadership in CISPES at the time, also believed the 
convention was a turning point for CISPES, especially because addressed unnamed issues 
such as sexism and racism for the first time: 
Especially when it's primarily white and a lot of men in it, so you're dealing with 
sexism and racism. And you know not all of it explicit, a lot of it implicit or not, 
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you know it's there and you've got to deal with it. So you know that came up, 
there were issues around women in leadership, that came up in the late 80s, early 
90s, and then I think racism, how we were relating to the Salvadorean community, 
and how we were relating to other communities of color in the United States. And 
again, we did training in our national organization. And then did some local and 
regional training on undoing racism. Because we did have, you know we weren't 
an all White organization number one, two we did have a lot of women in 
leadership, and probably the majority of activists, so you know we had to struggle 
with all of those issues. 
 
Claudia believes that “shifting the discussion from gender violence, sexual 
harassment to racism” was a strategic maneuver by the leadership to “have a discussion 
about different kinds of oppressions in a safe way that theoretically would not tear the 
organization apart.” Alvaro indicates that the deepening of the discussion on race, gender 
and sexual orientation responded to the change of demographics inside CISPES: 
We reviewed the ethnic makeup of CISPES and we saw that it has varied in 
seven years, even though it initiated as a majority white. (By the end of 1980s), 
CISPES national direction had two Salvadorans and a Mexican and we already 
had support in the Afro- American and Asian communities. At the same time, 
there were outbreaks of alcoholism and we need to see ourselves. 
 
Barbara believes that the organization never addressed those issues before the 1990s 
because of the urgency of their goal to stop U.S. intervention and to help Salvadoran 
revolutionaries: 
This is one of the struggles that took place, back in the 80s and early 90s is like, 
you know, I mean we could talk about feminism too, you know, what’s the 
priority? Salvadorans are dying and being tortured and whatever down in El 
Salvador so do we work to deal with that or do we also you know, talk about, you 
know, the sexism going on, or the racism… or that we are primarily a white 
organization and we haven’t done the outreach in communities of color to make 
that be different. And that’s an important question. I don’t have the answer to it. I 
know that in that point in time, a lot of us made decisions to focus in – well, plus 
the fact that we focused in, that we kept our focus in terms of the revolutionary 
struggle in El Salvador and the U.S. intervention, the fact that that was our focus 
is what made us effective. It also created some antagonism with other 
organizations and maybe individuals who felt that maybe we weren’t dealing with 
civil rights issues going on, discrimination in our own country, racism, 
environmental stuff, and everything else. And so, it’s a legitimate question to look 
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at, I still feel pretty solid. We could have done it better, but I think in general, the 
way we were going it was the way it had to be.  
 
I don't possess the information that proves the change of ethnic makeup inside 
CISPES between 1980 and 1990. However, a majority of CISPES activists perceived the 
convention in 1990 as a turning point in the organization’s racial dynamics. These 
perceived changes occurred alongside other events that challenged the core of the 
organization’s ideology that were stopping U.S. intervention and supporting the FMLN. 
In November 1989, the FMLN conducted a national military offensive which first goal 
was to overthrow the ARENA’s government. Amidst the offensive, six Jesuits priests 
were killed by the Salvadoran military, which provoked inside Washington’s 
establishment several calls for the suspension of U.S. military aid to El Salvador (Krauss, 
1990). In February 1990, the U.S. government supported the intermediation of the Union 
Nations in the negotiations between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government (Goshko, 
1990). This change in U.S. position happened five months after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
that marked the beginning of the end of the socialist block. 
In 1990, the percentage of Latino in the U.S. had reached 9.0% from 6% in 1980 
and the number of Salvadorans in the U.S. increased almost five times from 94 thousand 
in 1980 to 465 thousand in 1990- the majority of them located in the Texas, California 
and the Washington D.C. area. (Census Bureu, 2018; Terrazas, 2010). In 1990, U.S. 
Congress still reported that over 90% of its legislators were white and it wasn’t until 2017 
the percentage went down to 80% (Bialik & Krogstad, 2017).  
As we can see in the last stage of the process of intersectional recruiting, the shift 
in CISPES responded to a three-dimensional shift at the organizational, national and 
international levels. Domestically, a new generation of members wanted the organization 
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to be more involved in debating social justice issues such as racism and sexism. As 
Claudia explained, the 1990 convention expressed the concerns of a new generation that 
did not aim at “making CISPES more diverse, but an anti-racist organization.” At the 
same time, the leadership of CISPES had more Salvadoran-born activists or people from 
Latin American heritage in its ranks. At the national level, the demographic makeup of 
the U.S. had changed, as many undocumented immigrants had access to permanent 
residency or citizenship due to the Reagan immigration amnesty of 1986. In cities such as 
Los Angeles and Washington D.C. – metropoles where CISPES had a strong presence – 
an influx of Salvadoran immigrants started to become visible. In Congress, there was 
strong bipartisan attitude to stop the U.S. military assistance to El Salvador. 
Internationally, the Cold War was at its end and negotiations between the FMLN and the 
Salvadoran government began. As a result of these structural changes, the collective 
identity of the organization entered a crisis: CISPES as a white organization created in 
1980 needed an ideological realignment.  
Ideological identity model of public relations 
After reviewing the history and discourses of CISPES from 1980 to 1990 and the 
many public relations strategies the organization used, I define CISPES’ ideology as one 
that advocated for the end of U.S. assistance to El Salvador and in support of Salvadoran 
revolutionaries in the Third World. The materialization of this ideology was an 
organization led and comprised by an overwhelming white majority with strong 
connections to Salvadoran radicals who provided support and advice. CISPES’ 
mobilizing organizational identity is the synthesis of these two dialectic forces. In the 
same fashion, CISPES shows other dialectic dynamics: Salvadoran radicals vs. U.S.-born 
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activists, mainstream vs. radical public relations strategies, and centralized vs. 
decentralized communications (Derville, 2005). Here I focus on the dialectic between 
ideology and materiality in CISPES and how their public relations strategies demonstrate 
that tension. In this dissertation, I present the first building block of the ideological 
identity model of public relations (Figure 13) based on the findings exposed in the 
previous sections. The ideological identity model of public relations is located between 
stage 5 (the construction of the white organization) and stage 6 (the reconfiguration of the 
white organization) of the process of intersectional recruiting.  The ideological 
identity model of public relations is a work in progress that needs further theoretical 
reflection and empirical testing.  
The ideological identity model of public relations centers the organization, but is 
surrounded by two layers: organizational ideology, understood as a particular view of the 
world that leads the organization, and the demographics of its practitioners, which I see 
as the material conditions of public relations. The unit of analysis of my model is the 
organization. My work draws on the work of Curtin and Gaither’s (2005) cultural circuit 
and Hon’s (2015) digital advocacy model. In both I appreciate the efforts to connect 
social contexts with the organizational realities.  Mundy (2016) brings a 
multidimensional vision of why diversity faced so many obstacles in public relations 
practices. He shows proposals in which two types of dialectic forces take place: 1) 
structural and cultural and 2) internal and external dimensions. Edwards (2013) and 
L'Etang (2004) have provided strong arguments that race is still a factor in the practice of 
strategic communications from an organizational point of view, especially in the West.  
I am illustrating my model using a concentric model inspired by Reese and 
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Shoemaker’s (2016) hierarchy of influences model.  In their sociological model, Reese 
and Shoemaker argue that a five-layer concentric model describe the different levels of 
influence that people working in media have. The five-layer model has the following 
levels: 1) the individual, 2) the routines, 3) the organizational, 4) the social institutions, 
and 5) the social system. Reese and Shoemaker (2016) define the individual level as “the 
personal traits of news workers, news values they adhere to, professional roles they take 
on, and other demographic features (e.g., gender, race, class) (p. 398). The routines are 
“concerned with those patterns of behavior that form the immediate structures of 
mediawork” (p.399). The organizational level examines the influence on practices inside 
media organizations in the formation of the news. The social institutions level refers to 
the “concerns beyond any single organization” that lead to the “interorganizational field” 
(p.402). The authors define the most macro level, the social system, as the level 
“concerned with traditional theories of society and power as they relate to media” 
(p.403). 
My proposal, the ideological identity model of public relations, has six levels: 1) 
the organization, 2) the ideology of the organization, 3) the demography (e.g., race, 
gender, sexual orientation) of the organization, 4) organizational/PR routines (strategies, 
tactics, relationship building), 5) national social system and 6) international social 
system. Each level influences adjacent levels and at the same time, the macro level of 
international social systems and national social systems also affect the organization. The 
interactions between these levels create a mobilizing organizational identity that is 
historically located in specific contexts and, as I have showed in the process of 
intersectional recruiting, enters in crisis when social factors are changed. Changes in 
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social conditions do not provoke change in the public relations of organizations per se, 
but they facilitate or constrain the emergence of collective political subjects. Also, each 
level of the model should be seen as a mediation that filters the national and international 
social systems. In order for an international phenomenon to transform the organization, it 
should also exert pressure on the intermediate levels. I will illustrate each level of my 
model with examples from CISPES’ history between 1980 and 1990.   
 
Figure	13:	The	ideological	identity	model	of	public	relations	
 
The organization 
Unlike Reese and Shoemaker (2016) who assume that individuals are “creative” 
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and internally possess demographic and identity markers, I argue that organizations are a 
direct byproduct of the tension between ideology and materiality. In this case, the tension 
lies between the communication discourses and the material conditions surrounding the 
organization, which are operationalized as the demography of the individuals who are 
part of the organization. In the organization, physical location is crucial. In the case of 
CISPES, as a U.S.-based organization, they must abide by U.S. laws. In early 1988, 
leaked FBI documents reveal years of an extensive surveillance of CISPES and other 
Central American solidarity movements. The FBI Director William S. Sessions, states 
that the surveillance aimed at determining whether CISPES was materially supporting the 
FMLN (Shenon, 1988). Shenon (1988) recounts that law-enforcement officials revealed 
that the investigations on CISPES’ activities began in 1981 “after allegations that the 
group was acting as an illegal foreign agent for Salvadoran rebels; it became a 
counterterrorism investigation in 1983.” According to U.S. legislation, if CISPES was 
serving as a representative of the FMLN, the organization must have registered at the 
Department of Justice.  Finally, the FBI concluded that CISPES “was involved in 
political activities involving First Amendment rights – and not international terrorism” 
(Shenon, 1988). 
Ideology 
According to Hall (1996), ideology is a “(s)ystem of meaning, concepts, 
categories and representation which make sense of the world” (p.334). In this case, 
CISPES’ ideology consisted of stopping U.S. intervention, and supporting the Salvadoran 
revolutionaries.  In the midst of the conflict between a group of women and the national 
leadership in late 1980s, the organization attempted to solve their differences by stressing 
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the ideological “bottom line” of the organization. Barbara describes the bottom line as 
“the fact that we focused in, that we kept our focus in terms of the revolutionary struggle 
in El Salvador and the U.S. intervention, the fact that that was our focus I think is what 
made us effective.” Based on that ideology, CISPES attempted to solve the difference in 
a “real constructive manner, it wasn’t like you’re the enemy,” as Laura recalls. CISPES’s 
ideology was based in a context where the war was the central element of their political 
praxis, rather than internal identity politics. In this war mentality, other conflicts inside 
the organization were secondary to ending the civil war and U.S. intervention in El 
Salvador. Claudia recalls the role of ideology in neutralizing conflict: 
 Then the National committee of CISPES used the same line that the Salvadorans 
(the FMLN) used in El Salvador which is, we can’t talk about sexism right now 
because it’s too divisive and we need everybody united. After the war, we’ll deal 
with sexism and sexual harassment and sexual violence, but not now. 
 
The examination of themes in CISPES’ discourse reveals that the organization 
had a transnational vision of the world (Figure 2). First, the organization heavily 
criticized the role of the U.S. in a foreign country for two main reasons: 1) being an 
accomplice of a brutal government and 2) wasting the money of U.S. tax payers. 
However, these themes also stress the similarity between U.S. intervention in Central 
America and the war in Vietnam. The transnational vision of CISPES coincides with the 
values of the U.S. Third World Left that expressed solidarity with revolutionary groups in 
Latin America, advocated for the end of U.S. hegemony in the region, and called for the 
dismantling of race and class hierarchies (Pulido, 2006, Hobson, 2016). 
The example of CISPES’ discussion about misogyny and racism illustrates how 
organizational ideology leads the debate in moments of crisis, but at the same time, 
orients the type of strategies and tactics that help achieve their goals. In the table of 
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strategies of tactic, the goal of stopping U.S. intervention by influencing policy-makers 
led CISPES to combine mainstream tactics such as writing letters to Congress with more 
radical tactics like street protests outside federal buildings. Ideology is not free-floating, 
but materializes through actions, strategies and tactics (Munson, 2001).  
Demography 
The layer of demography connects to types of individuals that participate in the 
organization in terms of race, class, gender, and other axes of social location. Unlike 
Reese and Shoemaker (2016), I don't believe that demographic markers are only 
ingrained in the individual, but are social forces that affect other elements of the 
organization. CISPES activists recall that between 1980 and 1990 at least 80% of its 
members were white. This data coincides with the findings of Smith (2010) who shows 
that over 90% of the activists involved in Central American movements where white with 
college educations. However, the racial and educational background of CISPES activists 
also coincide with the close relationship they had with Salvadorans. The demographic 
nature of CISPES as an organization with white college educated individuals, many of 
them from middle-class households, shaped the type of discourses and strategies that the 
organization employed.  The majority of individuals joined CISPES in the aftermath of 
the Civil Right movements and of the protests against the war in Vietnam- a movement 
that originated on college campuses and with a majority of white activists (Fernandez & 
McAdam, 1988). The juncture of the civil rights movement and the anti-war movement 
instilled a culture among white radicals that understood the dismantling of racism and the 
end of U.S. “empire” as complementary parts of the same struggle (Berger, 2006). This 
culture among white radicals, which is illustrated in stage 4 of the process of 
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intersectional recruiting (rehearsals of radical politics), shaped the creation of an 
organizational ideology.  
Public Relations/Organizational routines 
Reese and Shoemaker (2016) define routines as “concerned with those patterns of 
behavior that form the immediate structures of mediawork” (p.399). In this case, 
organizational/PR routines are the public relations strategies that tie the organization with 
other organizations and their internal audiences. Following the different intended 
audiences of the organizational routine, I categorize routines in two ways: internal and 
external. Internal public relations routines have a goal to inform and strengthen the 
relationship with staffers and volunteers inside the organization. External public relations 
attempts to affect audiences who are not formally connected to the organization. 
An example of external public relations is CISPES’ public relations strategy to 
influence the electoral process in the U.S. Morris recalls that in 1986, CISPES organized 
a campaigned that attempted to influence the electoral result of swing districts:  
We did a whole campaign around trying to stop US Aid to El Salvador and doing 
some work in specific legislative districts in 1986 that we considered swing 
districts, and so we sent organizers into those communities, some of which had an 
El Salvador committee.  There was one in Wisconsin, the head of the Latin 
American Committee, Latin America sub-committee, the foreign affairs committee 
of the house, a powerful democrat, whose name I'm forgetting, starts with an O, her 
last name starts with an O. His was one of the districts. It was basically what we 
considered the key people, who were calling the shots, and I think at the time the 
democrats – they did – they had control of the house. Even though Reagan was 
president, they had control of the house. And so we were trying to move them on to 
be more sort of against aid to El Salvador.  
 
 Barbara complemented Morris’ vision by stating that CISPES toured across the 
U.S., which helped the organization to get free press coverage that improved the 
possibility of having positive political outcomes. “We would go around to college 
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campuses and community events and did press work, you know local press work, in small 
towns or whatever, so that was a big thing. And then there were the different material aid 
campaigns and the delegations,” she stated. Morris, Barbara, Jeffrey and Vincent recall 
that by the late 1980s, CISPES had already hired a person who was in charge of pitching 
stories to the mainstream media. “I was on Nightline (with Ted Koppel) because we had 
the strategy and had somebody who knew how to do that. Local level people were just 
very creative and had fearlessness about just calling up local reporters and making 
connections.”  
 Morris explains that CISPES provided its activists with “media training” on “how 
to reach your local press.” CISPES’ archives reveal how the organization monitored the 
U.S. media closely and documented those monitoring by using paper clips. For the 1985 
CISPES Midwest regional conference, the CISPES regional office organized a media-
training workshop that taught activists “how to organize a media campaign” and “how to 
get their message across most effectively”. CISPES wanted to teach them how to 
“prepare a statement and a speaker who will turn the short media moments into a 
valuable projection of time.”  
 As part of its external public relations, CISPES established strong organizational 
relationships with external activist organizations. CISPES’ archive shows that the 
organization kept in its record press releases, newsletters and internal documents of 
friendly organization such as Committee for the Freedom of Political Prisoners and 
Disappeared Persons in El Salvador, Voice on the Borders, the General Association of 
Salvadoran University Students. At the same time, CISPES also closely followed the 
material of conservative activist organizations such as the CARP, Committee to Save El 
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Salvador. In a CARP flyer, this right-wing association called for the Soviet Union and 
Cuba to get “out of El Salvador.” In April 1985, CISPES participated along other 
organizations in four days of demonstrating against Reagan Administration foreign policy 
in Central America and South Africa and about the state of unemployment in the U.S. 
The New York Times revealed that the coalition “includes the American Indian 
Movement, the Congress of National Black Churches, the Gray Panthers, the National 
Gay Task Force, the National Lawyers Guild, the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, the United States Students Association and Women Strike for Peace” 
(Franklin, 1985). 
Beyond the media work, informing and educating internal audiences was 
CISPES’ priority. The most important instrument was the El Salvador Alert. Jeffrey, who 
was the editor of the newsletter, explains, “our primary audience was our own activists in 
terms of giving them information they could use to reach more members in the 
community. The Alert was a more activist tool or activist-oriented publication.” Jeffrey 
also recalls that the media landscape in the 1980s was different than ours today. El 
Salvador Alert brought information that was not available to people in the mainstream 
media. Some of this news had a point of view of the FMLN and Salvadoran radicals 
about U.S. foreign policy. Along with El Salvador Alert, CISPES’ public relations 
strategy to reach internal audiences was using its own members as the messengers of 
information. “Telephone was part of that as we did do a lot of phone banking, sure. But 
also, we did a lot of house meetings and door-knocking, canvassing door to door,’ Jeffrey 
describes. 
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These public relations routines reveal that to participate in CISPES efforts, 
especially on the strategic side, activists needed to have a level of education that allowed 
them to reach political allies, monitor opponents, write press releases and articulate a 
message in English to the media. These activities are “color-blind” in appearance, but in 
the historical context, they are precisely the types of tasks that white, college-educated 
activists could deliver (Bourdieu, 1984). This demonstrates how demography and 
organizational routines shape one another. In the case of CISPES, the conflation of 
demography and organizational routines was not automatic but resulted from strategic 
decisions made by U.S. and Salvadoran activists to hold North American activists 
responsible for targeting Congress. 
National Social System  
 The national social system consists of all the events that directly or indirectly 
influenced the organization’s work and vision.  Between the 1980’s and 1990’s, there 
was a strong increase in the number of Latinos and Salvadorans in particular in the U.S. 
Changes in the demography of the U.S. affected organizational strategies that were aimed 
at influencing policy, rather than debating about racial and gender dynamics.  
 In addition to that, at the beginning of the 1980s, CISPES’ strategy aimed to 
contain U.S. military assistance by influencing Congress, but by the late 1980s, the 
strategy changed to prioritize the legitimization of the FMLN as a reliable partner in the 
negotiations. The change in strategy was influenced by changes in the national social 
system: Reagan left the presidency in 1988 and George H. Bush assumed it. As the goal 
of CISPES was influenced by U.S. foreign policy, any change in national social system 
would affect their strategy.  
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International social system 
The international social system consists of all the events that affect the country 
and, at the same time, the transnational project in which the organization was embedded. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall influenced the change in the position of the U.S. regarding the 
negotiations in El Salvador.  In February 1990, the Bush administration accepted a 
negotiation, which was brokered by the United Nations and that should take place 
between the FMLN and the El Salvador government. In the same month, the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front (FSLN in Spanish) lost the election against an “aristocrat 
democrat” (Uhlig, 1990). 
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CHAPTER VII 
           DISCUSSION 
The topic of this dissertation emerged from questions about why CISPES, along 
with other Central American solidarity organizations, were so white. Smith (2011) and 
Pearce (2012) argue that CISPES was not only white, but was also comprised of college-
educated activists. How did CISPES become a white organization with a penchant to 
recruit college-educated members? What were the implications of a white organization in 
its public relations strategies? These overall questions led me to elaborate three research 
questions that attempted to unveil the role of race in activist public relations. I believe 
that racial dynamics are crucial forces to understand the formation of collective identities. 
Collective identities are the products of the relations between ideology and social 
conditions, and they are ingrained in history.  To study this phenomenon, I looked at 
CISPES’ recruiting routines through the examination of public relations material and in-
depth interviews. Like many social movement organizations in the 1980s, CISPES 
comprised mostly of white, college-educated activists and its history was directly tied to 
resistance against the war of Vietnam and the civil right movement. Due to the 
contradiction between having a mostly white membership and its radical ideology, 
CISPES was an ideal site to understand the relationship between organization members 
and organization ideologies. In short, this dissertation shows how organizations form an 
ideological identity. To find these mechanisms, I develop a methodology that examines 
the dialectic between ideology-production (public relations material) and social 
conditions incarnated in the identities and life stories of CISPES’ activists.  
I followed the same logic in my three research questions. The first RQ1 explored 
  
 
170 
the most prevalent discursive themes between 1980 and 1990, but also how the 
discourses changed every year during that period. The second tried to understand the 
types of public relations strategies that CISPES used and how they revealed the 
organization’s strategic goals of simultaneously containing a white political elite and 
recruiting radical whites. The third question understands how CISPES became a white 
organization, especially looking at the relevance of the relationships between U.S. 
activists and Salvadoran radicals. In the next section, I will recapitulate the core findings 
of my dissertation and how relevant they are to expand the research on public relations 
and social movement theory and praxis.  
CISPES’ discursive system- answering RQ1 
CISPES’ public relations material had eight themes that ran through 1990: 
1) U.S. government wasted U.S. taxpayer money 
2) U.S. government is an accomplice of the Salvadoran government 
3) The U.S. has a long history of intervention in the region 
4) El Salvador has a brutal government 
5) U.S. government is creating another Vietnam 
6) U.S. government is escalating its participation in El Salvador 
7) Salvadoran people are politically active 
8) CISPES is a multiracial organization 
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These eight themes represent the core of CISPES’ discursive system and give the 
organization a thematic arc over the course of ten years. The themes reveal that CISPES 
created polarization with the U.S. and the Salvadoran government on one side, and the 
Salvadoran people and CISPES on the other. The organization’s discursive system 
responded to Reagan’s messaging which tied the FMLN and CISPES with Cuba and the 
Soviet Union (Peace, 2012; Smith, 2011). However, the eight themes also show the 
amplitude of CISPES’ ideology. The organization framed international issues like the 
conflict in El Salvador as a domestic problem through the use of war of Vietnam as a 
proxy theme. At the same time, the discursive system stressed the diverse nature of 
CISPES or, at least, its aspiration to be diverse. The ability of CISPES to frame an 
international issue as a domestic issue reveals the transnational scope of the organization. 
Della Porta and Tarrow (2005) argue that there are three processes of transnationalization 
in social movement organizations: 1) diffusion (spread of movements ideas, frame one 
country to other), 2) domestication (planning out of domestic territory of conflict that 
origin externally) and 3) externalization (“playing challenge to supranational institution 
to intervene in domestic problems of conflicts”) (p.2). Through discourse analysis, I 
argue that the framing of international issues as domestic problems was the most 
important force in the devising of CISPES’ public relations.  
The eight themes of CISPES discursive system represents the organization’s 
roadmap that anchored its practice, but also initiated the formation of a collective identity 
that I call mobilizing organizational identity. The mobilizing organizational identity 
proposes a way to define the nature of its members and its political goals. Mobilizing 
organizational identities answers the question of who we are and who are our friends and 
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foes. In CISPES’ discursive system, the “we” is transnational and clearly tied to the 
events in both El Salvador and the U.S.  
The large picture of CISPES’ discursive system demonstrates the trajectory of 
themes by year. The themes in CISPES’ public relations changed every year with the 
purpose of updating the discursive system in relation to the most recent world events. The 
study of themes led me to create seven different historical episodes in CISPES’ public 
relations system (Table 2). They are: 
1) 1980: Creating the polarization and defining the struggle 
2) 1981: The emergences of the allies 
           3) 1984: The closing of the congressional path 
4) 1985-1986: Stop the Bombing 
5) 1987: The National Referendum Campaign 
6) 1988: The Legitimation of the FMLN 
7) 1990: The End of the War is Near 
 
The historical episodes in isolation do not represent more than mere labels to 
understand the background behind the discourses. However, by establishing relations 
between each other, I recognize that the historical episodes were telling a general history 
of CISPES that I call narrative plots. The three CISPES’ narrative plots were: 1) 1980-
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1981: the presentations of characters in CISPES’ discursive system (friends vs. foes) and 
the problem (reducing damage from Reagan and advocating for the FMLN), 2) 1984-
1987: CISPES’s definition of its primary spaces for political action (Congress and the 
streets), and 3) 1988-1990: CISPES finds a solution to its problems by moving its focus 
from reducing the damage to framing the FMLN as a responsible and influential actor in 
the political negotiation with the Salvadoran government.  
The three narrative plots reflect how events shaped the organization’s discursive 
system. Ellgson (1995) shows how the discourses of race in Cincinnati were 
fundamentally modified after the occurrence of riots. A similar argument can be made of 
how, at the end of 1980s, CISPES played down the theme of fighting U.S. intervention in 
favor of embracing a commitment to legitimize the FMLN as an indispensable player in a 
political settlement of the Salvadoran government. Although CISPES had a core of 
themes that guided its praxis, the organization was able to redefine them according to the 
changing reality.  
These three types of thematic categories (discursive system, historical episodes, 
and narrative plots) can be divided into two groups: historically consistent discourses 
(CISPES’ discursive system) and the juncture-based discourses (historical episodes and 
narrative plots). In line with previous research on media framing (Iyengar, 1990; An & 
Gower, 2009, Aarøe, 2011), historically consistent discourse resembles what media and 
public relations scholars have called “thematic frames.” Thematic frames are media 
interpretations “that focus on political issues and events in a broader context and present 
collective, abstract, and general evidence” (Aarøe, 2011, p. 209). Juncture-based 
discourses are consistent with what Aarøe  (2011) defines as “episodic frames” that 
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describe particular event and cases. Unlike the episodic and thematic frames, the 
historically consistent discourses and the juncture-based discourses are seen from the 
activist organization’s perspective instead of that from the media practitioners’ view. 
Historically consistent discourses and the juncture-based discourses represent the 
dialectic tension between an organization that wants to maintain a consistent message, 
but at the same time, must modify its discourses to adapt to the U.S. political reality. 
CISPES initially focused on the immoral and inconvenient alliance between the U.S. and 
El Salvador governments, but eventually, in the late 1980s, the organization played down 
the anti-intervention elements of its ideology to elevate the FMLN’s profile on the 
negotiation table. 
Decentralized-centralized PR -Answering RQ2 
The “centralized-decentralized” public relations approach consisted in concerted 
strategies designed and lead by the organization’s headquarters in Washington D.C., and 
decentralized executions by regional and local chapters throughout the U.S. This 
“decentralized-centralized” approach included five types of public relations strategies 
(media, street, political, fundraising, and tours). Each one of the strategies had a series of 
tactics that coalesce around the idea of challenging the U.S. government through the use 
of resources in possession of CISPES. Amongst these resources were whiteness and 
college credentials.  
I argue that CISPES’ overall strategy targeted two types of sources of political 
power: directs sources of political power and indirect sources of political power. The 
political and the street strategies were oriented to exert continuous pressure on the direct 
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sources of power (legislators, U.S. officials, and El Salvador officials). CISPES’ goal was 
to inundate the Congress with letters and telegrams and to saturate the telephone lines of 
U.S. legislators and government officials. CISPES wanted to keep the U.S. government 
off-balance through the combination of militant tactics such as mass demonstrations and 
legislative instruments such as letters and telegrams. The organization sought to make the 
Salvadoran consulates feel the brunt of the civil war while on U.S. soil. These strategies 
were the nails in the movement that scratched the epidermis of the U.S. government.   
On the other hand, the media, fundraising, and tour strategies attempted to harness 
power by targeting secondary sources of political power such as newspapers, potential 
donors, and recruits. If the news outlets give more space to CISPES’ discourses, they 
believed the U.S. public could become more aware of the legitimate role of the FMLN as 
the organization that represented the Salvadoran people. They also believed media 
coverage would make it easier for CISPES’ framing of the U.S. assistance to El Salvador 
as ineffective and immoral. The fundraising strategies provided CISPES with the 
capabilities to continue with its actions and to promote a new alternative vision of 
international aid. The tour strategy was a hybrid of media-oriented events and recruiting 
tools. The tours aspired to “win” American souls that could later turn their economic and 
social capital in favor of CISPES’ cause. The speakers and the delegations of U.S. 
citizens to El Salvador gave CISPES access to networks of people – especially those who 
were college educated – and could provide the organization with specialized skills and 
resources. Furthermore, connections with local networks of activists could eventually 
serve to influence local and state elections. 
By reviewing CISPES’ strategies and tactics, it is clear that the organization 
  
 
176 
aimed to attract college-educated activists who had the time, resources, and abilities to 
execute tasks that were required by an organization in struggle against a powerful and 
savvy U.S. government. Their tactics were not designed to integrate disenfranchised 
populations, but rather to maximize the available resources in order to influence policy. 
Writing press releases, producing a radio show, sending telegrams and letters to 
legislators and officials, and monitoring Congress required advanced knowledge of the 
centrality of media in the U.S. public sphere and the political opportunities in the 
Congress. Attending demonstrations in government buildings or protesting in front of 
consulates – which are places protected by international law – entailed the assumption 
that the image of massive arrests of “innocents” could produce political harm to the 
government’s image. This goal is more difficult to achieve if you organize protests that 
might harm already criminalized groups such as undocumented “brown” immigrants. As 
Claudia asserted regarding the delegations of U.S citizens that CISPES used to send to El 
Salvador, the threat of harm to U.S. citizens -especially if they are white and well 
educated- had the power to discourage violent government actions and sheltered local 
folk in Latin America.  
There were two main audiences of CISPES’ discourses and strategies: a white 
political elite and U.S. progressives. Both audiences had English as their first language 
(Smiths, 2011; Peace, 2012). As we have revealed through this study, CISPES knew from 
the beginning that their main goal was to recruit “North Americans.” CISPES’ discursive 
system appealed to the sensitivities of people who had direct or indirect experience with 
the war in Vietnam and other U.S. actions in foreign countries. The same rationale 
informed CISPES’ public relations strategies and tactics. CISPES’s double objective was 
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to put pressure on white political elites and, at the same time, persuade college-educated 
activists to join the organization. However, as Goodwin and Jasper (1999) show, CISPES 
created themes and public relations strategies that resonated in white college-educated 
radicals not only for “instrumental” or “strategic” purposes (p.49), but because that 
reflected the collective identity of the organization. In other words, the messages and 
tactics of a public relations campaign are not only shaped by the type of public the 
organization wants to influence, but, in high degree, by the kind of people who develop 
them. 
The theoretical implication of this dissertation is that the lack of diversity in 
public relations organizations, as other scholars have revealed (Edwards 2013, Logan 
2011, Mundy, 2016; Pompper, 2005), is not merely due to poor results of recruitment and 
retaining strategies. The lack of diversity in public relations is a reflection of the social 
dynamics that privilege some groups over others, and in some cases may consciously or 
unconsciously be used as a public relations strategy. Structural factors such as class, race, 
and gender cannot be remedied only through organizational guidelines, but by a profound 
transformation of the U.S. society. Although CISPES had a radical agenda against all 
types of oppression, their praxis did not avoid the reproduction of structural factors and 
organizational routines that kept CISPES as a white college-educated setting until the 
organization had a profound crisis in early 1990s.  
The process of intersectional recruiting and the ideological identity model-
answering RQ3 
I found that the majority of my participants followed a six-stage model to join 
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CISPES. These stages were: 
1. The foundations of the radical individual 
2. The racialization of political life stories 
3. “Despertar de la conciencia” (awakening of consciousness) triggered by an event  
4. Rehearsals for radical politics 
5. The formation of the white organization  
6. Reconfiguration of the white organization: the awakening to gender and race 
 
These stages constitute the process of intersectional recruiting founded on a 
dialectic contradiction: a white organization heavily influenced by Salvadoran radicals 
who believe whiteness was an asset to achieve the political goal to stop the intervention 
and improve the image of the Salvadoran insurgency. From this process, a collective 
identity for the organization was born. CISPES’ collective identity was not only defined 
by the organization’s leftist ideology but by the social conditions that drove white 
college-educated radicals into the organization. In this dissertation, collective identities 
are not only a rhetorical operation, as Nepstad (2001) de Volo (2000) and Gamson (1991) 
suggest, but the synthesis of a dialectic process between the organization’s ideology and 
the social location of its members.  
These social conditions are historically located and provide activists with a 
horizon for its praxis. In the 1980s, white elites dominated politics in the U.S.; therefore, 
any political effort to contain U.S. foreign policy required white college-educated 
individuals as front-runners against Reagan. These findings are in line with Viterna’s 
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(2013) model that highlights that structural factors reshape collective identities. Unlike 
Viterna, I argue that power dynamics are behind the reasons some identities are more 
valuable than others in social movement organizations. Previous research in social 
movement theory in the U.S. (Della Porta &Tarrow, 2005; McAdam, 1986; McAdam 
2010; McCarthy & Zald, 1977) proposes models to understand the ways organizations 
mobilize; some encompasses ideological and structural factors (McAdam, 2010) and 
other more ideological (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999). The theoretical implications of the 
process of intersectional recruiting is that, racial dynamics- in combination with class 
markers such as level of education are centrifugal forces that explain the crafting of 
discourses and strategies, as well as the co-creation of collective identities. Smith (2011) 
and Peace (2012) demonstrate that the Central American solidarity movements in the 
U.S. struggled to attract minorities to their overwhelmingly white ranks. Peace (2012) 
shows that the Central American Solidarity movements were supported by white 
religious organizations, in part, because black churches were focused on the fight against 
apartheid in South Africa. However, this dissertation is one of the rare examples that 
show the process behind the formation of white spaces.  
The case of CISPES reveals that its nature as a white organization was a 
byproduct of the negotiations between U.S. activist and Salvadoran radicals. The fact that 
CISPES was a majority white organization does not imply that people of color were 
absent. On the contrary, there is evidence that having white college educated people as 
the face of CISPES was a deliberate decision promoted by Salvadoran refugees with ties 
to the FMLN. Salvadoran refugees knew that whiteness was an asset that they did not 
possess. Chicanos, at least at the beginning of the 1980s, seemed to play the role of 
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intermediary between whites and Salvadoran activists (Almaguer 2009; Pulido 2006). 
With this in mind, I theorize that CISPES between 1980 and 1990 was a purposive white 
setting. A purposive white setting is the one in which the resources of a white-majority 
organization, in conjunction with the participation of people of color, are put in favor of a 
larger political goal. The major assets of a purposive white setting are the affluence and 
racial advantages of its leadership and members. CISPES was not merely “white,” but 
also college-educated. These ideas emerge through a qualitative method inspired by the 
historical recounts of Thompson (2016) and D’Emilio (1983). In my opinion, it is 
tautological to argue that white organizations produce white strategies and white 
discourses. To move forward, social movement theory and public relation should 
understand the formation of social movement organization as part of a historical 
continuum where race and other demographics are at the core. 
Likewise, the process of intersectional recruiting led me to observe the relevance 
of ideology in keeping CISPES alive despite its internal contradictions. CISPES’ goals 
consisted of two principles: CISPES wanted to end U.S. intervention in El Salvador and 
CISPES support revolutionary movements in El Salvador. Any conflict between internal 
factions was settled by returning to these two principles. These principles produced a 
profound contradiction. On the one hand, it encouraged a continuous dialogue with 
Salvadoran revolutionaries under the premise that U.S.-activists were to respond to the 
needs of the Salvadoran process. On the other, it confronted the rising of debates about 
sexual harassment, race, and homophobia inside the organization. When this ideology 
entered into crisis at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, the organization updated its 
ideology in order to align itself with new challenges created by a post-Cold War world 
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and a country with more people of color and a more open acceptance of gender diversity. 
The crisis in CISPES coincides with the emergence of intersectional vocabulary in U.S. 
academia and activism (Crenshaw, 1989). CISPES’s emphasis on stopping the 
intervention over solving internal intersectional conflict shows the theoretical limits of its 
political praxis.   
I argue that the vision of U.S.-activists in CISPES was shaped by race and their 
ideological view of geopolitics. Here there is dialectic: racialization becomes political 
ideology, and political ideology becomes a racial perception. People’s ideological 
identity matter in how one understands racism and its origins. Slobodian (2015) shows 
that the East Germany communist regime delineated race through the principle of 
“socialist chromatism” that “relied on skin color and other markers of phenotypic 
difference to create (overtly) neat divisions between social groups within a technically 
nonhierarchical logic of race” (p.24). Slobodian connects the vision of the State in 
communist countries with the management of racial dynamics by the communist states: 
“Socialist chromatism in East Germany was an outward extrapolation of a model that was 
originally an imperial, and later Soviet model of representing multiethnic territory under 
a single administration” (p.30). Slobodian reminds us of the difficulty of isolating “racial 
thinking” from “geopolitical thinking” and political ideology. CISPES reveals that the 
connections between anti-imperialistic ideology and anti-racist praxis occurred through 
the activists’ participation in many causes ranging from anti-apartheid platforms to 
workers-rights organizations.  While liberals in the 1960s and 1970s saw racism as a 
phenomenon that needs to be fixed within the limits of a capitalistic society, radicals 
understood racism as one of the many failures of the capitalistic society (Hobson, 2016). 
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As I have exposed before, CISPES discourses and interviews reveal deep links between 
geopolitical perceptions, racial views, and political ideology (Figure 14). Research on 
postcolonial theory have reiterated that race was a category cultivated by Western 
colonizers in the Third World (Hall, 1996; Fanon, 2008; Gilroy, 1993 Mohanty, 1991, 
Said, 1978;Wekker, 2016). In other words - using Omi and Winan’s (1994) terminology - 
race is a political project that is shaped by people’s views about how society and the 
world should work. With this in mind, I am not suggesting that there are no 
commonalities in the formation of identities that can connect white nationalists and white 
anti-racist activists through a common “hegemonic whiteness” (Hughey, 2010, p.1289). I 
am arguing that geopolitical views and political ideology significantly influence people’s 
perception of race and vice versa (Figure 14). 
Figure	14:	Relations	between	views	of	race,	ideology,	and	geopolitics		
 
 
The six levels of ideological identity model of public relations (the 
organization, the ideology of the organization, the demography, organizational routines, 
national social system and international social system) probe that national and 
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international structural factors constrain public relation praxis. It is impossible to discuss 
the lack of diversity in public relations and not debate about the social conditions that 
perpetuate a profession with a strong penchant toward recruiting white upper-middle 
class practitioners in the U.S. (Edwards, 2013; Logan, 2011; Pompper, 2005). The model 
understands organizations as international actors and suggests that the difference between 
domestic and international public relations is as ideological as it is methodological. 
Postcolonial public relations (Dutta, 2015, Munshi & Kurian, 2015; Curtin & Gaither, 
2005; Molleda et al, 2017) show that organizations ranging from corporations to social 
movements rely on networks that sometimes extend beyond the border of nation-states. 
The ideological identity model of public relations is a historically based 
explanation that stresses the need of combining methodologies used in history such as 
document analysis with sociological tools such as qualitative interviews. A historically 
based explanation understands CISPES as a moving phenomenon and not as a fixed 
reality. Public relations scholarship is inclined to divide its research into snapshots of an 
organizational phenomenon (e.g., Grunig & Huang, 2000) or historical accounts of the 
past (e.g., Murphree, 2004; Munshi et al., 2017). Historical methodologies have the 
ability to explain the present because organizations, along with other social issues, are not 
objects but processes. By explaining these “processes,” we can understand the journey of 
organizations to become something depending on their social conditions. Becoming an 
organization is a never-ending struggle between what the organization wants to be and 
what the context allows it to be. In this dialectic process, power is central because it 
opens or closes possibilities to modify social phenomena such as the formation of public 
opinion and policy-making.  
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Ewen (1996) describes how public relations in the U.S. emerged as a corporate 
response to progressive populism and muckraking journalism. Later, President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt used public relations as a tool to bash corporations opposing the New 
Deal. In other words, public relations born as a power-grabbing strategy, led by a white 
elite, that had the goal to alter the political balance in U.S. society. In the ideological 
identity model of public relations, organizations are subject to national and 
international forces and they possess a limited ability to transform those forces. In the 
struggle to transform U.S. society, organizations such as CISPES used race and class 
markers as resources in attempting to contain Reagan’s anti-communist agenda. 
Paradoxically, by relying on whiteness and the educational background of its members, 
CISPES reified the power that it despised. This is not because CISPES’ activists were not 
committed allies. Rather, the use of whiteness and college education occurred because 
they were convenient avenues to challenge Reagan; these were unconscious recruiting 
behaviors and an aspiration held by Salvadoran radicals.   
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
The central finding in this dissertation is the process of intersectional recruiting. 
As I have discussed, this model reveals a pattern of political mobilization in CISPES in 
which a privileged population -white and college-educated- negotiated a collective 
identity with members of a vulnerable population –Salvadoran refugees. This type of 
organization can be called white purposive settings and their goal is to use the activists’ 
privilege to influence policymaking on behalf of a weaker group. As a white purposive 
setting, CISPES entered in crisis due to transformations in the demographic makeup of 
the organization, the emergence of a feminist agenda, the growth of Latinx populations in 
U.S., peace talks between the Salvadoran government and FMLN, the end of the Cold 
War and change in the geopolitical priorities of the U.S. government. 
    The second relevant finding is to propose an ideological identity model of 
public relations with six concentric levels (the organization, the ideology of the 
organization, the demography, organizational-PR routines, national social system and 
international social system). This model proves that ideology and demography are the 
core elements in the formation of collective identities and public relations strategies. In 
the case of CISPES, the organization had a “decentralized-centralized” public relations 
approach in which the strategy was developed by the headquarters in Washington D.C. –
with inputs from the local chapters- and the execution relied heavily on the creativity of 
the local and regional chapters. CISPES’ public relations strategies reveal that they were 
designed to match the skills and resources of its white college-educated membership. 
Likewise, the ideological identity model of public relations stresses that all 
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organizations are influenced in different degrees by the national and international social 
system that surrounds them.  
The events analyzed in this dissertation occurred in the context of the Salvadoran 
civil war in which the U.S. government supported military and political efforts of the 
Salvadoran government against the leftist insurgency of the Farabundo Marti National 
Liberation Front (FMLN). This occurred when there was a resurgence of a Third World 
Left perspective in the minds of U.S. radicals. In the 1980s, CISPES was embedded in a 
context in which a combination of anti-racist and anti-imperialist discourses helped build 
solidarity in favor of the Salvadoran people and the FMLN. This situation is different 
today when the struggle for racial equality and anti-imperialistic agenda appears to run in 
parallel dimensions with few intersections. While in the 1980s, the anti-racist struggle 
had anti-imperialistic undertones (i.e., Black Power, Chicano movement); today, race is 
circumscribed as a domestic issue that only can be fixed through the burgeoning of 
diversity efforts in public and private institutions. A similar phenomenon can be seen in 
the discussions on Central America in the U.S., especially about El Salvador. For most of 
the liberal establishment, the only viable approach to solve social inequality, gender 
violence and homophobia seems to be supporting intergovernmental organizations such 
as the United Nations, funding local NGOs and shaping the U.S. economic assistance 
policy. The idea that the best way to help Salvadorans and Central Americans was to 
support local radical organizations that will achieve profound transformation is gone. The 
weakness of an anti-imperialistic agenda in the U.S. and the growth in numbers and 
educational achievements of Latinx communities makes it less likely to replicate 
CISPES’ model today. Latinx populations have more political power now than in the 
  
 
187 
1980s, and the intermediation of whites seems less appropriate than before. 
However, there are lessons from CISPES that are still relevant today. CISPES 
shows us that geopolitical views and political ideologies heavily influence race 
perceptions in collective mobilization. People do not only “see” race, but their views of 
racial hierarchies implies a vision of how the world should be structured (e.g. U.S. as a 
leader or as a follower) and the type of society that must be pursued (e.g., the community 
at the center or the individual). Racial political projects are also ideological and 
geopolitical. The idea of race as a domestic category is reified by a trend in social science 
that locates race analysis within the boundaries of nation-states, especially in the U.S. and 
western countries. We need to bring to the examination of radical public relations a 
vision of race that is transnational and flexible. The formation of race and the status that 
race may provide can change when the subject crosses borders (i.e. a “white” middle 
class educated Salvadoran could easily become racialized as an undocumented brown or 
person of color immigrant in the U.S. context). For decades, the humanities have 
published groundbreaking works on the connections of race, postcolonialism and 
decoloniality.  Social science approaches need to explore them and use them in their 
effort to build sociological views of local and transnational activism. 
CISPES’ case also sheds light on how undocumented activists engage in a 
relationship with individuals with more economic and cultural capital. In CISPES’ case, 
white activists were able to play the role of leaders and followers at the same time. The 
same happened to Salvadoran refugees who were aware of their limits in influencing U.S. 
audiences. With this antecedent, future research should explore what the racial dynamics 
in the DREAMERS movements are. How do they interact with white upper-middle-class 
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activists? What are the boundaries of that relationship? The examination of the 
DREAMERS can reveal new facets of the complex nature of inter-racial activism. Can 
people detach themselves from their social conditions when they are resisting a greater 
power? No, but they can start the journey to become “something” in alliance with like-
minded individuals. Political mobilization is not for puritanical minds, but for pragmatic 
activists who can understand their contradictions. 
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APPENDIX A 
ABBREVIATED REFERENCES OF PRIMARY DOCUMENTS  
 
Undated 
CISPES Madison (undated). El Salvador update review. 
 
1977 
Committee for a Free Chile (1977). Wanted for murder General Pinochet. 
  
1980 
CISPES D.C. (1980). El Salvador: A people in struggle. 
CISPES D.C. (1980). U.S. military involvement in El Salvador 1947-1980. 
 
1981 
Carp (1981). U.S. policy Challenge in El Salvador. 
CISPES Boston (1981). Resolution of the Boston labor conference against the U.S. 
intervention in El Salvador.  
CISPES Boston (1981). Press statement of Boston labor leader in U.S. intervention in El 
Salvador. 
CISPES Chicago (1981). Letter for a dinner to discuss crucial issues for American 
workers behind the crisis in the Central American country of El Salvador. 
CISPES Madison (1981, December 16). Letter to support people’s book. 
CISPES Seattle Labor Task  (April 25, 1981). Invitation to union to take a strong stand 
against U.S. intervention in El Salvador. 
El Salvador Alert (June 1, 1981). One hundred thousand voices. 
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1984 
CISPES South East Regional Office (1984). Fourth quarter SE regional report. 
Medical Aid for El Salvador (August, 27, 1984). Report on El Salvador bombings. 
 
1985 
CISPES D.C. (April 17, 1985). Urgent letter about 1986-87 foreign Aid Authorizations 
bill (Central America aid).  
CISPES D.C. (June 6, 1985). Letter about Q86-8T foreign aid authorizations Bill (HR 
1555). 
CISPES Midwest Regional Office (September 21, 1985). Letter about the recent 
shipment of twelve additional attack helicopters to the Salvadoran Air Force. 
CISPES Northwest Regional Office (October 1, 1985). Letter for up the campaign to 
Stop the Bombing. 
CISPES Midwest Regional Office(October 20, 1985). Midwest CISPES regional 
conference Update.  
CISPES Midwest Regional Office (October 24, 1985). A call to participate in the 1986 
National Coordinators Conference. 
 
1986 
CISPES D.C. (1986) Report of delegation of U.S. citizens for peace a friendship with El 
Salvador. 
CISPES D.C. (1986). Strategy for the 1986-1987 foreign aid authorization.  
CISPES Chicago (1986). Chicago Alert. 
CISPES Midwest Regional Office (1986) 6th annual Midwest CISPES conference. 
CISPES Midwest Regional Office (1986) CISPES Midwest Regional Report. 
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CISPES New York (1986). El Salvador, six years of struggle. 
CISPES Southwest Regional Office (February 14, 1986). Summary of response to 
Guazapa offensive. 
CISPES D.C. (June 6, 1986). Human rights attacks update. 
CISPES D.C. (October 15, 1986). Earthquake update. 
CISPES D.C. (October 20, 1986). Analysis of the current conjectures brought about and 
heightened by the earthquake. 
CISPES D.C. (October 20, 1986). Urgent action alert. 
CISPEs D.C. (October 20, 1986). Earthquake update. 
CISPES D.C. (October 24, 1986). Army offensive continue in aftermath of Salvadoran 
earthquake. 
CISPES D.C. (October 25, 1986). Letter informing fundraising of $30,000 as a response 
to the devastating earthquake. 
CISPES D.C. (November 6, 1986). Earthquake relief update. 
 
1987 
CISPES D.C. (1987). National Referendum to end the war in Central America. 
CISPES Chicago (1987). Transcription of presentation by Rep. Stephen Solarz. 
CISPES D.C. (January 8, 1987). Congress update. 
CISPES D.C.  (February 5, 1987). Call for the National Referendum to End the War in 
Central America. 
CISPES D.C. (February 12, 1987). Congressional update. 
CISPES D.C. (February 27, 1987). Congressional update. 
CISPES D.C. (March 25, 1987). Congressional update. 
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CISPES D.C. (March 13, 1987). Congressional update an timeline on Central America. 
 
1988 
Steps to Freedom (1988). Letter with information in last minute information on the 
October 17 Pentagon Action. 
Center for Constitutional Rights (March 10, 1988). Second round of FBI files raise new 
question of FBI misconduct in Central America probe. 
CISPES New Jersey (July 1, 1988). Fiesta de Solidaridad con El Salvador, the people 
will win.  
CISPES Midwest Regional Office (December 20, 1988) Letter about the 7th Annual 
Midwest CISPES Conference-E1 Salvador, on the threshold of victory. 
 
1990 
Center for Constitutional Rights (January, 1990). FBI field office files: New Haven. 
CISPES D.C. (October 23, 1990). The Senate vote on El Salvador. 
National Agenda for Peace in El Salvador. (June 5, 1990). Washington Update. 
CISPES D.C. (June 35, 1990). Update on Congress and Appropiation bill. 
CISPES D.C.  (Abril 4, 1990). Congressional action alert.  
CISPES D.C. (March, 27, 1990). Congressional floor votes on El Salvador likely soon. 
CISPES D.C. (March 22, 1990). Urgent action on El Salvador legislation. 
CISPES D.C. (March 22, 1990). Early vote on El Salvador likely in House. 
CISPES D.C. (February 9, 1990). Congressional update. 
CISPES Southwest Regional Office (April 7, 1990). Southwest region report. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
TIMELINE 
 
 
September 11, 1973: Coup d’état in Chile against the constitutional government of 
President Salvador Allende. 
November 7, 1973: Congress and Senate approve federal law War Power Resolution that 
controls the ability of the President to send troops to foreign wars. 
August 4, 1974: President Richard Nixon resigned. 
January 14, 1975: End of the House Un-American Activities Committee in the 
Congress.  
January 20, 1977: Inauguration of President Jimmy Carter 
July 17, 1979: Sandinistas entered Managua after months of struggle against the 
dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza. 
March 24, 1980: Archbishop of San Salvador Oscar Arnulfo Romero is killed while he 
was celebrating mass in San Salvador. 
October 10, 1981:  Birth of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) 
October 1980: Birth of CISPES as a network of a grassroots organization. 
December 2, 1980: Four Catholic nuns are raped and killed in El Salvador by the 
Salvadoran Army. 
December 12, 1980: The FMLN called for a democratic alliance, a foreign policy of 
non-alignment, and supports a democratic government that includes “business people.” 
January 3, 1981:  Two U.S. land reform consultants Michael Hammer and Mark 
Pearlman and the Director of the Salvadoran Land Reform Institute, Jose Rodolfo Viera 
are killed by death squads in San Salvador. 
January 10, 1981: First military offensive of the FMLN. 
January 20, 1981: Inauguration of President Ronald Reagan 
February 23, 1981: State Department published the white paper “Communist 
Interference in El Salvador.” The U.S. government “reveals” the contacts between the 
FMLN and governments of the socialist block.  
March 2, 1981: Reagan sent $20 million in military aid to El Salvador using his 
emergency power. 
March 24, 1981: The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations 
approves $5 million in military loans to El Salvador (8 votes in favor and seven against)  
May 3, 1981: At least 20,000 demonstrators marched on the Pentagon to protest the 
United States military assistance to El Salvador 
April 1, 1981: the U.S. stops economic assistance to Nicaragua. President Reagan 
promises to restart it if Nicaragua halts their support of the FMLN. 
May 3, 1981: CISPES march to the Pentagon against U.S. aid to El Salvador.  
August 12, 1981: U.S. Assistant Secretary of Inter American Affairs, Thomas Enders, 
met with the Nicaraguan government and reaffirmed Reagan’s opposition to Sandinista 
support to FMLN) 
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August 28, 1981: The governments of France and Mexico recognize the FMLN as a 
“representative political force.”   
December 11, 1981: The Salvadoran army killed hundreds of civilians during what it has 
been called the Mozote Massacre that occurred in the department of Morazán. 
December 9, 1981: The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 
1981 (H.R.3566 ) requires that the President certifies the Speaker of the House of 
Representative and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that El Salvador’s 
Government is not violating human rights. If the certification is not made, the military aid 
can be halted. 
January 28, 1982: The New York Times report for the first time the Mozote Massacre 
and at the same time, President Reagan certified to the U.S. Congress that the 
government of El Salvador had fulfilled the condition to receive more military assistance. 
December 14, 1982: The House approves $81.3 million in U.S. military aid to El 
Salvador for the fiscal year of 1983. 
November 2, 1982: the people of Multnomah County, Oregon, voted 134,859 "yes" and 
44,663 "no" to approve an initiative calling on the federal government to end all military 
aid to the government of El Salvador and to withdraw all military personnel from that 
country. 
December 19, 1982: Senate approves $81.3 million in U.S. military aid. 
September 30, 1983: House votes bill HR 4042 which ban on military aid to El Salvador 
if the president does not certify the Congress on improvement on human rights. 
Sponsored by Rep. Michael Barnes (MD) (8th district) Takoma Park, CISPES. 
November 8, 1983: the people of San Francisco voted in favor of Proposition N, which 
call the federal government to “end all military aid to El Salvador and withdraw of 
military personnel from El Salvador.” 
November 17, 1983: Senate voted in favor of HR 4042 with no changes  
November 30, 1983:  Reagan vetoed a bill (HR 4042), which would have prohibited 
military aid to El Salvador unless he certified to Congress every six months that of 
progress on human rights in El Salvador.  
May 9 1984: The Studds amendment, which would have ended U.S. military aid to El 
Salvador, was defeated by a 2-to-l margin in the House. Republican version was adopted, 
and this did not need human right certification. 
June 1985: first CISPES convention and the organization is transformed from a coalition 
of grassroots organization to a unified organization. 
February 19, 1986: Reagan says that a Nicaraguan public relations campaign to 
influence U.S. public opinion is “a campaign of lies.”  
March 27, 1986: Republican-controlled Senate narrowly approves $100 million for 
Contras (53-47). Among the Democratic Senators who supported was Bill Bradley (New 
Jersey).  
August 13, 1986:  Congress approved a $100 million packages to fund contras in 
Nicaragua. 
January 23, 1988: Concert “Blues for Salvador” organized by New El Salvador Today 
(NEST) in Oakland California. Carlos Santana, Jerry Garcia, and Bonnie Ratt played it 
the event. 
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June 1, 1989: The newly elected President of El Salvador, Alfredo Cristiani, started his 
five-year tenure as head of state. Cristiani belongs to the right-wing party Republican 
National Alliance (ARENA). 
November 11, 1989: FMLN launches its final offensive. 
November 16, 1989: Four Catholic priests and two Salvadoran women are killed by the 
Army. 
February 27, 1990: FSLN lost elections in Nicaragua. 
October 19, 1990: The Senate voted 74-25 to withhold 50% of U.S. military aid to the El 
Salvador government. 
January 12, 1992: The Salvadoran government and the FMLN signed a peace agreement 
at the Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City. 
 
Sources: CQ Press Library (http://library.cqpress.com), The New York Times, The 
Washington Post and Los Angeles Times. Bibliography: LeoGrande, W. M. (1998). Our 
Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992. Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press. Grandin, G. (2006). Empire's workshop: Latin 
America, the United States, and the rise of the new imperialism. New York City: 
Metropolitan Books. 
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APPENDIX  C 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
BPR    Bloque Popular Revolucionario 
   Popular Revolutionary Block 
 
CISPES  Committe in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador 
 
FDR   Frente Democrático Revolucionario 
   Democratic Revolutionary Front  
 
FMLN   Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional 
   Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 
 
FSLN   Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional    
Sandinista National Liberation Front 
 
FPL   Fuerzas Populares de Liberación 
   Popular Forces of Liberation 
 
NOMA:  Non-Aligned Movement  
 
UR-19   Universitario Revolucionarios 19 de Julio 
   Revolutionary Students 19th July 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
BRIEF HISTORY OF REVOLUTIONARIES 
 
BPR:  the Popular Revolutionary Block (BPR) was the FPL ’s mass organization. It was 
created in 1975 and coordinated the union and peasant organization associated with the 
FPL. 
 
FDR: In April 1980, a coalition of Social Christian and Social Democratic parties 
formed the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR). On November 27, 1980, a 
paramilitary group killed six members of the FDR leadership. Later that year, the FDR 
formed an Alliance with the FMLN and became the political wing of the Salvadoran 
guerrilla.  In 1988, the FDR transformed itself into the political party Democratic 
Convergence (CD) and participated in the legislative elections in that year. 
 
FMLN: the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) was founded in October 
1980 as a coalition of five insurgent groups: Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS), Popular 
Forces of Liberation (FPL), the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), the National 
Resistance (RN), and the Revolutionary Party of the Central American Workers (PRTC). 
In January 1992, the FMLN and the Salvadoran government signed in Mexico City a 
peace agreement that ended a 12-year civil war. On September 1st, 1992, the FMLN 
became a political party and in 1994 participated in its first elections. In June 1995, the 
FMLN dissolved the structures of the five organizations and became a unified party.  
 
FPL:  In 1972, teachers and former members of the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS) 
founded the Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL).  In 1979, the FPL joined forces with the 
PC and RN to create the Unified Revolutionary Directory (DRU), which was the 
antecedent of what later became the FMLN. 
 
UR 19: the Revolutionary Students 19th July (UR-19) was a college activist organization 
with ties with the BPR and the FPL. The organization’s name commemorated the date in 
which the army intervened at the University of El Salvador and took away the 
university’s autonomy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
198 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E 
 
RECRUITMENT EMAIL SCRIPT Hello,	I	appreciate	your	interest	in	answering	some	questions.	I	am	a	Ph.D.	candidate	in	the	School	of	Journalism	and	Communication	at	the	University	of	Oregon,	so	this	project	will	be	a	part	of	my	doctoral	dissertation.	I	am	doing	research	on	the	perspective	of	former	CISPES	activists	about	CISPES	political	communication	strategies	and	tactics	between	1981-1991.	I	am	interested	in	interviewing	you	because	you	were	part	of	the	organization	and	worked	actively	in	the	design	and	implementation	of	campaigns.	Additionally,	this	research	seeks	to	have	your	perspective	of	the	changing	demography	in	he	U.S.	between	1981-1991	and	its	impact	in	CISPES’	political	work.	If	you	agree	to	participate	in	this	study,	first	you	will	be	asked	to	engage	in	an	in-person	interview	or	a	phone/Skype	interview	(your	preference)	that	will	be	audio	recorded	at	the	location	of	your	choice.	If	you	decline	to	be	audio	recorded,	you	may	choose	to	participate	using	a	“notes	only”	option	in	which	I	will	simply	take	handwritten	notes	while	you	speak.	Either	way,	this	interview	will	last	for	about	40	minutes	and	will	include	various	questions	regarding	your	experiences	as	CISPES	activists.	After	that,	you	will	be	asked	to	complete	a	survey	in	which	you	will	provide	us	confidential	information	about	your	age,	racial	background,	yearly	income,	level	of	education,	marital	status	and	place	of	residence	and	birth.	Your	participation	in	this	study	is	completely	voluntary.	If	you	choose	not	to	participate	or	withdraw	from	the	study	at	any	time	there	will	be	no	penalty.	With	all	this	in	mind,	would	you	be	willing	to	participate	in	this	in	this	research?	If	so,	would	you	prefer	to	meet	in-person	or	speak	via	phone?	If	not,	thank	you	very	much	for	your	time	and	consideration!	Best,	Ricardo	Valencia	PhD	Candidate	School	of	Journalism	and	Communication	University	of	Oregon	
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APPENDIX  F 
 
 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Interview Protocol 
Semi-structured interview 
CISPES 
 
Background 
Could you tell me more about your background? How would you describe yourself racially or 
ethnically? 
What was the occupation of your parents? 
Where did you study your college? 
When did you realize for the first time you were white? When did you realize for the first 
time your social class and gender? 
Do you speak Spanish? 
 
Enrolling in CISPES 
When was the first time you were involved in activism? 
How would you define yourself politically in your time you were involved in CISPES? 
Could you describe me the time you decided to join CISPES? 
I would like to know more about your relationship with CISPES 
How long were involved with CISPES? Where? 
How did you get involved with CISPES? How and who recruits you? 
Why did CISPES? Why El Salvador? 
How would you describe CISPES’ ideology? 
Who were you close friends in CISPES? Could you tell me their backgrounds? 
What were the long-term plans of CISPES? Medium-term? Short-term? 
 
CISPES STRATEGIES 
What did you do during your time in CISPES? Staff or volunteer? 
How did you plan the demonstrations? 
How did you define the objectives? 
How did CISPES assign the roles of communicating with external and internal audiences? 
Who were your imagined external audiences? And potential recruiters? 
How did you select the politicians you wanted to influence? 
Who were the key politicians you wanted to influence? 
How did you relate with the media? 
Does speaking Spanish help your work? 
How did your skills help you in your job to influence U.S. policy toward El Salvador? 
Do you think that the fact that you were white (Latino) was an advantage or disadvantage for 
you? How did you see that your racial or ethnic background was disadvantage or advantage? 
How often did you bring people connected to the FMLN to talk to your activists? Why? How 
was the process? 
How did you communicate with each other if you feel you were under surveillance? 
How did you define the campaigns you worked with? 
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Members of CISPES were creating other organizations. Why? 
 
How were the organizations you worked with the best? Why did you choose them? 
How were your relationships with Salvadoran nationals? 
CISPES MESSAGES 
How did you define the type of message you will use? 
What was the relevance of Vietnam as part of the message? 
How did you try to frame the FMLN? 
How did you react to Reagan’s association of the FMLN with communism, Cuba and the 
Soviets? 
What was the difference between the discourse for the outside audience and the one you used 
for your activists and supporters? 
What was the idea of the Salvadoran people you wanted to challenge? How did you do it? 
Tell more about your work translating Venceremos, the FMLN’s newspaper? 
 
Historical Moment 
Could you tell me what were the political defining moments your tenure in CISPES? 
Do you remember a big debate about CISPES strategies and tactics? Any contention? 
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